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Preface 
For one reason or the other, I had always come back to street vending as a subject 
of research during my academic career. This dissertation project builds upon the findings 
of previous research I undertook as an undergraduate and graduate student, but more 
importantly connects me with a life experience.  
Officially, my interest in street vending started with my bachelor thesis in which I 
explored ethnographically social capital among street vendors in Independencia, a district 
of the Northern Cone of Lima. In this experience, a common spatial pattern was that 
neighbors from poorest neighborhoods mobilized as vendors to central and better-off 
settlements relatively close to their residential areas. Access to public space was not 
guaranteed just by occupancy; rather, vendors relied on kinship and neighborhood 
linkages to individually or collectively take up streets. I believed that in lower impact 
locations (that is those with little agglomeration of vendors, using common areas rather 
than high traffic avenues) in which social networks were stronger- given that most 
relationships were multilayered as customers, co-workers, family, neighbors and friends, 
street vendors will be more likely to stay. Nonetheless, I also pointed out that one of the 
weaknesses of the configuration of their economic and political networks were their 
closure to a neighborhood setting or the lack of flexible ties. For instance, politically, 
they counted in their local leader but the lack of awareness of other districts or zones 
connections limited them to develop joint strategies.  
After two years, I visited again the site of my research on a Saturday that felt like 
a Tuesday due to the low flow of customers. I was surprised that a supermarket, located 
in an unpopulated area of the district, altered completely the social dynamics in street 
markets. My ‘star’ street market that I always swore would never be removed due their 
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strong leaders, community ties and habits of cleaning the streets, was now located in the 
garage they used to store their stalls. Local authorities in the district successfully moved 
vendors away even in places where neighbors did not claim public space. Neighbors 
showed proudly their supermarket labeled plastic bags. They still were close to street 
vendors but believed that they were better off in a roofed market. My vendor’s friends 
complained that they are receiving less profits and that they are actually spending more to 
maintain their roofed place. “Here it is always as a Tuesday”, I was told several times 
during that day. 
Exploring other cities in Latin America, I witnessed similar processes affecting 
even regulated forms of street trade. In my master’s thesis, I found that location decisions 
of local authorities on street markets were following patterns of residential segregation in 
Santiago de Chile. In a regularized context, the capacity to control access to street 
markets was subject to location decisions that municipalities undertake. But despite the 
claim of policy makers to use urbanistic criteria to reduce the negative impact of the 
economic use of public space, I found that many of their decision making had many 
unintended effects. Allocation of street markets was segmenting the consumer’s market 
by placing them in heterogeneous but lower socioeconomic status residential areas, 
increasing their stigmatization and their possibilities of effective control. Unlicensed 
vendors were responsive to the socioeconomic composition of a neighborhood and its 
distance to supermarkets, being more visible and numerous when segregation was high 
and supermarkets were farther. These two pieces of evidence contribute to my 
questioning of the dynamics of the informal sector at the face of urban structure and 
policy related changes. 
Unofficially, however, this dissertation started some day in April when I was six 
years old. At school, the teacher called me to discuss my homework. I was supposed to 
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fold and cut rectangles in even proportions to represent fractions but my cutting skills 
were a little disappointing. She asked why my mom did not help me with my homework. 
“She works” I replied. But she insisted, “What does she do that she cannot sit with you a 
couple of hours?” and I responded, “She works as a street vendor, she sells underwear, 
soaps, and other things and when she gets back home, all she does is washing and 
washing clothes”, smiling she stopped me and in a very sweet tone asked me to lower my 
voice. Later I learned that saying that one of your parents is a street vendor was not a nice 
thing to say at an all-girl private school of a middle class district. My dad had a 
professional degree and was employed and my mom had higher education too. My naïve 
comment just gave away the fact that my family was struggling, and even if many 
families were at that time, it was not supposed to be obvious.  
My brothers were more aware of those unspoken rules. My oldest brother used to 
ask my mom not to come to pick him up with her boxes. But those requests never went 
through to my mom. When teenagers, despite the fact that she stopped working at the 
streets for a long time and we were better off due to my dad’s promotion, she challenged 
my brothers and me to be street vendors ourselves to earn our Christmas gift. She 
installed us in front of an aunt shoe-store to sell toys. My brothers would abandon the 
stall every time a pretty girl or an acquaintance approached. But I stayed and even called 
acquaintances to buy from us- with the disapproval of my brothers of course! Anyhow, 
we managed to sell everything and bought the bike of ‘our’ choice. Ironically my 
brothers picked the one that was too tall for me to ride. I never complained about this 
unpaid gift to my mom, perhaps because in some way I always knew I will come back to 
this experience. My mom always says “working is never a shame” and “chamba es 
chamba” [“work is work”, a colloquial way to say in Peru that you just need to do what 
helps you to afford a living] and these lessons resonate to me as a scholar. I believe it is 
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important to look carefully and deep on to the categories we use to describe work as well 
as classify and represent occupations. Here, as sociologist, I try to be up to the task to 
‘reveal’ the ideologies and consequences behind these schemes used in our common 
understandings, but most importantly, those used in policymaking towards jobs usually 
perform by the urban poor. 
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In addition to labor market factors, the informal economy in Latin America is 
explained as a product of a weak state capacity to enforce regulation and a networked and 
resourceful community that enables self-sustained economic activities. Theoretically, 
informal self-employment flourishes where these conditions prevail. However, as urban 
renewal advances and business chains expand thorough the city, street trade, one of the 
most typical informal occupations is persecuted more aggressively, questioning its 
legitimacy as a spatial practice and source of employment for the urban poor. This 
dissertation examines the changes in the conception of street trade as a subject of policy, 
by analyzing closely how current transformations in the urban structure, ideologies of 
urban development and planning have impacted in the way policy makers intervene in 
public space and have redefined practices of street trade. It compares the cities of Bogotá 
and Lima, contributing respectively, to the understanding of progressive and neoliberal 
styles of urban planning. Using a mixed methods research design, it articulates citywide 
 xiii
trends with local conditions and individual experiences, following three stages of 
analysis: (1) A comparative policy analysis based on a descriptive analysis of its 
evolution across scales and a spatial analysis of the local variability of enforcement 
patterns, identifying not only vendors’ agglomeration factors but also where enforcement 
matches the expansion of large retailers; (2) a comparative analysis based on public 
officials interviews of current rationales behind placemaking strategies at the city and 
local level; and (3) a comparative analysis of street vendors spatial practices as well as 
economic and political choices given the different city policy frameworks and their 
exposure to distinctive enforcement patterns as identified in the spatial analysis. The 
findings of this study provide a baseline for further theorization of the role of spatial 
dimension as it relates to the informal sector. The systematic comprehension of the 
relationship between city regulation of space and its actual use aims to contribute to a 
more integrative approach to policy making seeking to ensure that regulation and 
commercial growth complement and do not burden opportunities for self-employment 
among the urban poor. 
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Chapter 1: About the study 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The informal economy1 contains a wide range of economic activities and occupations that 
produce or distribute licit products and services but do not comply or are protected by existent 
regulation (Castells &Portes 1989; Feige 1990). In Latin America, almost one half of the urban 
working population is either employed or self-employed within this sector (Perry, Maloney, 
Arias, Fajnzylber, Mason, and Saavedra-Chanduvi 2007; Tokman 2007b), which not only rise 
issues on the adequacy of economic regulation and labor protection, but also concerns related to 
city authorities’ duty to regulate urban space. For instance, in South America, it has been 
estimated that almost three-quarters of these economic activities take place at streets or in 
entrepreneurs’ or clients’ houses (OIT 2004). While the fact that the informal economy 
constitutes a structural component of labor markets and urban landscapes is widely known, the 
transition towards a free market has posed major changes in the conceptualization of the informal 
economy as a subject of policy as well as a spatial practice.  
During the previous model of Industrialization by Import Substitution (ISI), cities faced 
population growth with an important share due to rural-urban migration. While many migrants 
made a living in the city by entering the growing industrial sector, many others developed 
income generating activities as an alternative to wage employment, providing low cost services 
and products to the working population. In this context, wage labor was entitled with the ‘full’ 
protection package that set the distinction between formal and informal sectors of the economy. 
At the State level, the bet for the modernization through industrial growth was believed to 
generate conditions to incorporate the informal sector. However, within large cities, a growing 
population put upward pressure on land being compelled to create their own housing solutions 
                                                 
1Thorough this dissertation, the use of informal economy is to call attention to wider academic research that have 
focused on issues about political economy, urban poverty as well as rationality and regulation within neo-
institutional approaches. For operational issues, I reserve the use of informal sector to refer to the low productivity 
sector of the economy, as commonly described in the accounts made by international agencies. Both concepts are 
analytically not the same but are interrelated as they aim to describe those economic activities in the lower spectrum 
of the division of labor. 
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through land squatting at the periphery of these cities and to create their own jobs increasing the 
number of people employed in the informal sector. Given the urgency of social problems, city 
governments, then politically dependent to national politics, were somehow tolerant towards 
several manifestations of the informal economy in urban space.  
Current changes, brought directly or indirectly by larger forces of globalization, have not 
only challenged the conceptualization of the informal economy but actually the way certain 
occupations among this sector can be targeted by policymaking. Nowadays, with privatization of 
public owned enterprises, the flexibilization of labor regulation and the reduction of trade 
barriers the distinction between formal and informal employment has blurred. Unprotected labor 
can be either found within large and small scale enterprises, and subcontracting practices have 
widespread heterogeneous forms of self-employment  
Territorially, economic restructuring have also altered national urban systems not only 
between but also within cities. Many capital cities across the region show a decrease in internal 
migration rates, with urban growth more prominent between intermediate cities (Roberts 2004). 
Political and administrative decentralization have increased the autonomy of city governments 
and gave them a proactive role to promote local economic development. Within main cities, 
massive efforts have been undertaken to regulate informal settlements, increasing levels of 
housing consolidation and provision of services, portraying a less sharp spatial polarization than 
during ISI times. The emphasis on private investment through tourism and liberalization of trade 
barriers have contributed to an increased focus in urban renewal, and the expansion of malls, 
large retailers, and gated communities, changing the typical urban landscape. 
The increase in resources and accountability for local governments brought by 
decentralization permitted cities to target the informal sector more effectively than in the past. 
Paradoxically, as deregulation of labor intensifies pushing more people in relying on the informal 
sector, local policies have developed a clearer intent to persecute or regulate the informal 
enterprises or self-employed (Tokman 2005). As regulation could imply greater operation costs 
potentially burdensome to these economic units (Tokman 2001), many initiatives at the national 
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and local level are essayed to reduce cost and time to get a license, register for taxes and comply 
with labor regulations while increasing controls over these enterprises. Additionally, greater 
efforts in improving urban infrastructure have led to a stricter control towards urban space, 
particularly in touristic or commercially attractive urban areas. Thus, some occupations typically 
informal which are more visibly agglomerated such as street vending or home-based businesses 
are perceived as even more problematic to urban planners since they operate beyond what is 
defined as appropriate uses fir respectively public and private-residential-spaces. Consequently, 
street vendors are now being evicted or displaced in the historic centers where they once 
proliferated(Bromley and Mackie 2009; Chavez and De la Flor 1998; Cross and Morales 2007; 
Donovan 2002).A city and economic modernization urge to promote national and foreign private 
investment encompasses a policy package that encourages formal entrepreneurship, yet the 
success of these initiatives of incorporating the informal economy remains questionable.  
How do city governments justify their efforts in persecuting or controlling informal 
entrepreneurs despite the increasing need of poor residents to work and rely on these economic 
activities? What is the role in the representations of urban space in the conceptualization of 
specific occupational groups in the informal sector? What mechanisms prevent or enable 
informal entrepreneurs to circumvent those regulations? What difference does it make for them a 
more progressive city management in the implementation of those policies? Exploring how 
changes in the perception of urban space and structure have altered the conceptualization of 
informal economy as a subject of policy, this dissertation aims at answering these questions by 
focusing on an occupation that has been the typical portrayal of the informal economy: the street 
vendor. 
1.2 THE INFORMAL ECONOMY DEBATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS THEORETICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Since its appearance as a subject of debate in the sixties under ‘marginality’ research and 
a policy concern in the seventies, the informal economy has merited many studies and 
discussions among scholars and policymakers concerned with issues of economic growth and 
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urban poverty. More importantly, its understanding as a field of inquiry and policy making has 
been evolving thorough the changes in models of development in Latin America from the model 
of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) times (from 1970 to the mid 1980s), through the 
introduction of structural adjustment measure in the economy to the present on what can be 
labeled the Free Market economy. I describe these debates and highlight common 
understandings in policy-oriented and academic research in order to revisit the understandings on 
the socio political conditions that have traditionally been found to explain the emergence of the 
informal economy and may or may not apply to street trade. 
1.2.1 Changing development perspectives 
As a concept and a subject of policy concern, the informal sector was introduced by Keith 
Hart out of a series of studies on urban labor markets in Ghana. Hart (1973) postulated a dualist 
model by contrasting wage labor against income generating activities. Initially thought as a 
solution to the lack of employment opportunities, the International Labor Office (ILO) started to 
explore its potentiality to promote development and launched a series of comprehensive missions 
in many developing regions(Bangasserm 2000).With the aim to capture its heterogeneity, the 
ILO also operationalized the definition incorporating a wide range of economic activities, 
independent and dependent, with low levels of productivity and low capacity of accumulation 
(Tokman 1982).  
During the seventies until early in the eighties, within the context of the Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model, cities across Latin America faced rapid population 
growth, not only through natural population growth but more importantly from the rural-urban 
migration. Despite the accelerated growth strategies based on maximizing the Gross National 
Product (GNP), access to full employment was constrained. While unemployment did not rise as 
expected, forms of ‘disguised’ unemployment or underemployment proliferated. The main 
question regarding these activities labeled ‘informal sector’ comprised not only conceptual 
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definitions –which still face analytical challenges2– but more importantly, development 
perspectives to define its nature, reasons for its persistence and possibilities for autonomous 
economic growth.  
Two contrasting but structuralist views at this time dominated the debate in the region. In 
one hand, the ‘dualist’ perspective, led by the ILO’s Regional Employment Program for Latin 
America (PREALC)advocated for closer links between the informal and formal sector through 
subcontracting and credit (Klein and Tokman 1988). In the other, ‘the petty commodity 
production school’, influenced by Dependentist and neo-Marxist theorists, portrayed the links of 
the informal and formal sectors as exploitative and advocated for a increasing autonomy of petty 
commodity producers, cutting the links with large-scale capitalist enterprises (Moser 1978: 
1061). Despite difference in advocacy, both perspectives reaffirmed the importance of small-
scale enterprises for the expansion of large scale –national or international– enterprises, as well 
as the critical need to identify the social relations with accuracy for understanding the diversity 
of exploitation within the informal sector. 
Consequently, actions of the state were focused initially on promoting the growth of 
those medium or small enterprises that were closely connected to the areas of industrial growth. 
In other policy realms, such land occupation or survival strategies, the focus on building a 
welfare state based on the wage workers created a laissez-faire perspective towards the vast 
majority of the informal sector occupations (Fernández-Kelly 2006; Tokman 2001). 
Beginning in the 1980s to early in the nineties, issues tied to the worldwide recession and 
political restructuring, shifted the focus to a further conceptualization of the informal economy as 
an asset, leaving behind previous definitional issues (Peattie 1987). Emergent perspectives were 
brought by a wider number of actors, from international organizations to NGOs, concerned with 
                                                 
2 For instance, by definition, the informal sector or economy includes heterogeneous sets of activities and people 
without clearly identifiable or analytically useful common characteristics. The degrees from which such activities 
can be described as unregulated, unorganized or unprotected by the State are variable. Enterprises can be 
categorized rather as a continuum rather than a clear cut in terms of scale of operation, organizational form, mode of 
production and even degrees of compliance or protection. 
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the increasing poverty rates, giving the deep economic crisis(Rakowski 1994). For instance, 
PREALC studies, based mainly on sample surveys or economic censuses followed overtime 
concluded that the informal sector evolution did not show a counter-cyclical source of wealth 
and job creation. Its relative decline from 1950s to 1980s, was not large enough as 
expected(Portes 1985), and even in times of economic crisis, it failed to absorb completely 
declines in formal employment since the rates of open unemployment in urban areas also 
increased from 3.8% in 1970 to 11.1% in 1985 (PREALC 1987; Marshall1987). Moreover, the 
rapid industrial restructuring to less labor intensive modes of production shifted the informal 
sector towards service and commercial sectors. 
During this period, the debate also started to problematize the regulatory role of the State 
and its impact in general labor market trends. The previous structuralist approaches of the 
PREALC had not explicitly elaborated on the regulatory dimension, as the State during the ISI 
times, drew in practice a clear-cut line separating wage workers within public and large private 
enterprises as protected by labor law. An influential policy approach, labeled as ‘legalist’, 
proposed early in the 1980s, emphasized other aspects of informality highlighting its 
entrepreneurial character and the role of inadequate regulation that were at the heart of its 
marginalization (De Soto 1986). Using the terms informal sector and informal economy 
interchangeably, De Soto in his book The Other Path (1986) popularized its ‘extra-legality’ as a 
central feature of informality and located the cause of the problem in the state labeled as 
‘mercantilist’. With this diagnosis, De Soto proposed less State intervention to lower entry 
barriers. Deregulation and de-bureaucratization accompanied with access to credit will not only 
ease formalization among small-scale entrepreneurs but also unleash their potential for economic 
growth. This legalist approach was heavily criticized on analytical grounds in the eighties by 
scholars studying urban poverty. Its argument was deemed as an oversimplification of the 
conditions faced by developing countries and its description of the urban poverty as a peaceful 
revolution failed to account for the hardening experienced by survival strategies (Bromley 1990; 
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1994). However, the appeal of his arguments was very influential among policymakers and many 
policies following his propositions materialize in later decades. 
During the nineties, in a context of fiscal crisis and increasing debts, Latin American 
countries, started to apply structural adjustments proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. 
These measures included the privatization of state owned enterprises, deregulation of labor and 
legislation to ease international trade, which as a result weaken the role of the state on the 
mediation of capital and labor. More in line to a neoliberal perspective, the legalist approach 
popularized in policy making in the early nineties and expanded to dominate policymaking 
discussions towards poverty in the 2000s. De Soto in his book The Mystery of Capital (2000) 
advocated for a less prominent role for the state in the regulation of labor, access to land titles 
and the lowering of other regulatory costs for smaller firms in the belief that would lead to more 
dynamic markets articulating and expanding through private credit markets. His arguments 
oriented many policies of land titling in developing countries. Numerous empirical studies, 
however, showed that land titling did not produce the effects suggested (Bromley 2008; Calderón 
2004; Fernández 2002; Gilbert 2002; Ramirez and Riofrío 2005).  
The debate up-to-date has gone beyond on the issues of titling opening up discussions on 
the role of regulation in many other policy arenas. Two dominant international agencies namely 
the ILO and the World Bank, in later publications, emphasized the continuum character of the 
informal sector. In 1993, the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians introduced 
in the informal sector estimations as defining criteria not only the size of the economic unit, 
including self-employees, but also the registration in the tax system (The Fifteenth International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians January 1993). Since 2000s, many national institutes of 
statistics in the region started to revisit their employment surveys to distinguish informal 
employment (workers without social protection) from employment in the informal sector, and 
identify precarious workers who are unprotected within the formal sector.  
Nowadays, the role of regulation is perceived as central but different perspectives exist 
on the direction of that role. The ILO argued that the informal sector was composed by rather 
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‘grey’ areas of regulation and economic stratification (Tokman 2001) and have advocated for 
comprehensive regulations –“flexicurity”– only necessary where it can be beneficial in elevating 
the standards of labor for the workers (Tokman 2007a; Tokman 2008). From another standpoint, 
the World Bank emphasized the need to identify areas of social exclusion and evasion to 
intervene accurately. In terms of social protection, it promotes universal social protection but 
based on individual responsibility, with gradient compromises of state subsidies, as opposed to 
employer-based social security schemes, contributing further to deregulation of the labor force 
(Mason 2007; Perry et al. 2007). Likewise, policies towards micro-entrepreneurs are also 
encouraged and implemented by both agencies to decrease costs of registration as well as 
increase tax collection, business registration and promote access to credit and training. Certainly, 
the changes in models of development towards a Free Market economy merit a coming back to 
the essential question of how the informal sector as a subject of policy, a form of labor and as a 
social practice is produced, questions that the scholars on urban poverty have largely focused. 
1.2.2 Informality and urban poverty 
Academic research on the informal economy can be traced back on the debates on 
marginality in the 1960s to the current discussions of the so-called “new” poverty (Itzigsohn 
2000; Ward 2004a). The concept of marginality called the attention on the rapid urbanization and 
peripheralization of the urban poor in cities across the developing world. It accounted for not 
only economic but also cultural dimensions of the population subsisting outside the promises of 
wage employment. The initial debate, before the emergence of the informal sector as a subject of 
policy, was brought by the defendants of modernization (Germani 1968) and dependency 
theories (Cardoso and Falleto 1977; Nun 1969; Quijano 1966; 1973). These discussions 
contributed greatly to frame the initial policy-oriented discussions. 
Later research, in the seventies, proved that there were more economic and cultural 
linkages than sharp economic process of exclusion, which contributed to situate informality in 
wider spectrum of research inquiries. Many studies proved that there were many linkages 
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between informal and formal sectors of the economy (Oliveira 1972; Roberts 1978; Perlman 
1976) and discredited the premises of the “culture of poverty” (Lewis 1959; 1961; 
1966).Empirical studies showed that there was a not clear rationality in the expanding slums 
distinct from mainstream society (Perlman 1976; Portes 1972; Safa 1970). Instead of 
individualistic responses, they found that social mobility and survival was rather accomplished 
by social networks and self-organization (Lommitz 1977; Roberts 1973). The political discourses 
were neither radical nor anomic (Eckstein 1977; Moreno 1970; Ray 1969), but embedded in the 
structure of political clientelism (Cornelius 1975; Leeds 1972). These findings confirmed that 
rather than a problem, the survival responses which translated in informal work and land 
occupation were rather a solution (Mangin 1967; Turner 1969; Ward 1976). 
Scholars have often found the concept of the informal sector hopelessly imprecise and 
confusing (Breman 1976; Morales 2001; Moser 1978; Peattie 1987). On the one hand, the 
distinctions between sectors, did not allow accounting for their linkages. On the other, just the 
definition centered in the classification of units of production did not allow to incorporate social 
context variables that scholars of urban poverty have largely studied. Yet, the diversity of 
survival strategies among the urban poor posed many challenges to characterize and define.  
Given the turnaround of the debate in 1980s centered role of regulation and the State, 
many scholars started to analytically distinguish what economic activities comprised the 
informal economy. Feige (1990) proposed to disentangle the concept “underground economy” to 
account for its size in terms of income. The informal economy, then was defined by the amount 
of income generated by informal economic activities which entail “those economic activities that 
circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights incorporated in the laws and 
administrative rules covering property relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, torts, 
financial credit and social security systems” (1990:992). He distinguished between informal, 
unreported, unrecorded and illegal economic activity. These distinctions however show a 
considerable overlap, particularly between unreported and unrecorded, but contribute to the 
differentiation of informal and criminal. Additionally, a measurement focused on income using 
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at the base the tax registration and recording system posed major obstacles to be replicated in 
Latin American contexts.  
Castells &Portes (1989) clarified the definition, which is widely used by many social 
scientists. The basic distinction between formal, informal and criminal hinge on the character of 
the final product (licit or illicit) and the manner in which it is produced and exchanged (licit or 
illicit). Then, the informal economy produces and distributes licit products without the proper 
permissions and regulations established in the contexts of reference. This definition opened up 
empirical and comparative research, in regulatory terms as informal economic activities 
comprised those activities “unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated” (Castells and Portes 1989:12). Notice, 
however, that even within this definition the informal economy contains diverse activities that 
can contribute to survival, dependent exploitation and growth (Perez-Sainz 1995; Portes 1993; 
Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Portes and Itzigsohn 1997) and self-provisioning (Gershuny 
1985; Pahl and Wallace 1985), which could coexist in the same urban settings (Venkatesh 2006) 
or intentions of participants (Williams 2008; Williams, Nadin and Rodgers 2012; Williams and 
Round 2008; Williams and Round 2009). Using this definition, it could be argued that 
informality is in the ‘eye of the beholder’. The State by its categories of classification and 
intervention conditions the emergence of informality. 
In contrast with the diagnosis presented by De Soto, scholars coming from neo-Marxist 
structural perspectives locate the informal economy as an integral part of urban economies in 
peripheral and core capitalist societies. These scholars concur that the relationships between 
sectors is functional, and that peripheral informality contributes to the process of capital 
accumulation (Portes 1993; Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987). 
The analysis of the role of regulation, then, is rather manifested in a four paradoxes (Portes and 
Haller 2001):  
1. The paradox of embeddeness in which the more the informal economy resembles the 
true market the more it relies on social ties for its effective functioning,  
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2. The paradox of state control entails that more rules and regulation often expand the 
opportunities to avoid control 
3. The measurement paradox involves that the more efficient the record-keeping and 
credible the enforcement apparatus of the State, the greater the chance it will miss the 
actual extent of the informal economy.  
4. The ‘policy’ paradox refers to the fact that the informal economy commonly yields a 
series of positive effects for the state, which is charged with its suppression.  
Using the first two paradoxes, Portes and Haller (2001) identified two conditions for the 
emergence of informality illustrated in Figure 1.1. The first one was the scope of the regulatory 
intent and the capacity of the State to enforce it. Then, if regulation is minimal and the capacity 
of enforcement is also high, the informal economy may be small. Likewise, if the intent is large 
and the capacity of enforcement is low, the informal economy is greater in size. However, the 
condition of state control does not suffice. Portes and Haller (2001:742) identify as the basic 
paradox of the informal economy is that increased official regulation of economic activity may 
also expand opportunities for violation of the rules. Social networks have been acknowledged to 
reduce transaction cost, and combined with the degree of control of the State, networks can be 
shaped to permit not only basic transaction but also to guarantee secrecy and avoid state control . 
The greater the State control, a networked community may take the form of a widespread 
resistance, the lower, it may replace the state as the only regulatory means. Based on empirical 
studies, they found that networked societies instead of those socialized in individualistic forms of 
access to welfare are in better shape to activate latent sources of solidarity among the population 
to resist state control (Pahl and Wallace 1985; Roberts 1989; Roberts 1991).  
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Figure 1.1 State regulatory power and the extent of regulation 
 
Source: Portes & Haller 2001, pp. 742 
The last two paradoxes also refer to the nature of the State and its incentives and 
administrative resources to intervene in the informal economy. Based on the basic paradox, 
Portes and Centeno (2003) proposed the Frustated State Hypothesis for Latin America, as an 
heritage from the ISI model, a greater intent in a highly bureaucratic and sophisticated regulation 
for labor and enterprise, but with little enforcement capabilities.  
The transition to a neoliberal state, however, merits further revision of this proposition. 
Recent writings on the State for issues related to collective action and policymaking have been 
described either as ‘absent’, “state to the rescue” and ‘proactive’, which can render a rather 
different picture on the diversity of intents and enforcement capabilities (Roberts & Portes 2005). 
Decentralization has introduced even more complexity in the institutional and spatial structures 
by which a specific regulation is enforced by the State. The workings of the regulatory intent and 
level of enforcement rely on many actions such the passage of a legislation, the usually uneven 
enforcement capabilities of state dependencies, and the actions of agencies that even in a 
territorial state may have contradictory mandates (Fernández-Kelly 2006:3). 
In the Free Market context, changes in operational definitions, policy approaches and 
conceptual framing of urban poverty have also modified the emphasis towards the informal 


































citizenship and assets instead of survival strategies currently dominate academic research on 
urban poverty. As pointed out by Roberts (2004) , rather than merely intellectual fashion, these 
conceptual representations are also brought by larger contextual issues, e.g. constraints for 
upward mobility brought by the precariousness of formal employment (De la Rocha 2001) and 
the reframing of urban movements towards entitlements rather than classists discourses (Safa 
2004).Consequentially, these changes may substantially affect the content of the networked 
society, as the second condition identified in the emergence of informality in Latin America.  
Furthermore, not only the changes in the regulatory role of the State and the content of 
the networked society merit further attention in the Free Market context but also a silent –if not 
sufficiently explored issue: the spatial dimension (Fernández-Kelly 2006; Kudva 2005).  
The spatial dimension has been only partially addressed in terms of spatial hierarchies 
when related to informal labor. Some scholars have theorized around how the position of cities in 
the urban systems determines the extent of informality by the pull-push factor of internal and 
international migration. Sanders (1987) developed an initial attempt to analyze the distribution of 
informal economic activities within developing countries urban systems, expecting to find that 
informality increases with proximity to large urban centers and the expansion of formal 
enterprise. Sassen (1994) argued that global cities’ wealth increase the need for a large informal 
sector, as most of informal domestic work and even illegal immigrant labor demanded in New 
York City was due to the rise of high income class of residents. Despite the increasing trends in 
informalization of labor at the urban cores, the informal sector appears to be more prevalent in 
peripheral cities, either in the international or national urban systems.3 
Only rarely has research in Latin American cities attempted to analyze the ‘spatial 
mismatch’, which may also condition the structure of opportunities for the urban poor, and 
perhaps their reliance on informal work as a primary source of employment. For instance in an 
study of Mexico city, Villarreal and Hamilton (2005) found evidence that formal sources of 
                                                 
3For instance, Sanders’ results (1994) rendered a very divergent predicted pattern. In Peru and Venezuela, informal 
economic activity rose in medium and smaller size cities. 
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employment in manufacture were inaccessible in terms of transportation to the urban poor in this 
city. Also, in an earlier study of this city, Eckstein (1990) described how housing patterns of 
settlements offer residents alternative sources of employment. In contrast to what was thought at 
the time, the inner city slums appeared more attractive than those residential zones at the 
peripheries for providing better sources of employment through informal trade. In a revision of 
the urban outcasts within the developed and developing world, Auyero (2001) suggests that 
marginal neighborhoods are not static geographies; they differentiate greatly according to the 
intersection of the State, labor markets and place-specific dynamics that links them to the city 
hierarchy. Beyond the mere fact that every social practice is located somewhere, the exploration 
of the informal economy as a socio spatial phenomenon constitutes a vacuum in our knowledge 
since local levels, which are more politically relevant and economically complex, provide 
uneven incentives and costs to maintain informal economic activities within the city. 
The role of space in the inner workings of state intervention is also worth revisiting to 
account for the changes in intent and levels of enforcement; the first condition of informality. 
Some initial evidence has found the linkages between the representations of space and the 
boundaries drawn for intervention of the state in informal housing policy. Gilbert and Ward 
(1985) in a three city study on housing policies analyzed how patters of the provision of services 
reflected spatial hierarchies associated with the interests in place to promote economic growth. In 
most recent studies, Roy (2004) found that the unmapping of urban slums in Indian cities was 
systematically related to not legitimizing rights of ownership given prospective investment in 
other urban projects. In developed contexts, Ward (2004b) also found the omission of colonias in 
Texas mushrooming outside metropolitan areas in Texas, provided a rationale to keep investment 
and coverage of services away from those areas. While many of the case studies refer to issues of 
land markets, it is possible to extend those theorizations to the practice of regulating some local 
labor markets, prioritizing areas of control for the supervision of taxation or periodical controls 
over zoning and public space. 
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The spatial dimension remains also underexplored in many studies related to the capacity 
of self-organization and/or the development of self-sustained economic activities among the 
urban poor. This dimension could play a crucial role as capital cities in the developing world 
consolidate. First, nowadays demands are not as widely based on the provision of similar public 
goods or services but rather take the form of special interests that are usually localized and 
fragmented (Tanaka 2000). Second, the shift in the patterns of residential segregation, from a 
macro “center-periphery” to a micro “neighborhood pockets” model, has been argued to 
condition the capacity to organize collectively and achieve an effective response for urban 
demands.4 And third, the changing cities’ structure have also conditioned where labor markets 
opportunities could be located and therefore how communities or local neighborhoods organize 
around them (Eckstein 1990).  
Finally, it could be argued that an uneven targeting of policymaking, which also relates to 
categories of classification on what is public, private or domestic, could condition the extent of 
state intervention and the type of responses to resist regulation. In his ethnographic study of the 
informal city in San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area, Laguerre (1994) suggests that 
informal activities develop inside the same realm of formal activities, but some of them 
transform urban space into ‘informal’ spaces. Then, he distinguishes between ‘raw’ and ‘cooked’ 
informality, in which the later requires more management of knowledge and networks to avoid 
regulation control (e.g. usually in the case of informality within formal settings). The multiple 
responses, strategies or acts of resistance in the civil society could take multiple forms as they 
belong to different scenarios of state intervention. A spatial perspective for the theorization of 
the informal economy will contribute to conceptualize the materialization of informal economic 
activities as a socially constructed reality within place making processes of the State and the civil 
                                                 
4See case on the mobilization in Santiago de Chile against the allocation of landfills in some peripheral 
neighborhoods. Sabatini, Francisco and Guillermo Wormald. 2004. "La guerra de la basura de Santiago: desde el 
derecho a la vivienda al derecho a la ciudad." Revista EURE XXX:67-86..  
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society. I argue that thinking spatially those conditions can provide a better grounding for the 
understanding of key occupations in the informal economy such as street vending. 
1.2.3 Street vending and the informal economy 
Instead of a subject of research in its own right, street vending has merited 
interdisciplinary attention within wider scholarly interests related to debates about the informal 
economy, urban poverty and the nature of the State in Latin America. Yet, many of its 
connections to the evolution of informal employment and the conditions described above for the 
emergence of informality remain unclear if the role of space in regulation is not taken into 
account. 
A common denominator for explaining the size of the informal sector has been the lack 
of employment opportunities or the inelasticity of the labor market in developing countries. 
Street vending as a typical survival economic activity certainly composes the informal sector. 
The fact that most vendors are also unprotected by social security schemes adds to this portrayal. 
As the need for sustainable employment is a constant among the urban poor, increases in 
unemployment rates could impact overall trends in informal employment. However, whether or 
not street vending can be perceived as preferred occupation to secure income against low wage 
informal or formal employment or even other type of income generating activities is still an open 
question.  
Fluctuations in the numbers of the working population working in street vending have 
rarely been addressed. Often, evidence is provided from the demand of labor. For instance, some 
studies show that street vending is more common among rural-urban migrants (Roever 2005) as 
well as international immigrants (Ha 2009; Loukaitou-Sideris 2009). But at the same time, there 
is also a substantial presence of in-born population participating in street vending (Aliaga 2002; 
Borja, Barreto and Sanchez 2008; Roever 2005). In the literature of the informal 
entrepreneurship, in the case of Ukraine and Moscow, even if survival rationales were prevalent; 
several other reasons explain individuals’ choice to start business off-the-books (Williams, Nadin 
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and Rodgers 2012; Williams and Round 2009). In the case of street entrepreneurs, a similar 
study has also pointed out that occupational ‘choices’ are not purely necessity-driven; more 
prevalent are reasons related to the expectations of higher earnings compared to wage labor, and 
secondary but important were also traditionalist arguments such as carrying out the line of work 
of the family or lifestyle choices, etc.5 
The characterization of street vending as an informal occupation while serving to locate 
this occupational group in a larger context has obscured certain key aspects of the occupation. Its 
portrayal as ‘extralegal’ or unregulated is far more problematic. The informal economy is not a 
free market realm (Itzigsohn 2000:176), and its ‘typical’ occupations do not necessarily illustrate 
a true market scenario. Street vending has diverse regulatory regimes –e.g. licensing, taxing or 
zoning, among others– in cities of the developing and developed world (Bromley 2000). Being 
‘informal’ carries a considerable weight of intellectual and ideological baggage in policymaking 
(Morales 2001; Williams 2008; Williams and Round 2008). For instance, the portrayal of 
vendors as entrepreneurs or independent workers may obscure other forms of labor, also 
prevalent within street vending such as vendors on commission or those dependent on providers, 
which make them less ‘independent’ than is often thought, and may not be taken into account in 
policymaking (Bromley 1978).  
Furthermore, at the core of street vending regulations, there are explicit and implicit 
conditions by which vendors can make economic use of public space. The relationship between 
street trade, public space and its regulated uses is deeply rooted in the imaginaries of the city 
(Loukaitou-Sideris 2009). Monnet (1996) found that in Toulouse-France and in Los Angeles-
United States the use of public space by street markets may express a community tradition or 
ethnic practice, respectively in the two examples. In the developing world, even if some positive 
consequences are found such as the rise of land values (Adeyinka, Omisore, Olawuni, and 
Abegunde 2006), street markets are usually perceived as a sign of poverty with negative 
                                                 
5Anonymous. “Explaining informal entrepreneurship in emerging marketeconomies: some lessons from a study of 
streetentrepreneurs in India”. (Forthcoming) in the Special Issue: Entrepreneurship in emergent market economies.  
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consequences such as pollution, crime, and unfair competition. Thus, in many Latin American 
cities, despite practices of regulation, the economic use of public space by street vendors has 
been historically perceived as inherently illegitimate. Not accounting for how representations of 
public space impact in policymaking towards vendors can overlook the fact that this economic 
practice depends heavily on the conditions that enable or limit access to public space. 
Most of the analysis of street vending have contributed to the analysis of social and 
political networks in the informal economy but rarely have addressed how they connect with its 
spatial practice. In his study of vendors in Mexico city, Cross (1998a; 1998b) expanded Portes’ 
‘Frustrated State’ hypothesis. His research described a ‘low-integration’ state, in which different 
dependencies of the state serving different political parties open the opportunities to circumvent 
regulation. For Cross (1998b), this limitation is an in-built condition of the nature of the state in 
Latin America which renders more political influence for the studied vendors association through 
mechanisms of political cooptation and competition. However, rather than a situation in which 
the state wants to over-regulate beyond their means to enforce, policies ‘in-print’ can be also 
ambiguous in intent. Roever (2006) analyzed how different regulations promoted an incoherent 
policy for street vendors in Lima. As local municipalities implemented evictions beginning in the 
1990s, an imprecise legislation portrayed them as micro-entrepreneurs, and thus, beneficiaries of 
promotional policies; while at the same time, another presidential decree legitimized their role as 
autonomous workers. But this ambiguity has not implied necessarily the incapacity of the State 
to implement evictions. In both cities, vendors have been evicted from historic centers (Chavez 
and De la Flor 1998; Crossa 2009). Given the diverse regulatory regimes and changes in politics 
of space across cities, deductive accounts about the nature of state may be misleading to 
understand current approaches to street vending.  
In the case of a limited state capacity of enforcement –intended or unintended- and the 
presence of a networked community, the informal economy may appear as a source of 
competitive norms to ease transactions over vendors’ access to space. But placemaking can 
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depend in multiple forms of networks and may or may not lead inevitably to establish 
organizations or associations.  
Roever (2005:36) identified three different models of association formation. The first 
model implies that social networks precede the occupation of street and latter develop 
associations to gain control of access. This model is illustrated by my earlier study (Aliaga 2002) 
of the district of Independencia (2002), where neighbors came together to invade a street for 
vending and latter on formed their associations to defend space. The second involves the 
occupation of the street, then the development of networks between users of the street and latter 
the establishment of an association. The second model situates Bayat’s study in Iran (1997a) 
where the permanent use of public space created the potential for political organization by 
bounding people together on a daily basis and activated once they were facing persecution. The 
third model involves as a primary condition the establishment of networks that form associations, 
which latter organize to occupy a street. The most representative example of this model is 
Mexico City. In a more politicized scenario, Cross (1998c) describes how the appropriation of 
space by vendors involved a series of alliances within political parties in power within the city 
government. Pena (1999; 2000) also identified that access to space was at the core of vendors’ 
organizations which control access of newcomers by membership, and Crossa (2009) reported 
that even cases of peddling practices after evictions vendors were closely connected and 
protected by already established associations. The establishment of associations, preceding or 
anteceding social networks, is only one of the possible outcomes of occupying public space. 
While most studies have focused on organized sectors of street vending to shed light on the 
political dynamics of informality, the proportion of vendors actually participating in associations 
is variable and do not comprise all the street vending population in main cities (Roever 2010; 
Skinner 2010).Thus, the impact of regulation is still limited by the accounts of organized sectors, 
which actually may not be the prevalent experience of informal placemaking. 
The sole emphasis on the interplay between the state and civil society can underscore the 
importance of market-driven conditions that enable street vending, and may indeed be a response 
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to the changes in the spatio-temporal structure of many cities. Drawing on an exploration of 
Mexico City, Monnet et al. (2005) suggested that street peddling will increase since changes in 
urbanization were promoting a more mobile population who require services and goods on the 
run. Fluctuations on the amount of people working at streets can be also traced by seasonal 
opportunities, and the inflow of prospective buyers as well (Bromley 1978; Hays-Mitchel 1994).  
While individual decisions to enter the activity could be diverse, access to space depends 
mostly on the local conditions where the vendor weights the profitability of area against the 
probability of being harassed by the police, and activates or builds his or her individual networks 
to enable its safe access. Hays-Mitchel (1994) studied the location rationales of street vendors in 
six Peruvian Andean cities. Using a survey, the author asked the reasons why a particular 
location was chosen. The results showed that these were mainly economic reasons combined by 
social conditions, usually social networks enabling its access to the site, and third legal 
considerations when the policy framework in the city required registration. Consequently, if 
consumer practices still validate the economic use of space, several conditions including the 
historical function of regulation, affects not only the number of street vendors, but also their 
location choices. 
Neither the actions of the State nor those of vendors are aspatial. Theorizations about the 
role of regulation cannot overlook the spatial dimension particularly in occupations such as street 
vending which naturally respond to the urban structures, are deeply rooted in placemaking 
practices not only by vendors but also by representations of public space materialized in 
policymaking. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This dissertation aims at contributing to the call of bringing space and place back in to 
sociological research (Gans 2002; Gieryn 2000; Tickmayer 2000) by an empirically grounded 
theorization of the sociospatial conditions enabling or limiting street trade. By answering how 
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the representations and interventions of city government affect policymaking towards street 
trade, the specific objectives are: 
1. Analyzing how enforcement against street trade is manifested across different levels 
of intervention across urban space 
2. Examining how representations of public space and informal work by local 
authorities affect the conceptualization of street trade as a subject of policy 
3. Exploring how differences in patterns of enforcement alter senses of entitlement 
towards the economic use of space and the structure of opportunities to resist 
displacement among street vendors 
4. Evaluating whether or not the tendencies manifested by patterns of enforcement, 
representations of public space and the prevalent structure of opportunities differ 
when city governments adopt a more progressive versus a neoliberal approach to 
policymaking. 
1.4 THEORETICAL GUIDELINES FOR THINKING SPATIALLY STREET TRADE 
This dissertation draws from contributions on scholarly research on the informal 
economy rethinking spatially the role of the State and regulation, the nature of social networks, 
the impact of neoliberal policies and the rationalities of intervention on informal self-
employment.  
Assuming that placemaking cannot be conceptualized sociologically is neglecting that the 
reproduction of a social practice in space is not an embedded social reality. Placemaking is at the 
heart of the local basis of street trade. Access to space is indeed shaped by larger forces 
governing the transformation of the city urban structure which conditions market, social and 
political opportunities for the street trader. But at the same time, street traders create their own 
space, even if denied legitimate access, by using differential tactics or ‘strategies’ whose routines 
and spatial trajectories also build the city’s everyday life. While no vendor will claim that the 
street belongs to them, certainly senses of entitlement are created by their daily routines. 
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Throughout the dissertation, I discuss issues of agency and structure as it is expressed in 
the spatial practice of street trade. I draw upon concepts commonly used in human geography 
and urban sociology to illustrate the nature of placemaking. Placemaking refers to the process of 
creating public spaces and defining uses. Classically, the concept involves the acts of design as 
elaborated by urban planners, but I use the concept in a broader sense involving any act in space 
whose routines and practices defines meaning and purpose of a particular public space. 
Then, to illustrate the interplay between the State agents and its users, in this case the 
vendors, I use two sets of theoretical approaches to describe the structure and forms of agency in 
placemaking. The structure is defined by the modes of production of space and the agency by the 
modes of appropriation as described below.  
1.4.1 Defining spatial structures 
Space is a social construction, and as such it is not passively given, but, actively produced 
and reproduced. Instead of conceiving of space as a fixed construct, or a scenario in which social 
actions takes place, the production and reproduction of space should be understood as an 
incomplete, tension-filled process, always subject to the effects of the (social and political) 
actions that change overtime.  
In his book, The Production of Space (1991: 33), Lefebvre argues that such historically 
and socially produced space may be understood as comprising three interwoven, qualitatively 
different kinds of spatial production, namely “spatial practices”, “representations of space”, and 
“representational spaces”. These different spatial modes correspond respectively to three 
cognitive modes, namely “perceived” space, “conceived” space, and “lived” space (Lefebvre 
1991: 38-39).  
The first – “perceived” space – corresponds to “spatial practices”. It is space as 
empirically observable, and contrast to the abstract spatial counterpart of the actual process of 
social production (and reproduction), whether this is characterized by disintegration or by 
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cohesion and structure. When referring to spatial practices, I am referring to the character of a 
visually available social practice such that of street trade. 
The second cognitive mode is the “conceived space” corresponds to “representations of 
space”, or what most people would probably intuitively regard as space in the true sense. It refers 
to the way in which space is conceptualized. It involves the imaginary on the purpose and 
functions of a given space in abstract. Typically, it refers to the realm of architects, urban 
planners, scientists or artists who intellectually relate to it through acts of design, geometrical 
representations and as such. It involves a political practice in the sense that is also oriented to 
intervention and determine the structure of the city objects in space e.g. streets, parks, 
monuments, among others. 
The last cognitive category is that of “lived space”, which correlates with 
“representational space”. It denotes space as reproduced in everyday life. This is the realm of the 
users of space, and their perceptions on the meaning, symbols and character that they attach to it 
as developed by their experiences. 
I use these distinctions to locate street vending. The spatial practice of street trade as a 
perceived space is defined as a product of the interplay of two different cognitive modes of 
production from above (conceived space) and below (lived space) whose routine acts of 
placemaking shape the geography as well as the structure by which this practice could be 
sustained. 
1.4.2 Defining agency spatially 
Thorough this dissertation, I use the distinction between strategies and tactics developed 
by Michel De Certeau (1984) not as dichotomy but a continuum representing differences in 
degree of agency on behalf of street vendors’ spatial practices against the strategies of state 
control. 
De Certeau (1984:474) proposed that looking at everyday practices, or spatial practices, 
involves the investigation of the ‘making do’ that is the ways in which users operate. He 
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distinguishes between two types of spatial practice: strategies and tactics. Strategies refer to a 
course of action developed by a position of power or dominance within the specific environment 
perceived as their own in which people operate. Certeau (1984:36-38) usually reserves the notion 
of strategies to the acts of the state given that its actions are aimed to coerce compliance among 
users. In contrast to strategies, tactics are defined as “the victories of the weak over the strong” 
(De Certeau 1984: 481). Tactics survive acting in others’ space, through improvisation and 
operate within the gaps and slips of conventional thought and the patterns of everyday life. 
Certeau proposed that as strategies expand to increase dominance, there is a corresponding 
increase in opportunity for tactical subversion.  
In this dissertation, I use strategies as related to the acts of state control of street trade but 
also allow the use of strategies to differentiate in degree certain types of actions developed by 
street vendors in particular situations. I argue that in cases where people have developed a strong 
sense of entitlement towards their environment, strategic actions are also possible to define 
agency. I refer to "entitlement" as the notion or belief that a vendor is deserving of the right, 
either by virtue of legislation or moral principle, to claim the use of public space as legitimate. 
Senses of entitlement contribute to create the otherness, an attribute that in fact condition how 
people perceive and interact in space. For instance, tactics proliferate when people perceive that 
they interact in the ‘others’ space, being on the watch for opportunities seized on the wing. 
People who perceive themselves as part of the environment develop strategies as they feel 
entitled to impose rules, defend their practices, and so on despite the competing regulations 
created by the state.  
1.5 HYPOTHESES 
1. Despite the centralized and decentralized structures of governance, city governments 
‘successfully’ controlling street trade in Latin America have conceived public space as a domain 
functional to the private sector by increasing their levels of enforcement across space following 
the expansion of private investment.  
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2. Regardless of the policy approaches being neoliberal or progressive in these contexts 
street vendors have been re-imagined in policymaking as a subject to discipline, and strategies of 
control are shaped accordingly reframing the discourse in exclusionary terms restricting access to 
public space. 
3. Consequentially, the local basis that once permitted the development of collective 
strategies among street vendors has been undermined by weakening street vendors’ sense of 
entitlement to use of public space and enabling instead the widespread use of tactics of 
appropriation. 
The explanation of each of the three tendencies, and specificities found in each city, 
compose the three major sections of this dissertation. The comparative dimension is tested across 
each of the sections. 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This dissertation adopted an exploratory and descriptive comparative and mixed-method 
approach combining multiple techniques of data collection and analysis which permitted linking 
citywide trends to local effects. The aim was to capture how different spatial hierarchies of 
intervention are produced, reproduced and contested. Rather than an analysis portraying the city 
as a fixed administrative unit, which indeed is misleading given the role of functional ties that 
accommodate everyday routines and understandings of the role of place and space (Matthews 
2008), the combination of qualitative and spatial analysis seeks to identify linkages across scales 
and the embedded rationales within placemaking practices from above and below.  
1.6.1 Selection of cities and within-city cases 
Most of the studies on street vending focus on one case in a particular city, usually the 
historic center. While several attempts have been made to revise research across cities in edited 
volumes, rarely studies on street vending have attempted to analyze it comparably in their 
design. This dissertation tries to overcome that limitation by providing a comparison between 
and within cities. A comparative design, despite the pitfalls of controlling the inherent 
 26
differences in case selections (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994), permits a deeper 
understanding on the nature of a given phenomenon by selecting cases to be compared across 
cities (Ebbinghaus 2005). Thus, it gives researchers the means of confronting findings in an 
attempt to identify and clarify similarities and differences, not only in the observed practices, but 
also in the search for possible explanations in terms of the likeness and unlikeness of certain 
tendencies to be reproduced in different contexts.  
At the start of my research I chose to compare Lima and Bogotá due to their similarities 
in terms of trends of informal participation in overall employment but differences in urban 
planning styles and management of city governance that could be translatable to a more effective 
regulation policy towards vendors. The proportion of working population in the informal sector 
and informal self-employment in these cities is fairly close. In Lima the informal sector 
represented around 58.2% of the total working population in 2001 with a share of 46% of 
independent workers (Saavedra 2003). Bogotá’s informal employment represented the 51.5% 
(CCB 2004) with an independent worker share of 39% in 2004.6 
Despite their similar labor market trends, both cities share a similar outcome. They have 
undergone successful historic center recovery and have focused in reducing street vending 
considerably after massive evictions. Nonetheless, the share of street vendors within citywide 
employment is lower in size for Bogotá.7 For Lima the number of street vendors is estimated to 
be 212,710 and 79,290 for Bogotá representing respectively 5.4% and 2.6 % of the working 
population (Castañeda and García 2007:87; Roever and Aliaga 2008). Holding labor market 
trends constant, the comparative approach is based on a method of agreement (Ebbinghaus 
2005:141), that is, I seek to find explanatory factors in different contexts that explain the same 
outcome, in this case the reduction of street vendors. 
                                                 
6Bogotá, Red. "Bogotá en datos: Empleo informal." vol. 2006. 
http://www.redBogotá.com/endatos/0100/0150/01544.htm: June 10 2006. 
7Part of the reason can be attributable to the differences of population between cities. Bogotá’s population is about 
with an estimated 7,304,384 inhabitants as of 2009, while Lima’s population is fast approaching 9 million. 
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These cities differ in styles of urban governance which may partially imply differences in 
the levels of success in controlling street vending after evictions. Decentralization has lead 
different capabilities to administrate the city government, strengthening of the city administration 
in Bogotá while increasing the autonomy of more local administrations in Lima. While Bogotá’s 
Metropolitan government design policies citywide that are administrated by 20 local 
municipalities (localidades) whose authorities are appointed by the city mayor, Lima’s 
Metropolitan government has little authority within the 49 local municipalities (distritos) that 
compose the city administration. Local authorities in Lima are popularly elected and have 
administrative and political autonomy to manage their budgets, planning and even change zoning 
regulation or adapt current street vending regulations according to their needs. In this way levels 
of enforcement citywide in Lima were assumed to show greater disparities potentially 
conditioning the successful targeting of street vendors.  
Given the decentralized city governance, Lima’s spatial regulation such as zoning or 
public space control is also more dissimilar across local administrations. The Instituto 
Metropolitano de Planificación (IMP) proposes the zoning for the whole city, yet local 
administrations can modify zoning regulations. More importantly, in terms of vending, zoning 
for restricted or permitted areas is not a common practice in many local municipalities. Most of 
those who rely on certain type of zoning can modify it without consultation of central institutions 
and make modifications often. Resources of control for public space entail not only the use of the 
national police for large evictions but the use of local municipal police for surveillance which is 
entirely financed by the local municipality. Control operations are not dependable on zoning 
restrictions; they are performed by national or municipal police upon request of the local 
authorities.  
In contrast, Bogotá’s city government has managed to centrally supervise spatial 
regulation through specialized planning units, policies and police force. For instance, the 
Departmento Administrativo de Catastro Distrital (DACD) monitors territorial stratification, a 
policy unique to Colombian cities, which entails the assignation of a strata category to every 
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block in the city to distribute costs of services and land tax equitably. The Unidades de 
Planeamiento Zonal (UPZ) are another administrative territorial unit that was created to monitor 
urban space and harmonized zoning policies across and beyond local administrations. Moreover, 
zoning laws and policies entailing street vending are also decided through centralized offices. 
The Instituto para la Economía Social (IPES) registers street vendors and coordinate actions not 
only with local administrations but also with specialized agencies that monitor Public Space, 
such the Defensoria del Espacio Público and the Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano, to design 
policies citywide. Zoning for vending involves differential legislation for restricted zones such 
recovered public spaces or special zones, and permitted zones such transitory zones or designed 
spaces for vending administered by the city. This zoning orients the almost daily monitoring of 
the metropolitan police, on top of the local inspectors in each municipality. 
Moreover, at the time of the study, the city administrations had different political 
tendencies that were manifested in their regulatory regimes towards street vendors. Bogotá was 
experienced the first term of a leftist mayor, Luis Eduardo Garzón, who undertook the discourse 
of social inclusion as a staple to guide city plans for urban renewal, including policies towards 
vendors which involved exchange options planned to provide alternative means of employment. 
Meanwhile, Lima had a two-term elected independent mayor, Luis Castañeda, with closer 
connections to the right national political parties. He had continued the policy of relocation of 
vendors and promoted associative savings towards formalization within licensed vendors in 
downtown Lima. His vision continued to deepen the neoliberal approach as it counted in the 
promotion of entrepreneurship, through vendors’ self-financed relocation projects.  
The purpose of this city-wide comparison is to evaluate whether or not a greater spatial 
focus in levels of enforcement and a more progressive orientation towards policymaking make a 
difference in terms of planning and regulation within the informal sector, and to understand how 
the different socio-political context and placemaking strategies can lead to similar outcomes 
through different spatial patterns of enforcement and control.  
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As the responses across local administrations and particular sites of vendors may indeed 
differ in each city, according to the city planning in Bogotá or the differences in governance 
across local municipalities in Lima, this study relies in a mixed method approach to characterize 
policies from above and identify cases from below, which I describe in detail next. 
1.6.2 Mixed method approach 
I used a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative, quantitative and spatial 
descriptive analyses, which permitted to connect citywide to trends to local contexts. The 
analysis was performed in three stages: 
Comparative policy analysis 
The purpose of this comparative policy analysis was to situate the different spatial 
hierarchies produced by the structures of governance in the cities selected. This analysis involved 
the gathering of secondary and primary sources of information about the changes and outcomes 
in policymaking towards street vending at city, local governments and neighborhood/trade areas 
levels of analysis. To identify the citywide trends, I relied on household surveys to analyze the 
demographic changes on the population of street traders. For the local governments’ 
disaggregation, I used available data sources in each city which provide a disaggregation of 
number of vendors registered in each locality and the number of interventions performed across 
local governments. The limitations of the available data sources and techniques of measurement 
used are described in detail in the Methodological Appendix A.  
For the neighborhood/trade analyses, I combine population, economic censuses, 
georeferenced data sets on places of interest as well as street vendor count data to identify 
agglomeration factors and effects of enforcement and commercial gentrification. In the case of 
Bogotá, this street vendor count data was elaborated and georeferenced by the city 
administration. I conducted a count for 33 districts in Lima, updating a preliminary count 
performed by NGO Alternativa in 2007 (See Methodological Appendix B).  
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The neighborhood/trade area was identified using a Thiessen Polygon technique, which 
mathematically computes and draws the boundary lines between vendors’ locations taking into 
account the closest distance of each vending site with each other. Using this technique, I 
calculated the mean number of vendors a day per square kilometer in a trade area.  
To identify the agglomeration factors, I used the Conditional Nearest Neighbor (CNN) 
technique. CNN computes the distances between distributions, e.g. supermarkets and the street 
vendors locations, based on closest distances on a street network. Once the relationship between 
both distributions is identified, CNN compares those patterns with one of a random uniform 
distribution of two hypothetical distributions, and test whether the distributions repel or attract 
each other. Moreover, after testing the relationship for randomness it plots the range of distance 
in which those relationships are statistically significant. 
I modeled the effect of the agglomeration factors identified by the CNN technique, 
against supermarket competition and police interventions using Geographically Weighted 
Regression. GWR is a technique that extends the classical OLS regression to allow for the 
representation of the variability of local parameters across space, that is, it serves to generate 
local coefficients for every observation or trade area. Taking into account the attribute values of 
the closest locations, it computes a regression model for each of the trade areas. Supermarket 
competition was measured by the proportion of expected supermarket consumers in the trade 
area given their socioeconomic status and distance from closest supermarkets. Enforcement was 
measured by the number of police interventions reported in the official statements of the 
municipalities. The main purpose of performing a GWR analysis was to identify the areas where 
police interventions decreased the mean density of vendors in a trade area and compare it with 
the effects of supermarkets’ competition. I am assuming that the negative effect is a proof of 
higher enforcement as the intent in both cities has been by any means to reduce vendors.  
All these spatial techniques, Thiessen polygons, CNN and GWR, are presented in detail 
in Methodological Appendix C. 
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Comparative qualitative analysis of public officials rationales of intervention  
In both cities public officials from relevant offices in each city were interviewed. The 
selection of local administrations was restricted to those local municipalities that constitute the 
urban core in each city –19 out of 20 in Bogotá and 33 out of 43 in Lima. My aim was to reach at 
least one representative of each local municipality in the urban core. I successfully conducted 16 
and 12 local officials’ interviews, respectively in Bogotá and Lima, and an additional 6 and 4 
interviews with public officials from city or national institutions that were directly related to 
street vendors’ policies. (See Methodological Appendix D for further detail) 
I used the policy analysis to classify the content of my analysis between high and low 
enforcement performing municipalities and illustrate the politics of planning and intervention on 
street vending within the city governments administration.  
Comparative analysis of street vendors’ spatial practices  
The prior selection of cases in each city was based on the degree of exposure to 
commercial gentrification, levels of housing consolidation–which I used as a proxy of 
socioeconomic profile. I typified comparatively four types of neighborhoods –gentrified, 
consolidated, strategic, emergent– and selected them if they showed street vendors.  
Lima and Bogotá differ in terms of the presence of vendors by the initial typology. Lima 
tended to have vendors in all the typologies while Bogotá had an overrepresentation of vendors 
in gentrified neighborhoods/trade areas. Thus the classification, as found in the spatial analysis, 
served to control for bias in the selection of within city cases levels of enforcement. I used the 
spatial pattern analysis to classify the distinct neighborhoods/trade areas in which enforcement of 
policies appears more effective (blue zones) against those neighborhood/trade areas in which it 
does not (red zones). Therefore, the analysis of testimonies within different levels of 
enforcement was possible to control for exposure to commercial gentrification and the 
neighborhood/trade area socioeconomic profile. (See Methodological Appendix E for further 
detail). 
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1.7 DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This dissertation is based on a comparative research design targeting mainly two areas of 
theorization: the levels of enforcement of the State and the nature of urban space appropriation. 
The value of this approach is that it permits creating a matrix of conditions that can clarify not 
only the singularities of each case and city case but also the limits of any generalization. The 
objective with the research design is to identify necessary conditions to contribute to a middle 
range theorization; there is no search for causality.8 
The scope of the research, even though broad, in the comparative design and cases 
involved does not cover all the types of street trade that could be identified in each city. 
Moreover, the type of vendors compared are not the same. Since the focus is on the construction 
of the subject of policy, the attention to specific types of vendor is delimited by the most 
common subject of intervention, vendors identified in the count registry in Bogotá (usually 
peddlers or semi-stationary vendors) and the street market vendor in Lima, which have attracted 
greater regulation in the local municipalities interviewed. Peddlers working on buses, fixed-post 
vendors in popularly large vending agglomerations and special cases of licensed vendors were 
excluded in the qualitative analysis in this city. On the one hand, the reason was the lack of 
documentation available in most districts about bus peddlers and the inconsistency of policies 
regarding licensed vendors across districts. Large agglomerations with more than 2000 vendors 
when included in the spatial analysis were not covered in the qualitative analysis due to the 
constant persecution that made difficult visiting and establishing relationships at the time of the 
fieldwork. Rather the focus in Lima has been the neighborhood street market, chosen even when 
existing also within downtown districts. Still, the effects as perceived in these neighborhood 
street markets can shed light on the common rationale of regulation applied in larger ones that is 
also being extended toward smaller agglomerations as well.  
                                                 
8 Causality will entail the search for necessary and sufficient conditions that only could be identified if including 
additional city cases that match the selected but with different outcomes. Such project goes beyond of the scope of 
this study. 
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Following the premise that the materialization of economic activities over urban space is 
produced by larger as well as local processes, this dissertation adopts a research design 
combining qualitative and quantitative spatial analysis. It draws attention to the disparities in 
policy targeting, and its interactions with the current spatial organization changes in the city. 
Based on a mapping of street vendors’ locations, it identifies through spatial analysis techniques 
the factors associated with the agglomeration of these activities in space and evaluates the effects 
of enforcement and commercial gentrification modeling coefficients globally and locally. The 
study also goes beyond the statement of location as an opportunity. Using as criteria the different 
levels of exposure to these city changes, it analyzes the spatial practice of street vendors 
comprehensively. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods as well as the multi-
dimensional and comparative approach in the exploration of space increases the validity of my 
findings.  
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight some limitations of my study. First, even when 
the emphasis is on change and evolution, the analysis of location patterns is cross-sectional and 
as such it does not permit a time analysis in rigor. Second, the perceptions captured by the 
qualitative exploration do not aim to capture in detail the multiple spatial strategies currently at 
play in a diverse environment, but rather the ones that are represented through the eyes of older 
populations, who can point out more clearly what worked then and what is happening now. 
Third, the findings cannot be generalized to all types of vending even in each city. Having said 
that, the study permits me to identify and outline variables or factors relevant to the analysis of  
different types of vendors and policy making in other cities. Finally, as the qualitative 
exploration is rather broader than deeper, some relevant actors that can portray more clearly 
changes in local networks, such consumers, providers or policemen, usually at the very heart of 
place making, have been left behind. Locations are taken as a starting point to think about space, 
but I acknowledge that much more is needed to understand it. 
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1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The dissertation is divided in six chapters. This first chapter summarized the research 
problem, review of the literature and theoretical underpinnings that justify this study as well as 
the methodological choices made to overcome current research limitations. Chapter 2 presents 
the policy analysis across scales. It examines comparatively the evolution of the institutional 
context relevant to the control and regulation of street trade in the selected cities, disentangling 
citywide effects across local governments. Chapter 3 presents comparatively the findings of 
spatial analysis, identifying the factors that explain the mean density of street vendors in a trade 
area, mapping the effects of enforcement on the reduction of street vendors, and analyzing how 
these patterns match or mismatch the expansion of large retailers in the selected cities. The 
spatial patterns –identified in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3– organize the analysis of interviews 
presented in the latter qualitative result sections.  
Chapter 4 examines, respectively in Lima and Bogotá, how rationales of intervention in 
urban space reflect the way that street vending is redefined as a subject of policy, illustrating the 
strategies of control and private sector partnerships used accordingly. Chapter 5 analyzes 
respectively the experiences of senior vendors in Lima and Bogotá within different types of 
neighborhoods. It describes the changes in the local basis of spatial practice of street trade by 
exploring vendors’ perception of policies, changes in their organizational and spatial practices at 
a face of persecution as well as economic choices to deal with exposure to commercial 
gentrification. Chapter 6 presents the comparative conclusions, discusses the broader 
implications of the findings and suggests further research possibilities. For each result chapter 
the details about the data collection and analysis are thoroughly explained in the corresponding 




Chapter 2: Evolution of policies and spatial hierarchies of intervention 
Most occupations performed by self-employed working poor residents in Latin America 
are typified as informal, either due to their participation in the low productivity sector, or 
because they tend to be unprotected or unregulated by the State. However, the sole 
acknowledgement that an occupation is informal does not suffice to adequately understand the 
specific conditions by which a certain occupation expands or contracts within the working 
population. While unemployment can be a predecessor of informal self-employment, general 
conditions enabling a particular market for specific occupations can increase or decrease the 
likelihood of participating in a specific occupation. For instance, changes in regulation through 
tax registration or even simplified plans to access social security can change not only the status 
of an occupation but also increase the barriers to access a specific market or influence the way it 
is intervened by State control. I propose to conceptualize street trade as an ordinary occupation 
that cannot be understood without an historical perspective of its market, sociopolitical and 
spatial conditions enabling its operation as well as contributing to the conceptualization of street 
traders as a subject of policymaking in cities. 
In this chapter, I start from the examination of historical and citywide trends to a closer 
exploration of local outcomes in policymaking. The first section describes historically the 
evolution of the policies related to the macro changes in the city government, urban structure and 
changes in models of development. Based on an analysis of household surveys and available 
datasets about street trade policy and population (See Methodological Appendix A), the second 
section presents comparatively how effects of citywide trends on the type of placemaking of 
vendors and their net incomes in Lima and Bogotá. The third section examines comparatively 
policy indicators, e.g. vendors’ registration and number of control operations, across local 
administrations within the selected cities. The comparative analysis across scales serves the 
purpose of identifying the spatial hierarchies of intervention across urban space and their 
relationships.  
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2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF POLICIES 
Street vending, despite being portrayed as a marginal economic practice, has always been 
a normal practice in any city. Its shape, in terms of place-making practices, products offered and 
population involved, is subject to change not only as policies and institutional arrangements set 
the conditions to appropriate public space but more importantly as the urban conditions enable 
the type of local markets street traders can respond to. Therefore, if we review the evolution of 
policies in a broader perspective, we observe that street trade historically has been shaped 
differently in Lima and Bogotá. As a result, in policymaking, both cities target a quite different 
set of vendors, and at the same time, they both reproduce, through an uneven territorial control, 
the conditions that enable niches of street trade. 
2.1.1 Lima: Building the markets from the streets 
Since the foundation of the city in the Colonial period, Lima’s street trade – one of the 
main occupations of poor mestizos, criollos, and native indigenous population– was subjected to 
ordinances and decrees that enacted prohibitions, evictions among other regulations (Iwasaki 
1989:125). The payment of sisa, a tax for the use of public space, was enacted since 1915, and 
unintentionally promoted a more permanent use of public space (De Soto 1986:74). With the 
changes introduced by the city growth at times of high rural-urban migration in the mid 1950s, 
and the political displacement of the population due to violence during the subsequent decades, 
informal human settlements expanded. The lack of an adequate system for public transportation 
(Sánchez-León, Calderón and Guerrero 1978) created underserved areas of basic services at the 
peripheries, including commercial services as well. In this context, street trade became an 
important commercial channel, which supplied daily goods to expanding peripheral 
neighborhoods. 
However, its function was not limited to the expanding peripheries. During the 1980s, the 
country faced economic crisis, with oscillating inflation rates that affected not only the urban 
poor, but the middle classes. Although some malls and supermarkets were initially inaugurated 
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during this decade, they hardly expanded beyond wealthy areas of the city. Within central 
districts where middle class residents usually had access to public-run roofed markets, street 
trading became a competitive tool to lower prices of groceries and other highly demanded goods 
such as clothing and even small appliances. Through contrabando (smuggling), large 
agglomerations of street traders occupied central areas of the city becoming an alternative 
channel to formal retailers. Consequently, street vending spread not only within the traditional 
downtown areas and the underserved peripheries but in every commercial site across Lima 
districts providing cheap goods to impoverished middle classes. 
At least in the sight of current policies, Lima’s street vending was and still is 
characterized as a matter of regulating open-air markets. Usually peddling is understood as an 
initial phase that is confronted by increasing hostilities. Peddlers are more likely to be persecuted 
either by local police or private guards if working closer to particular establishments such as 
governmental offices or stores, and sometimes if they work at street markets, stationary vendors 
may also harass them. Those who have more connections with stationary vendors may start to 
become stationary if a space is available.9 Once a vendor becomes stationary and widens the 
amount of merchandise to be sold, product diversity at the street market rises, which contribute 
to the overall commercial attractiveness. Then, the consumer is driven to street markets as an 
alternative consumer practice. That is the reason why some street vendors’ organizations 
pioneered the formation of established commerce, and voluntarily built their own roofed markets 
during the 1970s and 1980s even at a faster pace than public run markets (De Soto 1986:91). 
The formal election of mayors only began in Lima in 1980 and continued with the policy 
of sisa collection. The first elected mayor, Eduardo Orrego (1980-1983), promoted the 
concentration of vendors in selected sites to avoid further deterioration of the historic center.10 
                                                 
9 In an earlier study, I documented that stationary vendors tend to be organized to control the access to space. In 
some cases, the organization may also condition the product to be selling, and require the approval of all 
members.See: Aliaga, Lissette. 2002. Sumas y Restas: El capital social como recurso de la informalidad, redes 
sociales de los comerciantes ambulantes en Independencia. Lima: Alternativa-UNMSM. 
10 This policy gave origin to “PolvosAzules” a street market that was very popular during the 1980s by the abundant 
offer of smuggled goods. 
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After the election of Alfonso Barrantes (1983-1986), a leader of the Left coalition Izquierda 
Unida, policies started to incorporate participatory practices that increased the political influence 
of street vending organizations. In 1985, with the approval of Metropolitan Ordinance 002, street 
vending organizations were given rights to negotiate within municipalities under an institutional 
form named the Mixed Technical Commission. The ordinance also discriminated within 
restricted and permitted zones within downtown and established that 20% of street vendors’ 
collection be invested in services of social protection for them. A program of campos feriales 
(street fairs) also enabled licensed street markets within municipal lands or public spaces. While 
compliance was not substantial in the whole city, street vendors still managed to use this 
provision to advance negotiations. As noted by Roever (2005:58), some street vending 
associations managed to activate political relationships with elected mayors by providing 
political support during elections. The participatory practices lead to larger scale unionization11 
under the defense of the right to work. Despite the fact that most vendors were either self-
employed or independent, they were merely perceived as workers within the social movement 
framework. Likewise, sisa collection increased incentives to become stationary and left control 
of individuals’ access to local organizations. 
After the application of structural adjustment policies at the beginning of the 1990s street 
vending rose dramatically. The deterioration of the historic center particularly posed external 
pressures to upcoming mayors given the nomination of Lima’s Historic Center as a worldwide 
patrimony by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
At the start of the decentralization process, Lima and its 43 administratively and politically 
autonomous districts also faced the challenge of improving property and land tax collection. 
Mayor Alberto Andrade (1996-2002), a business man who ran as an independent and took office 
                                                 
11 For instance, in 1979 a federation claiming the representation of local organizations across Metropolitan Lima 
was established. FEDEVAL (FederaciónDepartamental de VendedoresAmbulantes de Lima) became a main 
intermediary in policy concerning street vending, along other powerful federations which consolidated their 
influence within the Cercado de Lima such as FEVACEL (Federación de VendedoresAmbulantes del Mercado 
Central y Calles Adyacentes) and the Sindicato de PequeñosComerciantes y VendedoresAmbulantes. 
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in 1996 undertook 20 operations to get rid of stationary vendors (Roever 2005:80). As the 
payment of the sisa increased the incentives to become stationary in Lima, Andrade also 
suspended its collection within the historic downtown (Cercado de Lima) to force negotiations 
with street vendors’ representatives despite the need to increase tax collection. Two-year 
agreements for relocation, even for those vendors in campos feriales were signed. Street 
vendors’ organizations were expected to save for at least a down payment to purchase a property 
and build a commercial center. The city hired a large staff that kept vendors informed about 
spaces for sale, and were continuously supervising their internal decisions and saving progress. 
After being relocated in new commercial centers within the downtown district, the city favored 
street vendors with two years exoneration of taxes and promoted their commercial centers in the 
mass media. Street vendors with larger capacity of accumulation, particularly those who sell 
imported goods, were successful. Vulnerable vendors such as the elderly were allowed to sell in 
a license agreement of only 2000 designed stalls to offer small goods on certain allocated spots. 
The recovery of the historic center set the standard of policy for the other local municipalities. At 
the end of 1990s, many municipalities within the central area of the city replicated this approach, 
conducing to a massive eviction of vendors within the middle class residential areas. 
While the 1980s framework permitted the organization of city vendors at the 
Metropolitan level, the experience of relocalization projects fragmented their participant 
organizations. Evicted vendors, who appealed to the Constitutional Court for their right to work, 
were not reinstated in their working sites. Eighteen out of twenty street vendors’ collective 
claims during 2005-2007 were declared unfounded. The rationale of most of these rulings 
expresses that it is the duty of the municipality to decide on matters regulating public space. This 
issue further accentuated the perception of the street vendor as a citizen that is entitled to work, 
but to do so following the existing regulations on the use of urban space, despite the fact that 
policy guidelines have changed in the new city context.  
Moreover, an ambiguous portrayal of the entrepreneur has been promoted within the  
1990s regulations. Roever (2004) analyzed different laws and decrees targeting directly or 
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indirectly the definition of street vending during this period and concluded that the ambiguous 
image of street vending created a misconception of the occupation as being at the same time 
recognized, indirectly promoted but at the same time ‘informal or illegal’. The Supreme Decree 
005 of 1991 recognized vendors as a legitimate occupation but did not have a clear application in 
municipal law. The 1995 Law of Microenterprise indirectly included street vendors as the 
definitions involved self-employed with a small revenue. Hence, the subsequent Law of 
Employment Promotion which promoted formalization of microenterprises using that definition 
ambiguously included street vendors. Moreover, Municipal Ordinance 082 for the sanitary 
control of food vending in the same year defined street trade as the activity carried out in 
regulated spaces but under the heading of ‘informal commerce’. Thus the perception of vendors 
has been ambiguously shaped by an ideology that conceives the occupation as entrepreneurial 
but at the same time unlawfully established. 
From a policy stand point, given the number of previous experiences probing street 
traders’ successes to become market owners, all districts insist that stationary vendors formalize 
by building and running their own roofed markets or commercial centers. In contrast to previous 
decades, however, access to land is more costly to vendors. On the one hand, as legalization of 
property is widespread across the city, land prices for intended commercial uses are expected to 
increase within informal origin neighborhoods. Calderón (2004:12-13) noted that legalizing 
property in the informal sector has not increased demand for existing housing; rather it is small 
entrepreneurs who potentially expand the demand but for commercial use. Willing to pay more 
for legalized properties, given that it is an important requirement not only to secure ownership 
but to guarantee access to credit; small entrepreneurs are more exposed to speculation. On the 
other hand, within areas where ownership is still in process of formalization, access to land 
ownership might not be necessarily guaranteed. For instance, in terms of roofed markets, the 
Commission for the Legalization of Informal Property (COFOPRI), a dependency of the 
Ministry of Housing and Construction, enables the legalization of roofed market within informal 
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human settlements or public lands that are not municipal property. Nonetheless, until 2008, three 
out of the thirteen roofed markets qualified for that legalization were within peripheral areas.12 
In the midst of the economic growth experienced in the country since the 2000s and the 
consequential expansion of modern forms of commerce, the focus on off-street relocation has 
continued by Mayor Luis Castañeda but has adopted a renewed framework with the aim of 
becoming a mainstream upgrading policy for all districts. For instance, some districts in Lima, 
such Comas and Cercado de Lima have promoted mandatory associate savings as a way to 
promote formal entrepreneurship. Comas, a district in which street vendors are mostly residents, 
besides collecting daily sisa, also declared savings as mandatory to keep working in public 
space. Public officials in that district registered all street markets’ associations in a census and 
established a minimum amount of monthly savings supervised by requesting a copy of the bank 
account statements. In the case of Cercado de Lima, whose mayor is also the metropolitan mayor 
and where the sisa is not collected, the Program Capitalizando also incorporates licensed 
vendors and incentive savings by giving further training to those associations saving faster.  
Formalization policies target vendors that are associated and working within a space 
regularly, being licensed or not licensed and mostly those working within street markets. 
Evidence so far suggests that relocation outcomes are highly dependent on the conditions that 
triggered the relocation projects. Based on a five year follow-up survey within two medium and 
two large relocated agglomerations perceived as successful, vendors reported having lost money 
between periods that lasted from three to six months but recovered their gains later (Guerrero 
2001). However, starting in the 2000s, as the number of supermarkets grew in Metropolitan 
Lima, reaching a wider population (Guerrero and Lazarte 2007:10-13), roofed markets of 
previously evicted vendors may be exposed to a more aggressive competition. Still, the practice 
of building markets has continued, prompted more by evictions than voluntary choices. Within 
                                                 
12 Calculations based on the 2008 informal settlements shapefile provided by COFOPRI to the author. 
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2002-2004, according to the Municipal Survey (RENAMU), 26 out of the 32 newly built roofed 
markets have been built by street vendors’ organizations.  
Despite the fact that policy concentrates on fixed or stationary street market vendors, a 
trend has started to change the spatial strategies of street trade. Recent estimations have shown 
that only 20 percent of the street vendors’ population have fixed places on streets (Roever and 
Aliaga 2008). Peddlers are now the majority but in Lima, they are rarely recognized in the 
current upgrading framework despite several incidents of municipal police abuse gaining 
attention in the media. For instance, in October 2001 the local municipal police –also known as 
Serenazgo in Lima– killed a young street peddler selling daily planners at a street corner of the 
District of San Isidro. From 2001 to 2006, the Defensoria del Pueblo has received 72 claims for 
authority abuse among the different municipalities of Lima, 32 of them with testimonies of 
physical harm in the historic center (Torres 2007). Despite the claims, most municipalities 
neither incorporate peddlers in their policy planning towards street vendors nor implement 
preventing actions to avoid human rights’ violations.  
2.1.2 Bogotá: The Permanent Peddling 
As in any Latin American city, the Sunday farmer’s market in Bogotá was a landmark of 
the urban life at the beginning of the 1900s. Similar to Lima, the occupation rose at times of high 
rural-urban migration, particularly in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, due to the 
inelasticity of the labor market to host recent migrants’ labor demand13 and contributed to the 
subsequent deterioration of the downtown areas. Street trade resulted also in specialized 
marketplaces within the city where smuggled specialized goods, such as clothing and electronics 
popularly known as ‘San Andresitos’, were sold, given the ban on imports,. However, crucial 
distinctions have historically shaped street vending as a less permanent occupation than in Lima. 
In fact street traders in Bogotá were less likely to acquire property or even develop street markets 
                                                 
13 According to Jiménez, 61.7%of street traders at the beginning of the nineties were migrants. See: Jiménez, Luis. 
1992. Las tendencias espaciales y temporales de los comerciantes informales estacionarios y ambulantes de Santa Fe 
de Bogotá D.C. Tesis, posgrado. UPTC-IGAC. Santa Fe de Bogotá. p. 84 
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because of a number of reasons such as the higher costs to access land property, which combined 
with the timing of economic growth and a traditionally centralized and public-space focused 
urban planning shaped a commercial structure more favorable to an early expansion of modern 
retail. Thus, even when there is still stationary vending, the practice of pedestrian-oriented rather 
than market-oriented was a feature from the outset. 
In Bogotá, rural migrants either rented or accessed land at the peripheries through 
purchases made at illegal lot subdivisions sold by owners. Land was rarely invaded comprising 
only 1% of the total cases reported in the 1970s (Gilbert and Ward 1985). Furthermore, the cost 
of land increased overtime with little differences between formal and informal settlements, 
provoking a diminishing lot size, as reported in later studies in the 1990s (Gilbert, 1996; Molina 
et al. 1993: 124). However, despite the fact that peripheral neighborhoods experienced a high 
densification process, conditions conducive to profitable farmers’ or to daily goods’ markets 
within those areas were not favorable. On the contrary, the tendencies to the development of a 
modern commercial structure characterized by larger retailers such as supermarkets and malls 
started in this city in the mid 1970s. Moser (1986), based on a longitudinal study of Bogotá’s San 
Juan Plaza from 1970 to 1978, attributed the decline in profits of the small business food retail 
system to: (1) the rationalization of the food system which moved the old plaza España (main 
wholesaler in the city), to the peripheries in the locality of Kennedy, which increased the costs of 
transportation for downtown and central small retailers while increasing  the purchasing power 
of supermarkets; (2) the proactive engagement of the State to increase large retailers investment 
and profits through the creation of Cajas de Compesación Familiar, which included as part of 
the formal worker benefits package a subsidized amount to be spent within supermarkets; and (3) 
the increasing land values that left some roofed markets largely publicly owned, to change in 
purpose given that many of the settlers working in close proximity were forced to leave given 
increases in the costs of renting. Most of the everyday products were increasingly distributed 
within neighbors’ stores, and occasionally farmers would set up their pushcarts to offer produce 
any time of the week. Moreover, given that peripheral land for housing was mainly informally 
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bought rather than invaded as in Lima, the costs to buy and build a private roofed market for a 
street vending organization were presumably high, leaving market construction to the city. 
Furthermore, Colombia’s economic liberalization started in 1986, but Bogotá lost few 
jobs in the process. Bogotá has increased its dominant position in the Colombian urban system 
and the economy with an expanding –but domestic oriented– manufacturing sector as well as 
financial sector, added to its traditional role as the main source of employment in the public 
sector. In the last three decades, poverty rates have been decreasing overtime, unemployment 
rates remain low, and general trends report an improvement of the quality of life of its residents 
(Gilbert 1996). These conditions have marked the expansion of a small and medium formal retail 
sector that is highly organized and proactive, which is shaped geographically by the dependency 
of the majority of Bogotá’s workers in the city center and its central surroundings for their daily 
trajectories from home to work.  
Moreover, Bogotá’s more effective urban planning in later decades and a traditional 
centralized administration has shaped differently the characteristics of street vending and the 
framing of its policies respond more to the need to foster urban renewal while integrating 
vendors into a form of welfare. During ISI times, Bogotá’s government administrated licenses 
and created an administrative unit, Fondo de Ventas Populares (Popular Sales Fund, FVP in 
Spanish Acronyms). In 1972 FVP was also devoted to develop programs for peddlers as well as 
stationary vendors. Similar to Lima, the administration differentiated between restricted and 
permitted zones within downtown, and differentiated policies and other conditions according to 
vendors’ lines of merchandise (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 2010). Food vendors were required to 
sell in fixed locations to ease sanitary control, specialized products such toys were relocated 
within publicly administered galleries and some designed stalls were rented to newspaper 
vendors. A more stable political environment enabled a greater political influence on behalf of 
vendors and promoted the creation of initial street vending organizations. 
The deterioration of the historic center was partially conducive to earlier initiatives to 
control stationary vending. For instance, the number of licenses of the traditional farmers’ 
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markets within downtown areas was reduced drastically during the 1980s and preference was 
given to licensed peddlers, who installed also periodically within peripheral expanding areas. In 
the case of San Andresitos, which still remain competitive, despite the lowering of the import tax 
in the 1990s, efforts consisted on their relocation in closed spaces that were funded by their own 
associations. The administration of rented stalls and galleries directed Bogotá’s administration to 
collection of rents rather than a control of the licensing policy. Consequentially, street vendors 
have been more oriented to attend a mobile population instead of creating an alternative 
marketplace but still these policies were ineffective to reduce agglomeration of street vendors 
even within downtown areas.  
As for many cities in Latin America, Bogotá faced a devalued historic center which 
became a symbol of disorder and lack of effective control. Mayor Antanas Mockus, an academic 
and independent politician elected in 1995, renewed the FVP adding to its functions the defense 
of public space and the development of programs to coordinate the recovery of public space 
affected by street trade. During 1995 to 2003 Antanas Mockus (elected for two terms, 1995-1997 
and 2001-2003), and Mayor Enrique Peñaloza (1998-2000), initiated massive evictions through 
policies of permanent and temporal relocation, training and credit. As a result, city government 
recovered “more than 1 million square meters of space, constructed or rehabilitated 1500 parks, 
built nearly 40 enclosed markets with stalls for 5000 former street vendors and invested more 
than US$20 million in malls for relocated street vendors” (Donovan 2008:30). The strategies 
used to ‘convince’ vendors relied mostly on educational technologies rather than political 
negotiations. For instance, from 2001 to 2003, one third of relocations have been voluntary 
(Castañeda and García 2007:176). Consequentially, citywide street vendors’ organizations 
weakened by these policies that fragmented the sector, either by establishing negotiation on a 
case by case basis or discriminating between those vendors with more possibilities to formalize 
and those who could not afford a similar project. However, it is important to point out that 
incentives to organize citywide started to decline earlier due to the fact that several of street 
vendors’ leaders in the 1980s were victims of political violence because of their support to the 
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leftist Union Patriótica party, whose militants were assassinated by paramilitary forces 
(Donovan 2002:65-87). 
Nowadays, Bogotá’s street vendors are mostly peddlers, constantly moving their 
pushcarts to areas with a large flow of pedestrians. Generally, their sales are limited to pedestrian 
opportunities and include products such cigarettes, candy bars, umbrellas or cell phone calls. 
They sell packed snacks, prepared foods or chopped fruits at peak times of the day. 
Notwithstanding, even if they still move around their predictable patterns enable a more 
permanent peddling which produces vendors’ agglomeration at particular sites and times of the 
day. Few of the vendors would become stationary since they risk ‘dead-times’. Agglomeration 
does not develop markets on the streets as access to space is less permanent. 
 Also, given the type of products peddlers sell in Bogotá they potentially complement 
rather than compete with established commerce but their mobility also gives space to sell highly 
demanded small goods at particular seasons. For instance a specialized study based on 467 
peddlers in chazas (baby strollers) found that they distributed 670 products from 130 formal 
enterprises (FVP 2006). However, 17.2 percent sell clothing or shoes and tend to be located 
within areas in which stores offer similar products (Castañeda and García 2007:110). In this way, 
vendors can also increase unfair competition at peak commercial days (Rocha 2006). 
Relocation off-street has been a staple policy applied mainly for downtown areas in 
Bogotá. However, as pointed out earlier, rarely does street trade in Bogotá involve the 
development of street markets, or a specialized trade centered in certain products and this 
explains partially why many relocations off-streets were unsuccessful. Only 7 out of 29 relocated 
projects from previous administrations are currently occupied (Castañeda and García 2007:174-
177). 
Also, as formerly evicted vendors received favorable sentences by the Constitutional 
Court, in contrast to Lima, a wider policy framework has been implemented since 2003. Based 
on the Law Nº 9 art.7 of 1989 which recognized the economic use of public space–ignored by 
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previous administrations, Mayor Luis Garzón enacted by Decree Nº 98 in 2004 a number of 
proposals to regulate the conditions by which this use should be incorporated in city planning.  
In 2005, the former FVP was reconverted into the Institute for the Social Economy, 
Instituto para la Economía Social (IPES), which conducted several studies to determine different 
approaches to ‘upgrade’ street vendors, particularly those who were protected by the Resolution 
of the Constitutional Court. Beyond relocation, the focus of the policy is based on agreements to 
exchange peddling for other forms of permitted but time-limited vending such public run fairs or 
stalls as well as participation at programs to upgrade their situation such temporal employment, 
educational training or financial support to collectively initiate a business. Street vendors are 
selected for each program according to their socioeconomic profiles. For instance, temporary 
employment and educational training are specially directed to young population (5 percent). 
Access to fairs or stalls renewable every year are open to all registered vendors but preferably for 
the elderly with fewer possibilities to enter the labor market (10 percent). 
Street vendors are also prioritized according to their locations. The Garzón 
administration, similar to previous zoning practices in the 1970s, mapped and categorized areas. 
As illustrated in Map 2.1, these areas correspond to three types of zones: transitory, recovered, 
and special zones, with different implications for control and policy intervention. Recovered 
spaces and special zones were regulated by the Decree 98 of 2004, in which guidelines for 
control were delineated. The recovered spaces are those that were taken by either force or given 
voluntarily by vendors to the city in previous administrations. The metropolitan police are 
expected to supervise them frequently to avoid these spaces being occupied again by informal 
vendors. The special zones correspond to areas where public services such the Cadastral Service, 
Police posts, Penitentiaries, and other health or educational institutions are located and where 
vending is strictly prohibited. Special zones are also monitored by the Metropolitan police but 
they often merit some additional follow-up from the local inspectors. In all these zones, the 
confiscation of merchandise is permitted by decree. Additionally, the city administration 
included ‘transitory zones’ in the Plan Maestro del Espacio Público enacted by Decree Nº 215 of 
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2005. Different to past administrations, instead of forcing evictions, these public spaces occupied 
by vendors are subjected to control through a mutual commitment. Transitory zones are declared 
when vendors, through their organizations, signed agreements with IPES to access upgrading 
programs in order to give back the public spaces in an agreed time-frame. Upgrading programs 
imply a diversity of options, including relocation off-street, and have implied an important 
centralization of resources of the city. By Decree Nº 419 of 2006, the inventory of spaces in 
which these transitory zones could be implemented was assigned to DADEP.  
IPES created two additional policies following urban planning guidelines to organize 
vending within current and prospective centralities: Analogue Spaces, Espacios Análogos, and 
the Pedestrian Service Network, Red de Servicios al Peatón (REDEP). The Analogue Spaces 
motivates for the creation of built-in marketplaces on empty lots, passages or areas with 
estimated large pedestrian flows, such bridging bus stations or malls, in which vendors can be 
relocated. The REDEP constitutes a going back to the practice of renting quioscos or city run 
stalls for only certain type of goods such newspapers and snacks that are authorized and enlisted 
as providers. Locations for the REDEP stalls were decided with previous approval of the 
Defensoria del Espacio Público (DADEP), and were approved by the Instituto de Desarrollo 
Urbano (IDU). In both, public run Analogue spaces and REDEP quioscos, vendors registered at 
IPES are appointed by raffle. While the Analogues Spaces were still at the building stage at the 
time of this study, up to date out of the 2,600 quioscos projected, 304 REDEP quioscos (608 
spots for sale) were installed within centralities of localidades such Santa Fe, Candelaria , 
Antonio Nariño and Chapinero. 
While IPES policies do not differ greatly from those implemented previously by FVP, 
they bring not only a new institutional management subject to dialogue with other planning 
institutions but also are intended to graduate the vendor. For instance, REDEP participants are 
expected to leave the quiosco after three years, in which they are also expected to save on 
average 300,000 Colombian pesos monthly (roughly 150 US dollars) in order to start a new 
business. Interestingly, in a city that has shaped street vending as a more mobile practice, 
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effective control relies on offering limited stationary options for those who can be selected to 
keep working at streets or off-the streets.  
Compared to Lima, Bogotá’s case shows much narrower opportunities to develop street 
entrepreneurs that can afford independently or collectively a formalization project. Thus, through 
time, we may expect that Bogotá’s stationary street vending has not been as large as that of 
Lima, but also even with a more proactive policy, it can be expected that this approach has been 
more efficient to control the number of vendors in the city. 
2.2 CITYWIDE STREET VENDING POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS 
2.2.1 Comparative Population Trends by Placemaking Practice 
While the available data sets in 21st century could not capture accurately evolution of the 
street vending population, there is enough evidence to show an increasing number of traders in 
each city during 1970s, 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, contrasting the trends in the 
2000. 
In the case of Lima, up to 1980s, there have been only one street vendors’ census and one 
street vendor’s headcounts. The former, carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (INEI), 
reported a total of 58,284 for 29 local districts in 1976. The latter, conducted by the Institute 
Libertad y Democracia (ILD) in 1986, reported a total of 94,231 based on 829 concentrations 
throughout the city. Both report vendors who were present at the moment of census or the 
headcount implementation which, given the volatile character of vending, may lead to an 
underestimation. Despite this limitation, the comparison of both sources shows an increasing 
number of vendors in 1980s. 
In the 1990s, the main source to account for the number of vendors is the Municipality 
Survey in which each local government reported the number of vendors registered in their 
district. Usually, local governments count on a “padron” which is a list of vendors by 
organization to report these numbers. The 1994 Municipality Survey documented a total number 
of 182,167 street vendors. While this source can also underestimate the number of vendors, 
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accounting only for those with a relationship with the municipality, certainly the progressions 
shows an increasing trend up to 1994. 
Likewise in Bogotá, the first census was collected by the Fondo de Ventas Populares 
(FVP) which counted 15,084 street vendors in the city in 1977 (Simanca Castillo 2007). In 1982, 
the National Institute of Statistics (DANE) estimated 58,347 street traders (FENALCO 1984). 
Later, using the Colombian National Household Survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENH), 
DANE estimated a total of 95,443 street workers in 1992 (Melo Moreno, 2001). Thus, both 
cities, despite the lack of accurate and comparable databases, have documented an increasing 
number of street vendors since the late 1970 through the early 1990s. 
Starting the mid 1990s, with changes in the styles of policies, both cities have reported a 
dramatic decreasing trend given the changes in policy that enacted massive evictions within 
historic centers in each city. The 1997 Municipality Survey in Lima reported a total of 45,594 
vendors, a fifty percent decrease from the total of 80,878 reported in the same survey the year 
before.14 In Bogotá, starting 1994 to 1996, the decline represented a drop of almost 26,000 
vendors (Melo Moreno 2001:18).  
Since 2000, a more systematic comparison of the street vending population is feasible 
since the introduction of the place of work as permanent question within the main household 
surveys’ questionnaires in Lima and Bogotá. Note that the numbers reported in the household 
surveys by default are expected to be larger than census, headcounts or municipality reports. 
Household surveys involve in their sampling design a larger spectrum of the working population 
and instead of counting vendors in situ, they rely on self-reported occupation. Thus, the larger 
numbers in 2000s are not necessarily showing an increase in vending from 1970s or 1980s. 
Rather the trend within comparable datasets in 2000s shows a decreasing if not an oscillating 
vending population.  In Lima, the number of street vendors has been oscillating from 198,000 to 
                                                 
14 Notice that in the 1996 and 1997 Municipal Survey only 23 and 25 municipalities respectively reported the 
number of street vendors in their jurisdictions. The data reported these years may not be comparable to 1994. In 
1994, 42 out of 43 local districts in Lima reported vendors. This gap can be also due to changes in administration of 
street trade as explained later in this chapter. 
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216,000 in the last ten years (See Figure 2.1), with peak times at election years for the population 
of stationary vendors. In Bogotá, comparing 2003 and 2007, a decrease of approximately 30,000 
vendors has occurred (See Figure 2.2). Nonetheless, what is important to notice is that decrease 
affects differently vendors by their place-making practice.  
In Lima, decreasing numbers are reported for vendors who use more permanent public 
space such fixed and improvised stall street vendors. While many districts in Lima allow fixed 
street vendors within assigned and designed stalls administered by the Municipality, they largely 
remain unregulated. These vendors are more visible as they agglomerate in key areas of the city, 
usually taking the form of street markets, and in turn, more easily targeted by Municipal control. 
Conversely, street peddlers are on the rise in Lima as a result to the targeting of stationary 
vendors. In the case of Bogotá, both stationary and peddlers have decreased. Stationary in 
Bogotá refers to those vendors who stay for long periods of time in a given location. Despite 
divergent trends, in Lima and Bogotá for 2007, peddlers account for almost 85% of the total 
street vending population.  
Figure 2.1 Evolution of the Number of Street Peddlers, Fixed and Improvised Stall Street 
Vendors and Roofed Market Vendors in Metropolitan Lima 2002-2009 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations for Lima based on National Household Survey, ENAHO 
* Municipal election years 



















Figure 2.2 Evolution of the Number of Peddlers, Stationary and Kiosko/Caseta Street Vendors in 
Bogotá 2003-2007 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on the National Household Survey, ECV 
Note: Only self-employed 
In Lima, the decreasing trend of more fixed vending corresponds to an important number 
of vendors within roofed markets (Figure 2.2). Given that traditionally street trade has taken the 
form of street markets in this city, the most common approach to upgrade street trade has been 
their relocation within roofed market which are constructed, and owned by the previously evicted 
street vendors. In contrast, Bogotá shows that the number of street traders working within on-
street quioscos or casetas, which are public-regulated stalls within fairs or assigned locations in 
the street, has absorbed neither street peddlers nor stationary street vendors. Consequentially, 
trends towards the reduction of stationary vending have made street trade less visibly 
agglomerated or permanent as it used to be. The implementation of upgrading policies combined 
with a greater control on stationary vendors in Lima and peddlers in Bogotá may suggest, in both 
cities, a more successful enforcement policy than when street vending was more widely either 
taxed or licensed. 
2.2.2 Income and Socio-demographic trends 
It can be expected that the changes in placemaking practices may entail changes on the 
















occupational sector. For instance, a peddler faces more constraints in the amount of merchandise 
he or she may carry along to offer to customers. Moreover, if a peddler works within a more 
profitable area such a downtown street corner, he or she may face more harassment which 
increases the risk of losing the merchandise. Therefore, the social construction of this occupation 
may be conditioned not only by the spatial structural constraints of the surveillance of the state 
but also the individuals’ construction based on gender, among other features, on how he or she 
can balance securing a safer space and a physical strength to overcome police harassment. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of certain basic characteristics of street traders based on 
their placemaking practice comparing 2003 and 2007. In Lima, peddlers tend to have fewer years 
in street trade than stationary vendors. This trend is to be expected since stationary vending is 
more clearly developed in that city. However, the decreasing trend in the number of years 
working as a peddler can indicate two possible trends. In one hand, the reduction of years may 
imply that peddlers are more likely to secure a space in the new geography of trade than before. 
In the other, it could imply that the increased supervision of public space in certain areas may be 
discouraging peddlers to stay in the occupation. Since the average years working in stationary 
street trade have increased almost by the same percentage rate, it could be implied that the 
former is more likely to be occurring. That is, the emergent pattern of street trade may be more 
resistant to control as peddlers are more likely to secure space within the existent areas that are 
less supervised by state control.  
The comparison with Bogotá in the number of years is not available based on the 
information of the Quality of Life Survey (ECV, in Spanish Acronyms). However, based on the 
registered data set in the IPES, Castañeda (2006: 99-100) calculated that on average a street 
vendor in Bogotá has been working 11 years. He found also an association between the number 
of years working and the level of education, being those with less years of schooling the ones 
who worked more years.  
Compared to Lima, Bogotá show a greater proportion of street vendors with no education 
or only primary education. In the two reference years, the situation have not changed for 
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peddlers but for stationary vendors there has been a slightly decrease in the proportion of 
vendors with fewer years of education. Lima’s peddlers just gather roughly one third of its 
population with at least primary education and stationary within 40 percent in the same category. 
Therefore, it could be argued that those with more than basic education may not be able to secure 
another job option in Lima but also that they may find in street vending a more ‘sustainable’ 
form of occupation if taking into account the increase in net income particularly for stationary 
vending. From 2003 to 2007, the average net income increased by 57.3% for stationary vendors, 
and even if relocated vendors earn roughly S/.200 soles more, this average income surpass by S/. 
50 the established minimum wage. In Bogotá, the net income is less than the minimum wage. In 
2003, the average monthly net income does not differ greatly for peddlers and stationary 
vendors, $. 246,224 and $ 271,131 Colombian pesos respectively, and even relocated vendors 
earn less than the established $ 515,000 pesos for the minimum wage.  
The relative safer access to space in the case of Lima may be behind also the feminization 
of street trade. Women typically have more restricted spatial trajectories given the need to 
combine their caregiver duties with their income generating activities. Therefore, if street trade is 
not only more permanent but more related to specific neighborhood economies that are at close 
proximity, more women in a disadvantageous position in the labor force may find in street trade 
a more appealing opportunity to secure income. In 2003, 60% of stationary vendors were women 
and this proportion has increased by 6.3%. While the sex composition of peddlers started more 
even in 2003, it has increased by 17.6% in 2007, perhaps due to the fact that the current spatial 
distribution may ease access to permanent space. In contrast, the sex composition in Bogotá has 
not changed greatly and is more equitable than in Lima.  
Another tendency in Lima relates to the decrease of the migrant population taking part of 
street trade. Despite the fact that in 2003 60.4% and 83.1% of peddlers and stationary vendors 
respectively were migrants, the numbers have decreased significantly in 2007 which indicates 
that more city-born population participate in street trade. In the case of Bogotá, the IPES 
reported in 2006 that 43% of registered street vendors in general are migrants and 12% of this 
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proportion was composed by population displaced by political violence (Castañeda 2006:98). In 
both cities, it could be argued that a greater proportion of the city-born working poor population 
rely on street trade as means of employment. If levels of enforcement restrict this activity, we 
could expect that fewer options to secure income through street trade may be available. As 
Bogotá may show more successes in this respect, the remaining population as shown, that are 
drawn to this activity has a more marginalized background. 
Table 2.1: Income and Demographic Trends by Type of Vendors, Lima and Bogotá 2003-2007 
Lima Bogotá 
Years %Change Years %Change 
Type 2003 2007 2003-2007 2003 2007 2003-2007 
Average Years 
working 
Peddler 7.42 6.17 -16.8 n.a n.a n.a 
Stationary vendors 8.71 9.93 14.0 n.a n.a n.a 
Net Income* Peddler 456.10 414.31 -9.2 246,224.03 n.a n.a 
Stationary vendors 416.05 654.53 57.3 271,131.75 n.a n.a 
% Female Peddler 53.39 62.79 17.6 40.15 35.64 -11.2 
Stationary vendors 60.94 64.76 6.3 46.49 54.1 16.4 
% No education or 
with only Primary 
Education 
Peddler 32.52 28.77 -11.5 55.51 55.92 0.7 
Stationary vendors 42.31 37.54 -11.3 53.56 45.98 -14.2 
* Adjusted income using 2003 as the reference year. 
** Roofed market for Lima, Kiosk and Caseta vendors in Bogotá 
Author’s elaboration based on ENAHO for Lima and ECV for Bogotá 
2.3 DISENTANGLING LEVELS OF ENFORCEMENT ACROSS LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES 
Citywide levels of enforcement show that Bogotá had traditionally a smaller street 
vending population15 and presumably a more effective control of street trade in its different 
forms than Lima. However, every act of control and state intervention is not independent on 
urban space and the conditions by which vendors may or may not appropriate it. Key differences 
in city administration that encompass styles of territorial control can influence the patterns of 
location of street trade and the strength of current organizations to either defend their 
marketplace or access the resources available through upgrading policies.  
                                                 
15While Lima’s population size has been traditionally larger than Bogotá, the last censuses in each country report 
that the current difference has narrowed. The city of Lima, that is the Province of Lima, gathers 7,605,742 residents 
while Bogotá´s population is estimated to be 7,185,889. 
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Lima city´s administration is decentralized in such a way that the 43 local municipalities 
can autonomously resolve governance of street vending, and usually enforces regulations not 
only using the national police but also municipal police or Serenazgo. Mayors are elected in each 
local municipality by their residents and budget decisions are not dependent on metropolitan 
level. Rather, each municipality is faced with the task to collect revenue, on top of the Fondo de 
Compesación Municipal (FONCOMUN), which is administrated by the Ministry of the 
Economy. This political and administrative autonomy could theoretically produce a number of 
different policy initiatives since Metropolitan Ordinances, such as the Ordinance 002, even if 
used as guidelines, is not binding.  
The fact that relocating street vending has become a popular strategy to increase a 
Mayor’s approval rating and the need to focus on tax collection to increase municipal revenue 
may indeed provide a fruitful terrain for local municipalities to look for coordinating actions 
towards formalization of their economic units. For instance, the district of Independencia in 
2000, only had one public official at a desk dealing with issues about commercialization, 
including not only problems with street vendors but also licensing of other local businesses. In 
2005, after the installation of Megaplaza mall, tax collection increased and the Office of 
Economic Development occupied a whole second floor in the municipality, with different 
officials specializing in training, a license simplification program and others instances dealing 
with the formalization of street vendors. Additionally, after launching the program 
“MiEmpresa”, the Ministry of Labor adopted a coordinating strategy with local municipalities, 
which collaboratively implemented services of regulation, training and promotion of 
microenterprises approaching different central agencies such the Tax, Labor and Commercial 
registry using the municipal installations. Either by the increase in revenue brought by private 
investment in the districts or by collaborating with national initiatives of formalization, local 
municipalities in Lima are giving a major role to local economic development offices whose 
duties also include those of regulating street vending. However, the fact that vendors can live and 
vote in the same district may indeed reduce the pace of those objectives. 
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According to the number of vendors reported in the Municipality Surveys, which include 
only working vendors registered in organizations listed in municipal records16, downtown and 
center district municipalities in Lima have been more successful in removing street vendors from 
their jurisdictions. As shown in Figure 2.3, those municipalities that have seen an increase in the 
number of registered street vendors are more likely to be located in the north part of the city, but 
also in the peripheral districts of the South and East. Due to the fact that local municipalities in 
Lima have to respond to their residents, vendors working in the same district may be more 
difficult to remove than those who do not belong, and as such do not vote in the jurisdictions 
they work. As shown in Figure 2.4 based on ENAHO 2007, if a street vendor resides in a 
peripheral district, particularly of the South, he or she is more likely to be a stationary vendor 
than a peddler. Conversely, as shown in Figure 2.5, while the number of operations to eradicate 
vending from 2005 to 2008 has increased within the downtown, center and the north, there are 
fewer undertaken within the Eastern and Southern districts. 
  
                                                 
16 Notice that these numbers account for fewer vendors compared to household surveys. The number of vendors 
working in the district may be larger but these vendors are those who have a more permanent relationship with the 
authorities. 
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Source: INEI’s Municipality Survey, RENAMU 
Figure 2.4 Peddlers and Stationary Vendors by Place of Residence, Lima 2007 
 
Author´s calculations 
Source: INEI’s Household Survey, ENAHO 









































In the case of Bogotá, policy decisions are centralized, as well as enforcement depends on 
the coordination with not only the Metropolitan Police but also other instances of urban planning 
such DADEP. While each localidad have implemented local committees in which vendor´s 
representatives are elected, policies and decisions are referred to IPES who coordinates with the 
respective urban planning agencies. Localities have mainly the duty to perform operations of 
control which are also coordinated with the police, a representative of the DADEP and a local 
public official –usually the legal adviser (inspector) who needs to report to the legal 
representative office (Asesoría Jurídica). Their actions are needed to be involved to guarantee 
non-human rights violations but also to frame rules of behavior for the street vendor. In some 
circumstances, regarding specific issues such as smuggling or the complaint about child labor, 
local inspectors may call for the presence of additional institutions such the DIAN and ICBF 
(Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar). 
In contrast to Lima, Bogotá’s city administration depends heavily on the national budget 
administration. Although Bogotá, as a city, collects revenue more than any other region in 
Colombia, this revenue is distributed to other regions by the central government (Secretaría de 
Hacienda Distrital 2003). This situation indubitably provokes some tensions more clearly shown 
at the political level. Clearly, the right-wing orientation of the national government in Colombia 
clashes with the left and progressive orientation of incoming mayors in Bogotá, who have in 
several elections presented themselves as candidates against the President Uribe. In terms of the 
management of public space and the policies of vendors in particular, the management of the city 
sometimes runs counter to national initiatives targeting informal workers, which do not 
purposely exclude vendors.17 An illustrative case is the Banco de Oportunidades, a national 
initiative, versus Banca Capital a city initiative to give credit to entrepreneurs. Public officials at 
IPES made a call for the commitment of other financial institutions in the city to support their 
mission of regulating public spaces inclusively by giving them the task to centralize the 
                                                 
17 Notice that this does not mean that national policies are necessarily pro-vendors. Public discourses at the national 
level rather are silent towards this sector. 
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resources available to vendors through Banca Capital. While many institutions, including the 
Banco de la Mujer, were prompt to collaborate and did not include vendors as a target 
population, the first credit that Banco de Oportunidades gave was to a Bogotá’s vendors with the 
purpose to buy a fixed stall.18 
As part of the centralized management at the city level, the locality and its authorities 
also remain relatively powerless in terms of the administration and design of policies towards 
street vendors. Not only do the local authorities not have management of those resources, but 
also are not expected to participate actively in the coordination of the resources. A representative 
of the IPES is assigned to each locality for that purpose. The rationale of a supplementary role of 
control at the local level is part of the institutional build-up of the city. While local mayors can 
make proposals for their own localities, public officials at the head of the central offices are 
ultimately the ones who push for a specific program or policy to the city mayor.19 IPES officials 
are entitled to resources to undertake research and justify their technical approaches and decision 
making. Additionally, as the scale of planning aims at envisioning the city as a whole, the vendor 
is perceived as a resident of the city, and as such, policies cannot be intended to partition senses 
of belonging by locality. Consequentially, in addition to a centralized decision making, the 
character of a more mobile street vending practice widens the gap between place of residence 
and work, which may in turn leave little agency for street vendors organizations to influence 
local authorities to gain support around their interests.  
                                                 
18 In words of the IPES director: “I meet with a group of vendors that have worked with the Banco de la Mujer 
which has five offices in Colombia. One of the commitments with this bank is not to give loans to people that work 
in public space to avoid contributing to disorder. But nationally, there is the Banco de Oportunidades, and the first 
credit they gave was to a vendor. They gave her 250 thousand pesos for her to buy a fixed stall”. 
19As the director of IPES illustrates in relation to a proposal of a local mayor in Kennedy to implement periodic fairs 
in its locality, “It was two days ago, the mayor of Kennedy proposed to me to only work with the street vendors who 
live in Kennedy, not all the vendors they sell there. He proposed to start a number of periodic fairs, with 
surveillance, almost like watch dogs, to guarantee that other vendors do not come near. I oppose that because I have 
seen that street vending has a clear characteristic of being a peddler market; and that same person who can sell you 
something in the Veinte de Julio neighborhood, can go later to Santa Barbara church, and on Wednesdays and 
Saturdays to the early morning market, and the next day to Fontibón. Then, a proposal like that does not work. So I 
have to respond to him immediately”. 
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The primary focus of the city administration has been to provide regulated options within 
centralities, mainly within downtown localities or those towards the north. In Map 2.1, the 
distribution of REDEP stalls (red dots), Casetas populares (purple dots) and temporary fairs 
(light blue squares) are more concentrated within the centralities (orange polygons) of downtown 
areas and central north areas, fewer options as well as centralities in the south, and rather no 
regulated options on the west. But vendors do not exclusively work downtown as population and 
commercial density have disaggregated across urban space overtime through the expansion of 
the transportation system. According to the 2006 headcount census conducted by IPES, street 
vendors tend to distribute differentially across the 19 local municipalities. As shown in Figure 
2.6, some peripheral localities are concentrating a greater number of vendors within their own 
centralities (commercial sub-centers) than in downtown localities. However, registered vendors, 
who are captured by IPES in the exchange programs, are still higher within downtown localities 
than anywhere else. In other zones of the city, street vendors within central or non central areas 
tend to compensate the number of registered vendors with exception of the Western Zone. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.7, vendors within the Southern and Western peripheral localities 
are more likely to work either within their own localities or the same zone. Conversely, 
operations as shown in Figure 2.8 have concentrated mainly within Downtown and Center, but 
have declined within those peripheral areas. Interestingly, peak periods of operations were 2003, 
2006 and 2009, the years before elections when most candidates start campaigning and focused 
mainly in the downtown area which is under the direct supervision of the City Mayor. This 
timing indicates how the electorate in Bogotá is also driven by the perception of efficiency in 
controlling public space, a key feature to discriminate the success of Mayors’ governments.  
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Map 2.1 Location of policies directed towards street vendors in Bogotá 
 
Source: (Castañeda and García 2007:193) 
Note: Analogue Space were not implemented at time of study 
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Figure 2.7 Distribution of Street Vendors by Zone of Work according to their Place of 
Residence, Bogotá 2006 
 
Author’s elaboration  
Source: Baseline Survey, IPES 2006  
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Figure 2.8 Number of Operations on Public Space due to Street Vendors, Bogotá 2000-2010 
 
Author´s calculations 
Source: Sistema de Vigilancia y Control, Secretaría de Gobierno Bogotá 
While strengthening control in downtown areas, effective public investment in policies 
towards vendors increased during the Garzón-Moreno administration and expanded to peripheral 
localities. According to the Final Report of the Contraloria of Bogotá, the expenditure of that 
investment has not only been inconsistent and inefficient but also rendered fewer square meter of 
public space recovered (733, 387 square meters) compared to the previous Mockus 
administration (1,795.97 square meters). Overall, Garzón administration spent almost six 
thousand million Colombian pesos and incorporated peripheral localities in the planning 



















Table 2.2 Localities with Investment in policies towards street vendors, Bogotá 2001-2007 





Center 1 2 2 1 
Antonio 
Nariño 
Puente Aranda X x 
Barrios 
Unidos x 
Teusaquillo x X 
Mártires X 
Subtotal: 
North 1 1 1 1 1 
Usaquén X 
Chapinero 
Suba x x x X 
Subtotal: 
West 1 1 1 
Kennedy 
Fontibón 
Engativá X X x 
Subtotal: 
South 1 2 3 1 4 4 2 
San Cristobal x x x X 
Usme x 
Tunjuelito x X x 
Bosa x x x 
Rafael Uribe X x x 
Ciudad 
Bolivar x X x 
Total 
localities 5 3 6 1 5 8 4 
Source: (Contraloria de Bogotá D.C. 2010:63-64) 
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2.5 COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter described comparatively the evolution of policies and their consequence in 
the types of mobility, income and social demographics of street trade attending to the different 
institutional settings which produce and reproduce specific spatial hierarchies of intervention. 
Both cities show a similar trend in the reduction of street traders, a change towards peddling 
rather than stationary vending, and a strengthening of policy controls within downtown and 
central areas. However, as an occupation street vending has assumed different ‘shapes’ in Lima 
and Bogotá.  
Historically, an earlier expansion of modern retail, combined by the timing of economic 
growth and the execution of urban reforms, has shaped a more pedestrian-oriented form of trade 
in Bogotá. In contrast, street trade in Lima functioned as an effective retail channel for many 
decades, developing markets that attract buyers and compete with the recent expansion of 
modern retail.  
The comparison of these placemaking practices in terms of income and demographics 
revealed that a more permanent use of public space accompanied higher earnings and were 
mostly appealing for poor working women. Despite the fact that vending can be perceived as 
marginal occupation compared to formal employment, income trends in Lima and Bogotá show 
that stationary vending provide a relatively attractive occupation compared to others within the 
informal sector. Likewise, a greater proportion of women participate in stationary vending 
compared to peddling, even though trends in income are showing a trend towards 
marginalization. 
Furthermore, these placemaking differences are embedded in the way policymaking 
portrays vending and intervenes accordingly across space. For instance, while in Bogotá policies 
involve peddlers and semi-peddlers; in Lima policies preferentially target street markets. In that 
sense, upgrading policies are built upon the experiences of those prevalent vendors. While in 
Lima the transition towards a roofed market have been the staple upgrading policy, in Bogotá the 
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precariousness of street trade have led to a wider arrange of options within an approach close to 
social welfare.  
The respectively centralized and decentralized city governance in Bogotá and Lima also 
make a difference in how spatial hierarchies of intervention are produced and reproduced. As a 
general pattern, more control efforts to reduce street traders in both cities were undertaken within 
downtown and central local administrations. This pattern is developed, however, within a 
differential institutional design. Each local municipality or district gives priority to their own 
central places. Through a ‘multiple downtown effect’ local municipalities in Lima are removing 
vendors copying lessons from the historic center experience and replicating those particularly 
within districts in which modern retail is expanding. In Bogotá, the city administration gives 
priority to control within centralities, and expand regulated forms of trade within few localities in 
downtown, although vendors could be registered at the same rate in Southern localities and 
policy investment increased in those areas. Then, interventions are thought in a wider scale using 
zoning as a main tool to prioritize the areas of control. 
By describing the evolution of policies and the institutional design which conditions the 
way street trade is intervened, regulated and imagined as a subject of policy, this chapter has set 
the comparison between and within cities. In the following chapters, I will explore how these 
different administrative and spatial hierarchies of intervention render a discourse as well as a 




Chapter 3: Understanding the spatial patterns of street trade 
As elsewhere in many Latin American cities, Lima and Bogotá enacted massive evictions 
in their historic centers in the mid 1990s. As these streets become 'recovered', two empirical 
questions remain on whether or not the reduction of street vendors are merely a product of  the 
‘success’ of policies and how effective enforcement relate to the expansion of modern retail. 
While both cities show a similar trend towards strengthening control within downtown, central or 
gentrified commercial areas, the mechanisms by which those areas are intervened vary. This 
chapter analyzes the citywide and local variations in policy enforcement. By modeling the effects 
of control operations on the mean density of vendors, it sets up the comparative design 
identifying within cities how levels of enforcement at local levels connect to the expansion of 
commercial gentrification, and how the placemaking practices of vendors mediate those 
relationships. 
The chapter is divided in two main sections which use respectively distinct spatial 
analysis techniques (Details in Methodological Appendix C). As the prevalent types of vending 
differ in each city (peddlers in Bogotá and street markets in Lima), I start by analyzing 
comparatively the factors explaining the agglomeration of vendors. Then, I identify patterns of 
effective enforcement –that is, areas where control interventions seem to decrease the average 
number of vendors– and test how they are connected with the expansion of modern retail.  
It is important to highlight that this modeling is exploratory and does not intend to be an 
explanatory model of street trade. There are several limitations to achieve such an objective, 
beginning from the intrinsic underestimation of vending counts, diverse and often uncomplete 
accounts on police interventions and the general lack sources of information that could permit an 
accurate and direct measure of the factors affecting street trade. Nonetheless, this attempt is 
beneficial to ground and organize the comparative strategy, find initial patterns and set light of 
the qualitative analysis in subsequent chapters. 
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3.1 WHAT MAKES VENDORS CLUSTERED OR DISPERSED? 
Street trade, and particularly those types of vendors more subjected to policy control, has 
been shaped quite differently in Lima and Bogotá. Bogotá’s street trade functions as convenience 
stores –that is oriented to a limited number of pedestrian opportunity products, rather than 
specialized marketplaces which attract a continuing flow of customers like in Lima. The 
conditions by which street vending is possible in both of these cities may depend on a balance of 
not only policy efforts but also how other agglomeration factors appealing to the type of products 
vendors usually offer. Therefore, the understanding of the local conditions by which urban space 
may attract or repel street sellers in each city is inherently different and may transcend an 
analysis of the general perceptions of effective enforcement of the city and local administrations.  
In general terms, all street vendors try to establish a workplace within centrally located 
areas, but the features that define those centralities may change according to the types of clients 
they are targeting such pedestrians in Bogotá and grocery shoppers in Lima. In order to identify 
those features of the urban structure, which explain the distribution of respectively street markets 
in Lima and peddlers in Bogotá, I performed a Conditional Nearest Neighbor Analysis (CNN). 
Explained in detail in the Methodological Appendix C, subsection C.2, CNN is a technique 
which statistically test if there is a conditional relationship between two distributions over a 
street network in a study area against an expected random distribution of a non-base (unfixed) 
distribution. The output of this test permits to identify the range of distance in which these two 
distributions show a significant relationship. 20  
The results presented in Table 3.1 confirmed a distinguishable set of agglomeration 
factors in each city. In the case of Lima, street vendors are relatively clustered at nearest distance 
from informal settlements, almost in close proximity to neighborhoods where many vendors live. 
Basically, they establish within commercial areas under-served by modern retailers. For instance, 
vending sites agglomerate in close proximity with roofed markets and popular malls but tend to 
be located farther from supermarkets and modern malls. City services that locate within these 
                                                 
20 See interpretation of output graphs in methodological Appendix C 
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commercial areas such as schools, health center, police stations, municipalities and churches also 
contribute to their agglomeration. Notice that many of these places in each district tend to be 
located within the main square in the local municipality as the classical Damero form inherited 
from Colonial times. Thus parks by themselves do not appeal to street vendors as much but 
rather central places where services and commerce complement, making locations convenient for 
customers such as housewives that can do grocery shopping after leaving kids at school or 
attending any other services nearby. This configuration of urban space can illustrate central areas 
that can be perceived as local downtowns around main streets, and as such be susceptible to 
intervention by local authorities. 
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Table 3.1 Conditional Nearest Neighbor Analysis on the Location of Vending Sites as Related to 
Selected Point Patterns Distributions Along the Street Network in Lima and Bogotá 
 Street Vending sites tend to locate:
Lima Bogotá
Urban Structure   
Informal Settlements Near significantly clustered 
up to 3km
Significantly far
Parks Significantly far Near and significantly clustered 
up to 2 km
Bus Stations N.A. Near but clustered only at 1.5 km  
Commercial Places   
Supermarkets  Significantly far* Near but only Cluster within 
1.5km
Malls  Near but only Cluster within 
1.5km
Roofed Markets Near significantly clustered 
up to 2km
Near Significantly clustered up to 
2km
Popular Malls Near significantly clustered 
up to 2km
N.A.
City Services   
Schools Near, clustered up to 1km , 
but then significantly far
Neither far nor near
Health Centers Near, significantly clustered 
up to 1km
Neither far nor near
Police Stations Near, clustered up to 2km Neither far nor near
Churches Near, clustered up to 1km , 
but then significantly far
Neither far nor near
Municipal Palace Near, clustered up to 1km 
but independent after that 
distance 
Near Significantly clustered up to 
2km 
Other    
Place of Residence of 
Vendors 
Near significantly clustered 
up to 2km
Significantly far
Zoning& location of 
policies 
  
Recovered Public Spaces N.A Failed to find a significant 
relationship
Transitory Zones N.A Significantly near up to 2km. 
Centralities N.A. Near but clustered only at 1.5 km 
Casetas Populares N.A Significantly near up to 1.5 km 
REDEP Stalls N.A Significantly near up to 2km. 
Notes: *Many supermarkets are located within malls in the case of Lima, therefore malls were not 
represented as a separate distribution. 
Source:  Synthesis of Author’s calculations based on gathered maps. See Methodological Appendix C. 
In the case of Bogotá, vending sites distribute quite differently. First, they are 
significantly far from informal settlements and the place of residence of vendors. Second, city 
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services, with the exception of municipalities’ main palace, are not significant factors either for 
agglomeration or dispersion. Vending sites rather locate significantly near to bus stations, parks, 
supermarkets and malls. Therefore, vending sites spatially behave as ´free riders’ which benefit 
from the agglomeration of particular spaces of flows within the city and ´catch’ clients in the 
way to work, home, recreation or shopping zones.  
Additionally, I tested how the distribution of vending sites relates to the location of 
policies. The centralized planning style in Bogotá has established different policies of relocation 
that are publicly run by the city administration. Interestingly, the results of the Conditional 
Nearest Neighbor Analysis suggest that vendors agglomerate around places where regulated 
street and off-street trade have been established. For instance, they locate significantly near to 
Casetas –small commercial centers where stalls are rented to previously evicted vendors– and 
REDEP quioscos –fixed stalls designed to accommodate exchange vendors for three years. Also, 
vending sites locate significantly near transitory zones, in which temporary authorization is 
granted to a group of vendors until choosing a particular exchange option. As in Lima, where 
vending sites keep locating in close proximity to roofed markets, Bogotá’s vending sites also 
show that areas undergoing relocations either at street or out of streets are invaded again. Despite 
the greater emphasis in control on recovered public space, their locations neither agglomerate nor 
disperse vending sites. Interestingly, the materialization of policy options in space seems to 
promote rather than inhibit the pattern of location of street trade in Bogotá. 
3.2 WHERE DO CONTROL AND COMPETITION MATTER? 
While in general terms, the distribution of vending sites is sensitive to the features of the 
urban structure that define an attractive market, vendors usually are exposed to other factors that 
condition their access to space. In this section, I explore two more factors such as the exposure of 
a street vending site to control interventions and supermarket competition. I compare global 
(city-wide) and local (trade area) effects in order to disentangle the relationships among uneven 
patterns of enforcement at a more micro scale than those identified across local municipalities. 
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For the purpose of modeling these three effects, I delineated for each vending site an area 
of influence from which I build a dependent variable that could be comparable across trade 
areas: the mean density of vendors per square kilometers21 (Details in Methodological appendix 
C). The independent variables were constructed for each of these trade areas. The agglomeration 
index is a count variables composed by the number of features identified at the specific distances 
that in the CNN analysis were as attracting vendors. The exposure to control policies is also a 
count variable which represents the number of control interventions that the trade area would 
have undergone in the last three or five years of reference22 before the vendors’ count (2005-
2007 in Lima and 2000-2005 in Bogotá). Supermarket competition is measured as the share of 
prospective clients the closest supermarket could have according to the socioeconomic profiles 
of the households living in the trade area. 23 
A review of the distribution maps of each of these variables clearly shows spatial 
relationships among them (Methodological Appendix C, Sub section C.3.4 Descriptive Tables 
and Maps). The highest values of mean density in Lima show an expanding pattern from center 
to North with some high value spots in the South. These patterns also converge into significant 
high-value clusters (See LISA maps in Methodological Appendix C, Subsection C 3.4). The 
agglomeration index shows a center-periphery pattern. Low values are more common at the 
periphery. Supermarket competition and exposure to control policies coincide in that both have 
higher values within central districts, resulting in significant matching clusters. 
In Bogotá the mean density of vendors shows higher values in downtown and the west 
side of the city which also correspond to high value clusters. In contrast to Lima, the 
agglomeration index is more widespread to other centralities in the North, West and Center of 
                                                 
21 The mean density of vendors represented a better indicator than the raw counts of vendors in each vending site. In 
one hand, it provided an offset variable (square kilometers) to draw comparison between trade areas of different 
sizes. In the other hand, it also helped to reduce the skewness of the raw counts. 
22 The differential time spam is due to the availability. 
23 Each of these measurements is explained in detail in the Methodological Appendix C 
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the city. Similar to Lima supermarket competition and exposure to control show a close match. 
Both variables tend to cluster within downtown and north areas. 
Table 3.2 shows the correlations of the variables with mean density of vendors for both 
cities. All variables in Lima significantly correlate to mean density. In Bogotá only 
agglomeration index shows a significant correlation. Despite this difference, for comparison 
purposes, I opted to include these variables in the OLS model for Bogotá. 
Table 3.2 Kendall Tau-b Correlation Coefficients for Mean Density of Vendors in Lima and 
Bogotá 
 Mean Density of Vendors 
 Lima Bogotá 
Agglomeration Index .135* .249* 
Supermarket Competition -.110** -.071 
Exposure to Control -.219** .059 
†p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
I present four OLS regression24 models summarized in Table 2.4 The results in Model 1 
suggest that the effect of enforcement alone is low and practically insignificant in both cities. 
Introducing the effect of agglomeration factors and supermarket competition respectively in 
Model 2 and Model 3 do not alter the effect of enforcement. In model 2, enforcement still 
remains insignificant and while statistically significant in Lima the negative effect is practically 
irrelevant. Also, in model 3, the control of supermarket competition does not show a 
considerable effect on enforcement coefficients in both cities. Even in model 4, which controls 
for both supermarket competition and agglomeration factors, the exposure to control policies 
does not show a statistical significant effect on vendors’ mean density in both cities. The 
adjusted r squared for model 4 in both cities show also a quite low goodness of fit (4% in Lima 
and 12% in Bogotá). 25  
                                                 
24 Due to the distribution of the variable, Poisson models were discarded. The initial raw counts merited a negative 
binomial regression model which is unavailable in both Arc Gis and GWR3. The mean density made the distribution 
more normal to use OLS. While a poisson model theoretically would have been desirable to use for mean density, 
the Poisson option in GWR3 failed to run due to the small sample size.  
25 Nonetheless, regression analyses of mean density in other research contexts, such hazardous facilities, are usually 
low, presumably due to the fact that location as a dependent variable may require further predictors which are 
difficult to compile. See Mennis, Jeremy L. and Lisa Jordan. 2005. "The distribution of environmental equity: 
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Table 3.3 OLS Regression Coefficients of the Effects of Agglomeration Index, Supermarket 
Competition and Exposure to Control Policies on the Mean Density of Street 
Vendors within a Trade Area for Lima and Bogotá 
LIMA         
Independent Variables Model 1 Sig. Model 2 Sig. Model 3 Sig. Model 4 Sig. 
Constant 89.008 ** -27.651  96.770 ** -37.991  
 (7.948)  (61.247)  (9.033)  (60.887)  
Exposure to Control Policies 
(CP) -0.053 * -0.055 * -0.025  -0.023  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
Agglomeration Index (AI)   15.238 †   17.797 * 
   (7.933)    (7.954)  
Supermarket Competition 
(SC)     -2.736 † -3.262 * 
     (1.541)  (1.544)  
N 191  191  191  191  
Adjusted R2 0.010  0.024  0.022  0.042  
 
BOGOTÁ 
Constant 86.924 ** -38.675  128.748 ** 7.982  
 (13.247)  (35.615)  (33.292)  (43.548)  
Exposure to Control Policies 
(ECP) 0.0246  -0.400  0.423  0.078  
 (0.689)  (0.658)   (0.746)  (0.701)  
Agglomeration Index (AI)   19.106 **   19.941 ** 
   (5.076)    (5.039)  
Supermarket Competition (SC)     -2.565  -3.198 † 
     (1.874)  (1.756)  
N 102  102  102  102  
Adjusted R2 0.020  0.098  0.011  0.119  
†p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses 
The global models may suggest that exposure to control policies are not as strong, despite 
the fact that historical accounts show how greater efforts in control have translated in areas 
within cities in which vending is visibly more persecuted. But, given the fact that enforcement is 
indeed uneven across local administrations, it is expected that the role and strength of 
enforcement is a spatially heterogeneous phenomenon. Then, I explore the effects of model 4, 
using Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR), a regression technique that extends the 
classical OLS model to estimate and map coefficients across space (details on this technique are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Exploring spatial nonstationarity in multivariate models of air toxic releases." Annals Association of American 
Geographers 95:249-268. 
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explained in Methodological Appendix C).26 The advantages of GWR are mainly related to the 
visualization of varying spatial relationships which are relevant for the purpose of this study. 
However, it is important to point out that this technique has been criticized on the grounds that it 
increases collinearity (Wheeler and Tiefelsdorf 2005) in the data and it may show spurious 
relationships (Paez et al. 2011). Given the limitations of the data gathered on the number of 
vendors and the imprecise account of control operations by the administrative offices in both 
cities, the use of this technique then is rather informative for the purpose of this study. Using the 
local mapping is meant to find evidence of spatial processes that could be further explored in the 
qualitative analysis. 
When observing the mapping of local coefficients in Maps 3.1 for Lima and Maps 3.2 for 
Bogotá, the strength of control interventions becomes clearer and permits the visual 
representation of spatial hierarchies of intervention and its matching relationships with the 
expansion of retail consumer base.  
In general terms, the GWR model for Lima seems to fit strongly in most of the areas 
where local coefficients are significant at .05 level as shown by the local adjusted r squares (Map 
31d in orange). In the coefficient Maps 3.1a and 3.1b for Lima, control interventions and 
supermarket competition have a decreasing effect on the mean density of vendors in most of the 
trade areas for which the model is statistically significant. The matching suppressing effect, 
represented in blue tones, is located in downtown and northern zones, at the point that the 
agglomeration index effect is suppressed.  
Fewer areas of exception, where either the effect of supermarket competition or control 
interventions increases vending (in red), are identified. For instance, at the intersection of 
Comas, Los Olivos and Puente Piedra, supermarket competition seems to rather increase the 
mean density of vendors. Likewise, particularly in Comas there is a specific trade area in which 
                                                 
26 In these local regression models, the option of adaptative kernel was used, meaning that the program selected the 
optimum bandwidth. The N or local sample size for Lima and Bogotá was respectively 36 and 52. The bandwidth 
method used was based on the optimum number of neighbors that could reduce the AIC.  
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control interventions do not show a suppressing pattern.  In both cases, this may be due to a time 
effect. As in that area a supermarket just recently installed within areas with large roofed markets 
and street markets. 
The agglomeration index in general shows a rather unexpected effect. Instead of 
promoting more vending, when controlled by enforcement and supermarket competition, it 
decreases the mean density of vendors. The exception is found at the entrance areas of the 
districts of El Agustino and Santa Anita. This can be due to the fact that within those areas, 
despite their relative attractiveness to vendors, control operations are strongly clustered.  
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Map 3.1a Local coefficients for control interventions in Lima 
 




Map 31c Local coefficients for supermarket competition in 
Lima 
 





The results in Bogotá overall reflect those of Lima but also show substantial differences. 
The GWR model show a stronger fit in most of the city trade areas as shown in Map 3.2d (in 
orange tones). Like Lima, Maps 3.2a and 3.2b for Bogotá´s strength of control interventions also 
matches the patterns of supermarket competition. Exposure to control interventions shows a 
negative or decreasing effect on mean density of vendors within downtown, and central areas up 
north and west. In contrast to Lima, the effect is more widespread and shows a clustered pattern 
of exception within southern areas corresponding to the border region of Rafael Uribe, Ciudad 
Bolivar and Tunjuelito.  
Like Lima, the suppressing effect of control policies matches closely the suppressing 
effect of supermarket competition. But the areas of exception, where supermarket competition 
rather increases vending, are much larger comprising many localities in the Southwest such as 
Bosa, Kennedy, Ciudad Bolivar and Fontibón. Within downtown areas supermarket competition 
does not have a significant effect. This may be expected as many other factors, rather than solely 
supermarkets, promote the concentration of a pedestrian population that vendors look for. In this 
area, the only significant coefficient is the exposure to control policies. 
Unlike Lima, the agglomeration index shows an expected positive relationship, 
increasing the mean density of vendors, particularly in the peripheral north and south of Bogotá. 
This means that in these areas many factors are strongly attracting vendors despite control 
interventions. Also, another exceptional case corresponds to the area where supermarket 
competition and control both show an increasing effect as well, suggesting that there are some 
enabling factors in the south which promote ´safer’ niches to locate.  
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This chapter served to provide a baseline comparison of the spatial patterns of 
street trade in Lima and Bogotá and test the hypothesis on how functional enforcement of 
control are to the private sector. 
The spatial patterns perceived in Lima and Bogotá reveal different placemaking 
processes and hierarchies of intervention. The results from the CNN confirmed that 
different features of the urban structure appeal to vendors differently in each city. In the 
case of Bogotá, the permanent peddling type implies a greater distance from vendors’ 
residence, and the factors more appealing are the closeness to bus stations, centralities 
and relocation on-street projects. Quite differently in Lima, closeness to residency, key 
institutions and popular markets were features more attractive to vendors, confirming that 
this activity is market forming. 
Likewise, the GWR local results confirmed that patterns of high enforcement 
expand beyond the historic center and reach increasingly the northern part of the city. 
Also, the fact that patterns of enforcement expand more evenly in Bogotá illustrate how 
the citywide perspective involve surveillance over public space that is more widespread 
with the use of zoning. The exceptional cases of low enforcement local municipalities 
show also a similar trend in which the more peripheral municipalities are usually those 
with more resident and working vending population. 
Despite differential processes, one key feature of the spatial hierarchy in both 
cities at the neighborhood/trade area level is that the patterns of enforcement closely 
match the expansion of modern retail in both cities. The GWR local results show that 
when controlling by supermarket competition and control, the agglomeration index effect 
is suppressed or even reversed. This means that even if an area is attractive to a vendor 
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control operations, which seem to be more aggressive in areas where modern retail 
expands their consumer base, are reducing the number of vendors. This is clearer in the 
case of Lima where street markets are in open competition as alternative points of 
destination to supermarkets. 
The differences between cities’ spatial patterns may suggest also differences in 
the practice of control policies and coping mechanisms of vendor when exposed to 
commercial gentrification. As documented in the previous chapter, control policies in 
Lima tend to be evictions that are definitive, using national or municipal police, 
compared to Bogotá where surveillance is more permanent but is required to assume a 
pedagogical role and prevent human rights’ violations. Furthermore, as supermarkets 
compete more openly with street markets in Lima, the most homogeneous suppressing 
effect is expected contrasting Bogotá, where supermarkets can also be an agglomeration 
factor for vendors 
Comparing the global and local GWR results highlight the importance of the local 
context. The way the urban structure impacts the vendor seem to be an important feature 
to explain the fluctuation of the number of vendors and the shaping of this occupation.  
At the city level, the impact of control policies seem to be minor compared to the 
urban structure features that gave room to market opportunities and also market 
competition. However, even if lacking strength in statistical terms, the role of state could 
not be minimized. The local results suggest that there are strategic interventions whose 
levels of success vary across urban space. The mapping of coefficients serves to identify 
places of trends where control interventions and supermarket competition have both a 
negative effect on street trade, and places of exceptions when either enforcement or 
supermarket competition appear having an enabling effect.  
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In the next chapter, I will explore more closely these patterns through the role of 





Chapter 4: Public Officials Rationale for intervention 
The cities selected for this study present different structures of governance, 
perspective of urban planning and political discourses that influence the policymaking 
towards vendors. As described in the previous chapter, Lima has an administratively and 
politically decentralized administration with numerous autonomous municipalities with a 
discretionary practice in the regulation of public space. In contrast, Bogotá has a 
centralized administration that delineates local municipalities’ interventions, and citywide 
institutions focused on the regulation of public space. Then, in Bogotá, the emphasis in 
policy making and evaluation of street trade governance take a more citywide dimension 
compared to Lima. Thus, spatial hierarchies are reproduced differently. In Lima, they are 
reproduced in a local scale through a ‘multiple downtown effect’ where local 
municipalities replicate at their pace and convenience successful practices in the historic 
center. In Bogotá, policies are implemented based on the commitment of local 
municipalities toward city planners through the use of zoning, whose regulations 
transcend local proposals and are decided through central institutions according to the 
priorities of the city plans.  
The political context of this study in Bogotá represents the experience of a 
traditional left party in governing the city, while in Lima; it is located within the 
experience of an independent but right-wing city government with a tendency to have 
independent mayors in many districts. The traditions of municipal management towards 
vendors in both cities also differ. The prevalent professional backgrounds at the local 
level correspond to more economist and business mayors in Lima through local economic 
development offices, while more lawyers at the local level in the offices of legal 
87 
 
assessment, and architects at the city level, design policies and reinforce control towards 
street vendors respectively in Bogotá.  
Influenced by these diverse political and professional backgrounds the discourse 
of policymaking can be labeled as ‘streetwise neoliberalism’ in Lima and ‘sidewalk 
urbanism’ in Bogotá. In this chapter, I describe and compare the key ideas at the core of 
these policy making approaches towards vendors attending to their particular mechanisms 
that reproduce different spatial hierarchies of intervention. Based on an analysis of 33 
interviews with local– 14 in Lima and 19 in Bogotá– and 6 – three in each city-
metropolitan public officials from offices directly related to control and regulation of 
street vendors in each city, 27 this chapter is divided in four sections, representing the 
dimensions for the comparative analysis: (1) representations of vendors’ economic use of 
public space, (2) the rationale for upgrading strategies, (3) the role of the private sector, 
and (4) the relationship with vendors’ organizations. I conclude with a comparative 
summary of results.  
It will be my contention throughout the chapter that even though the politics and 
discourses of planning and policymaking in Lima and Bogotá are different, similar trends 
can be found across the four dimensions. Then, both cities reframe policymaking and 
political practices in ‘exclusionary’ terms –despite claims that policies should be 
beneficial for vendors– and justify interventions aimed at disciplining the vendor and 
expanding the reach of the private sector.  
                                                 
27 For details on the data collection and methods see Methodological Appendix D 
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4.1 REPRESENTATIONS OF VENDOR’S ECONOMIC USE OF PUBLIC SPACE 
4.1.1 Lima: Probing the Peruvian dream 
At times of economic growth, with the objective to attract private investment, 
public space has acquired a different role in Lima. Public space has become the realm 
where economic growth needs to shine. The call for modernization is not only reflected 
in more investments in urban renewal, highways, etc. but also comprises the street vendor 
as a subject whose moving upwards proves that everyone can progress if they are willing 
to unleash their full potential. Then, taxing the street or saying that the use of it is valid is 
not only illegitimate but also a way to perpetuate informality. To illustrate this vision, I 
use the image below.  
Illustration 4.1 Microcredit Ad at the Entrance of the Northern Cone, District of San 
Martín de Porres 
 
 
I took this picture in 2005 at the entrance of the Northern Cone of Lima. The 
picture is an advertisement from a microcredit lender targeting informal entrepreneurs. 
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The sandwich stall on the street with the sign “Visit us in our new establishment in 
Miraflores”, 28 describes the aspiration of a vendor to become a formal entrepreneur, 
inviting his customers in the northern cone to go to their new place in the fashionable 
district of Miraflores. The slogan on white characters on the left confirms the intent of the 
lender, which states that “We lend you money to take your business to a better level”. 
Interestingly, the image of progress is not only moving away from the street but to be 
able to serve those market areas clearly targeted by larger retailers, with malls, designers’ 
boutiques and fancy restaurants. The image, showing a lonely stall on the street, 
capitalizes on the individual desire to attain better living conditions through formal 
entrepreneurship –and of course access to credit– a path to growth and modernity that 
every citizen should be entitled to aspire. 
The ideology that this image represents is not very different from policy making 
towards the informal sector, and the street vendor in particular. Many pretty pictures of 
recovered public spaces are presented with pride in many districts. However, the 
emphasis of the policy is not only centered on the aim to build a modern city but also on 
the dream of winning with modernity. As economic development comes first, public 
space has to follow. That is, controlling public space is an important strategy to secure 
and assure the movement towards that aspiration. It can be argued that it is the mayors’ 
duty to prove that economic growth is possible for all, a way to show the Peruvian 
Dream.  
Envisioning the management of public space as an economic development issue 
promotes a different approach to street vending. Heavily influenced by De Soto’s 
recommendations, a body of enthusiastic and young public officials, whose 
                                                 
28 All translations made by the Author. 
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professionalization is mostly in economics and business management, dominate Local 
Economic Development Offices that implement policies towards vendors. Many of them 
were trained in professional seminars such the 2005 Course of Local Economic 
Development provided by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2005. An 
expertise in LED was also evident by the fact that they have served in many other 
municipalities in the previously named Departments of Commercialization.  
De Soto (1989)observed that a transition from itinerant vending to fixed post and 
then roofed market vendors was likely and even desirable for the vendor. He argued that 
“street vendors aspire to stability” (1989:1132), reinterpreting that stability as being off 
rather that at streets. Interestingly, at the time of his study, vendors’ organization pushed 
for a stable regulatory practice materialized in the Ordinance 002 of 1985 which included 
taxation but made a compromise with municipalities to direct 20% of the collection to 
create a fund for vendor programs of capitalization and social services. Ironically, despite 
the regulations in place, De Soto highlighted that the appropriation of the use of public 
space was ‘extralegal’, and part of the reason for this ‘extra-legality’ –which means a 
grey area between legal and informal– was the payment of the right to use public space. 
Along these lines, policymakers concerned with the municipal role of 
strengthening local capabilities agree that in order to increase economic opportunities, 
informal entrepreneurs are an asset, and thus the promotion of their activity cannot be 
envisioned without their integration into the formal sector, and the progressive clearing 
out of streets. Consequentially taxing the use of the streets under the name of sisa has 
been discredited. Many of public officials interviewed confirmed that granting the 
payment of sisa was, as De Soto claimed before, a ‘boomerang’ policy which gave 
vendors a sense of entitlement that made difficult formalization projects.  
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“They [vendors] think that for paying 0.50 cents or 1 sol, they are owners of the 
streets, and this is neither here nor anywhere” (Villa el Salvador) 
 “In Surco never, never are they allowed to pay sisa, because in some way you are 
giving a right to the vendor, and they can claim that” (San Juan de Miraflores, 
public official with prior experience in Surco, a middle class district) 
Even if direct revenue could be extracted from taxing the streets, public officials 
perceive that in the long run formalization is the best practice. Most local governments 
prohibit the sisa tax just before relocation takes place. In peripheral districts where taxing 
street vendors still provides an important source of municipal revenue, such in Comas, an 
alternative approach entails collecting sisa, while also supervising collective savings. Or 
as part of the ‘multiple downtown effect’, such as the municipality of Puente Piedra, sisa 
is prohibited in the central commercial zone to avoid vendors’ using the streets that were 
subject to prior relocation. Overall, many public officials perceive that even with political 
costs, promoting the transition to formality is a must: 
“Look, I know that before there was a sum of money that came from that 
collection. They say it was one sol everyday by 6500 people, that is 6500 soles 
daily, by 30 days, we are talking about 195 thousand soles a month that came to 
the Mayor´s Office. By twelve months, we are talking about 2 million 334 
thousand soles, that is 800 thousand dollars in a year. Do you understand what is 
happening here? It is because there were created interests. Then if you don´t have 
an authority who thinks in the future, and wants to change things, that authority 
will not start problems with those 6500 people. It has a political cost that you 
know you will have to assume if you are someone with conviction and morals, 
you will not have another choice. How will you receive all this money? That 
could easily not be part of the municipality budget and nobody will file complaint 
about it if you do not change a reality that is urgent. Now we need to make the 
entrepreneurs realize that they have the duty to change this reality”. (Ate Vitarte) 
In this approach where no legal venue could justify the economic use of streets, 
street vending is a less tolerable activity. In the coded references from the public 
officials’ interviews, street vending was overwhelmingly associated with negative images 
such, disorder (16%), dirtiness (16%) crime (5%), the deterioration of value to the city 
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(3%) and distasteful aesthetics (1%). These negative references altogether compose 
almost half of the references and overpower other typical associations such the need to 
work (16%) and the recognition that there is a traditional custom to buy on streets (3%), 
contributing overall to worsen the image of this occupation. 
Furthermore, as economic growth is perceived as attainable, the need to work is 
no longer perceived as the most significant reason to remain on the street. In the 
testimonies collected, while the need to work were mentioned in less than a quarter of 
references, half of the references were composed by arguments associating street vending 
with the lack of control (17%), culture of informality (16%)and the lack of respect for 
public goods (12%), which are closely connected. That is, street vending represents a sign 
of lack of governance towards a ‘culture of informality’–usually connected to 
mediocrity– in which people occupy the streets permanently instead of challenging 
themselves to become full entrepreneurs.  
Success in policy towards assuring control over public space is usually measured 
by the number of vendors relocated; that is, permanently removed from the streets and up 
to the task of making a living in the formal sector. In the peripheral districts as well as the 
historic center, street vending represents the ‘culture of informality’ which takes 
advantage of lack of regulation. In that perspective the role of the mayor and the 
municipality is to regain control of public space, and do it in such a way that vendors can 
show that they are committed to development, instead of making a living in the shadows 
of subsistence.  
Clearly, this argument finds traction in the fact that private investment has 
increased, more notably in the peripheral districts. Large street markets with long 
histories are perceived as falling behind, that is losing competitiveness. Consequentially, 
93 
 
vendors are suspected of using poverty as an excuse for not improving themselves as 
entrepreneurs:  
“these people, the ones I am talking about they are not poor anymore, what 
happens is that they are used to that way of living, if you see them, they look 
poor, but if you just see them around, they have the best cars”. (San Martín de 
Porres about street vendors in Caquetá, the largest street market at the entrance of 
the Northern Cone) 
Even in areas where malls and supermarkets have not arrived, public officials 
project that investment will expand and the informal entrepreneur must prove their 
capacity to improve their business:  
“I see the same level of growth, there are people that have five, ten years and they 
continue selling the same thing all this time, that means there is no entrepreneurial 
vision for managing their business, and that is what work is, that is a paradox, 
there is a lot of poverty, lower levels of education, but above all a lot of 
informality”. (Puente Piedra) 
And this is not exclusive of the Northern Cone, where private investment has 
increased considerably, other districts in the peripheries have envisioned a closer 
connection to private investment through the construction of highways such as in the case 
of Ate Vitarte. The need to work, because of lack of formal employment, is also 
perceived as an excuse to avoid being pushed to grow, 
“They, that is the street vendors, consider themselves as informal workers because 
the system pushes them out, which is half true (…) what happen is that it is easier 
to be in the mediocrity than making efforts to get ahead”.  
Public space is imagined so that its recuperation provides economic growth. 
Beyond the historic downtown, most of the districts have central areas or ‘mini 
downtowns’ surrounded by main streets which are the most common sites for evictions. 




“The main thing is that they are not in main streets. Why? So that the main street 
is clean and organized, then you may relocate them in smaller streets, passages 
that are nearby but not in plain sight”. (San Juan de Miraflores) 
However, urban renewal by itself, rarely, was the main reason to justify an 
eviction. In many districts of the peripheries, “Alamedas” which are pedestrian pathways 
with trees were built after the eviction but these spaces are rarely designed purposively to 
attract visitors or even host local public events. Interestingly, a prior proposal from 
vendors to build an alameda with an underground market in another area did not merit 
much attention. The focus is to strengthen commercial activity in a formal setting. The 
urban renewal project in itself is not the selling point, except in the cases of the 
construction of highways: 
“the construction of the Alameda has a social and economic dimension, because 
we have not simply evicted 400 vendors, we have worked on a relocation of them 
in a market located only 2 blocks away which had empty stalls” (Independencia, 
on the Alameda 16 de Marzo) 
Urban renewal in some cases is a tool to communicate the Mayor’s success with 
before and after pictures usually displayed at the center of the recovered area. This is very 
much the principal lesson acquired from much popular relocations in the historic center, 
such the case of Las Malvinas. The Mayor not only constructed a large alameda with 
parking spaces and even soccer fields, he also promoted as results his success in creating 
10,000 business owners, increased their earning from 50 to 250 dollars and increased 
their land revenue from 250 to 1000 or even 3000 dollars. 29 
Meanwhile, central residential districts with functions more open to tourism, view 
public space an asset to attract visitors. While this vision is not fully incompatible with 
certain regulated spaces for vending, the common practice has been to reduce the quota 
                                                 
29Jaime Alva, Chief of Local Economic Development, in his presentation to the press and the OIT of 
Metropolitan Lima Municipal achievements in 2005 
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of permits, as the occupation in itself is neither considered fundamental to the vocation of 
public space nor perceived as important services to the residents. From my interviews, 
only the public official from Miraflores explained that regulation of public space, and 
vending in particular, was meant to make the district enjoyable for pedestrians, “We care 
about public space; people come to this district to walk here, to enjoy the streets”. 
The organization of street fairs and regulation of street vendors was not 
incompatible with this view, but it was not intended to create a permanent quota for 
vendors. As a vendor retired, the license was not issued to another person or even close 
relative. While the function to attract visitors was attributed to public space, it was at the 
time of interview unthinkable that this same function could be attributed also to a vendor. 
However, the district up to 2010 hosted the most famous vendor in the history of Lima. 
Grimanesa’s anticuchos30 became so popular that visitors from different parts of Lima 
started to crowd to her stall. She was even visited by the famous Peruvian chef Gastón 
Acurio, and interviewed several times on television shows.  
The fame proved not so beneficial: Grimanesa’s license was not renewed, in part 
because of claims from some neighbors that it was getting too congested to pass by the 
previously quiet street. The initial position of the Municipality supported the vendor, as 
she had become an important character of the district and even offered local police to 
alleviate traffic jams. Later, she was relocated in a wider street. However, after some 
time, they once again declined to renew her license and many other leading caterers and 
restaurant entrepreneurs supported her being moved as an example to other entrepreneurs 
                                                 
30Traditional street food made from beef heart which is marinated, skewered, and seared over the grill and 
served as a kabob. 
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that formality is the way to go. In other words, success cannot have a place at the streets 
anywhere in Lima.  
In either case, street vending is incompatible with the image of economic growth 
and progress and consequentially actions are directed to ensure that the path to economic 
development is achievable. The economic use of public space, then, becomes illegitimate. 
4.1.2 Bogotá: Designing for social inclusion 
As a city with an important legacy of renowned and progressive architects, public 
space in Bogotá is a realm of intervention on its own right. The transition to a more 
progressive attitude towards vendors’ economic use of public space cannot be understood 
without going deep into their aspirations to upgrade the citizen culture by providing a 
redesign of the physical environment. By focusing on public space, the street vending 
approach as implemented in Bogotá seeks inclusion through the belief in the positive 
impact of urban design but as a top-down approach continues to see the street vendor as 
the subject of discipline. To illustrate this vision, I use a picture and the case of the Eje 
Ambiental, one of the last contributions of Rogelio Salmona, 31 who was the most 
representative and influential architect in the city.  
                                                 
31 Rogelio Salmona died at the age 78 in October 2007, a year after his participation in the Public Space 
Master Plan for Luis Garzón administration.  
97 
 
Illustration 4.2 Eje Ambiental Bogotá 
 
The entrance of the Jimenez Avenue, now Eje Ambiental, was a paved street that 
was crammed by buses with some fixed post vendors that used to sell second-hand items. 
Inaugurated in 2000 during Peñaloza administration, as shown in the Illustration 4.2, the 
street incorporated several uses that show a progressive attitude towards public space. It 
recovered a natural creek that was paved before, incorporated trees and vast spaces for 
the pedestrian to enjoy. The Transmilenio was incorporated in this renewal with the aim 
of incorporating all the uses that the avenue previously had. Salmona gave Peñaloza the 
task to incorporate the street vendors in this space, and kept that recommendation even 
when confronting considerable criticism. As he argued in an interview:  
“They say that we are going to fill the street with ‘vendutas’ [derogatory term for 
street trade] because we have appointed spaces for street vendors, but they are 
part of the population and we cannot disappear them using magic. If there is no 
regulation, they will invade, and that cannot be controlled. Or, someone has been 
able to control the encroachment of these spaces, not by humans but by cars?” 
(Nieto de Samper 04/11/1997). 
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It is important to realize that policy making towards street vending had never 
previously aimed to incorporate the vendor. The rise of pedagogical urbanism in the 
previous Mockus and Peñaloza administrations was highly exclusionary of public space 
‘misfits’ such street vendors and the homeless, and involved methods not only to regulate 
urban space but also monitor street behavior (Berney 2011). The incorporation of vendors 
was given effect by the Sentence 772 of the Constitutional Court which stated that no 
vendor should be evicted without offering an alternative employment to secure at least 
the minimum wage.  
Faced with the mandate of the Constitutional Court, the following administrations 
were up to the challenge to fit the right to work into the right to the city, a right that many 
public officials perceive as fundamental, into a long tradition of planning public space. In 
that context, Luis Garzón, as the newly elected mayor from the left party Polo 
Democrático, asked Salmona to be a consultant in the elaboration of the Master Plan for 
Public Space. Temporary fairs started to be run in recovered public spaces, and 
specifically, a second-hand fair was run every Sunday in one of the plazas that are part of 
the Eje Ambiental. Quioscos, or fixed stalls specially designed and administered by the 
city, were also part of the plan to incorporate vending within urban renewal. All of these 
policies continued with Samuel Moreno. As proposed by the design of Salmona, public 
space is the scene to crystallize a democratic livelihood, in which all users agree to live 
harmoniously, involving a compromise of the residents to agree to the rules to assure 
everyday norms of behavior. In many of the public officials I interviewed the aspirations 
of social inclusion which involve the need of control could be perceived in the way they 
envision public space.  
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Despite regular violations, there is an extensive awareness that public space needs 
to be respected in Bogotá and its creation involves primarily urban design. For urban 
planners and policymakers, the character of physical space is shaped by norms and laws 
that mandate that any construction project delineates a percentage of its area to the 
creation of common use spaces that should be administered by the city.  
“We [public officials] do not construct public space, rather public space is 
generated by itself, the constructors keep generating it independently on what is 
there, that is natural”. (DADEP) 
Common uses do not create public space but rather a blank area which is 
subjected to regulation to accommodate a function designed from above. That is why, in 
contrast to Lima, policy reports on advances related to street vending are reported in 
square meters of public space recovered. By ‘recovered’, the city officials mean that it is 
back under the control of the city and thus respects the norms that accommodate 
harmoniously the uses and the function that is expected of an open space. 
The focus on public space as physical space reframes a specific use as a situation 
that requires planning and norms to complement the function assigned to an area. Public 
space goes beyond the issue of vending from a policymaking point of view.  
“The presence of informal vendors in the public space is one of the elements that 
clearly hinder its adequate use but it is not the only one, there are other forms that 
you can see, and they are occupations and uses that are not only related to sales, 
the parking of vehicles above the sidewalks or in front of a garden or even within 
the road dividers or other green areas, for example the extension of private 
dwellings on pedestrian zones, the location of private property furniture on the 
public zones using the sidewalk for exhibition, that is, there is more than one 
element that constitutes an inadequate use of public space and if we talk about 
vendors they are only a tiny portion compared to the rest of the aggressions” 
(DADEP) 
For instance, from the 4,784 actions reported by the Secretary of Government 
related to a violation in the use of public space between 2000 and 2010, only 235 
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involved street vendors.32 Regardless of the socioeconomic composition of the locality, 
all the local public officials interviewed said that they receive frequent complaints 
regarding violations in terms of street behavior or adequate use of public space, which 
need a prompt legal response beyond their normal activities. The fact that residents 
complain about uses such the loudness of music, or that a neighbor fixes his car on the 
sidewalk, among many other cases cited, shows that there is a common understanding on 
what is expected of norms of urban behavior among residents. Consequentially, street 
trade’s use of space is a problem from a policy making standpoint in that it challenges the 
control or authority of the city, which not only regulates the function of a specific space 
but also regulates its uses.  
Unlike the local public officials in Lima, public officials in Bogotá coming from 
different administrations, central or local, emphasized the social dimensions behind the 
phenomenon of street vending rather than its negative consequences. 33 From the 18 
municipalities and 4 central administrations interviewed, 53 references related to street 
vending use of space were coded. Public officials in Bogotá related street vending 
overwhelmingly to the need to work (28.3%), social and economic exclusion (9.4%) and 
political displacement (13.2%). Altogether social and economic conditions compose half 
of the references. Among the references, it is very usual to quote indices of 
unemployment and its effects on public space.  
“It is a combination of the excessive growth of poverty and an ‘easy’ growth of 
employment, in this last semester there were 452 thousand more jobs but of these 
300 were informal”. (IPES director) 
                                                 
32 Author’s calculations based on the reports of the Sistema de Inspección, Vigilancia y Control. Retrieved 
from http://www.gobiernoBogotá.gov.co/servicio/DH/consultaSG.php. February 06, 2011. 
33Negative perceptions were few compared to Lima. Among those identified were disorder (3 references), 
dirtiness (2 references) and also the attraction to delinquency in an area (2), which actually represent 
around 2% of the total references collected related to problems connected with street trade . 
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“We have studied the people in the locality because many of them looked for a 
job and did not get any offer. Then, every time the job fails, they occupy the 
public space. Employment drops by 2 percent points and you can see more street 
vendors, people prefer this form of work so they can take something to eat at 
home even if it is vending”. (Antonio Nariño, Legal adviser) 
Therefore, the need to work, which is associated with larger social and economic 
structures that the city administration cannot change, has brought the challenge to reclaim 
public space for the city: 
“Here in Ciudad Bolivar and in every locality, and the same in all of Colombia, 
South America and Latin America, and the world, they are the same conditions. 
Street vending is motivated by an economic need and basically the complexity of 
these issues is that these people in developing their activity collide with and go 
against the harmony of the city, with its mobility, with public space”. (Ciudad 
Bolivar, Legal adviser) 
Public officials at the central offices and local governments coincide in making a 
more socially concerned evaluation of vending and advocate for social inclusion: 
“I think that the society would need to accept street vending... The issue of 
informal vending should be valued differently. These are very brave people who, 
facing unemployment, are capable of creating their own jobs. I believe these 
economies are too fragile to be judged drastically.”(IPES director) 
“I agree with the idea that the city needs to be ordered with social inclusion. One 
cannot say that we end poverty by hiding it, because what created it is the social 
conflict in Colombia. That is what we need to end, not the vendors”. (Antonio 
Nariño, Legal adviser) 
Despite the emphasis of the social and economic reasons that explain street 
vending, there are also another set of references which attribute the practice as part of a 
‘deficiency’ of the citizen culture. Comprising about one quarter of references, public 
officials also find that street vending is related to the lack of civic culture (24.5%). Those 
responses involved a ‘culture of abusing the streets’ (7.5%), informality in the sense of 
not respecting the law (3.8%), taking advantage of not paying taxes (9.4%) or believing 
that the State has to provide for them (3.8%). These types of statements are more clearly 
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stated by local public officials who work as legal advisers in the local municipalities and 
rather than designing policy are expected to enforce regulations.  
“One is the problem of the State, the unemployment, and the other is because they 
benefit from it, don’t pay rent, don’t pay taxes and they do not need to comply 
with the Law 232 that regulates formal commerce”. (Fontibón, Legal Adviser) 
Notice that here, the culture of informality is not seen as the lack of 
entrepreneurship brought by the unwillingness to develop a full potential in the formal 
market thus limiting further economic development as was in the case in Lima. The 
culture of informality in Bogotá is phrased in terms of the idea of taking advantage of 
public goods or lack of respect for the rights of other people. It is understood as a 
particular relation with the State, not at the margins of it. Similar to the description of 
Georg Simmel (1965) on the nature of social assistance to the poor, the vendor becomes a 
recipient of social welfare, and as such the focus is turned to the actions of the giving and 
receiving, away from the perception that assistance can be a mean to an end or generated 
by a right itself: 
“the lack of a fixed job offer, lack of training of these people, the lack of initiative 
of many of those people that are used to be given things, that the State give things 
to them”. (Santa Fe, Legal Adviser) 
That attitude towards the state in the view of public officials is connected to the 
process of social exclusion. In other words, legal compliance is disregarded given social 
conditions that have kept this population away from the norms of society: 
“some limitations, the social and economic drama, then we are looking at some 
components that are related to the violence, the displacement, that generate 
informality, that conclude in that there is misery, informal vendors, illegal 
settlements, and those that are lucky to make any business, just do it without any 
condition, disregarding the legal compliance, any sanitary condition, safety 
condition, that is the same in any locality”. (Rafael Uribe, legal adviser) 
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The remaining references, which combined represented around 22.6%, associated 
street trade with the failure to provide adequate channels for commerce or reconversion 
of economic activity. Those references included statements about the individuals’ lack of 
entrepreneurship and capital, a habit of counting on that occupation as for a way of 
getting a living (9.4%). But they also included the fact that the society in general is used 
to that form of commerce (9.4%).  
“See, we are Colombians, and we like to stop at the traffic light and if they sell us 
bread and milk, we surely buy there”. (Santa Fe, Legal Adviser) 
Additionally, in few instances, public officials mentioned the lack of spaces for 
commerce to accommodate vendors, or the need of large enterprises to benefit from street 
commerce to start-up their businesses (1.9%).  
“As the need to work is too high, vendors will never find enough fairs where they 
can provide their services, then they use the streets without authorization, this is 
an endless problem”. (Candelaria, Legal Adviser) 
These last two set of references, which combine the need to develop civic culture 
and viable channels for people to provide commercial services and promote their activity, 
are motives that have been used to justify the current policy approach. In the rationale of 
policy makers, the need to work should fit in with the duty to comply with public space 
and a commitment to use the channels provided by the city to offer commercial services 
in an orderly manner with a promise of social inclusion.  
4.2 THE RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING STRATEGIES 
4.2.1 Lima: The need to unleash the entrepreneurs’ potential 
The practice of formalization has become a must for policymakers in Perú. On the 
side of the informal entrepreneur, it is considered beneficial as formalization involves an 
ongoing process, from relocation to permanent training and innovation. On the side of the 
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state, it is considered to be the cost-effective policy, as it makes tax collection for local 
and central administrations more efficient and involves little direct investment on 
infrastructure for the local municipalities. Thus, formalization is deemed as the best 
practice for unleashing the full potential of the street vendor, while keeping the state in a 
promoter role in line on what is expected in a free market economy. In that regard, a 
greater synergy between local municipalities and national initiatives brings up a higher 
investment in resources of promotion for entrepreneurship34 and consequentially a greater 
focus on upgrading street vending.  
While many public officials insist that formalization goes beyond relocation off-
streets, for the case of street vendors it cannot start without it. Formalization is perceived 
as a way to put an end to the ongoing negotiation at streets in which the need to work 
may lead to an increase in vendors or pressure to emit more licenses:  
“what do I win from fixing a stall, making it pretty, forcing them to wear a nice 
apron if he or she will be on the street, I want this gentleman or lady to become an 
entrepreneur, that he or she leaves the streets, and takes her or his business to a 
mall, or that they start their own store, to be out of the subsistence economy to a 
success economy, of growth, of progress. You have to think that the number you 
have authorized will be diminishing every day. That is the way you measure 
success in this program [Capitalizando], you should not measure it by the number 
that participates in it but by the number that graduates from it”. (Metropolitan 
Lima, LED office on licensed vendors) 
In situations in which the vendors have already relocated, many public officials 
agree that formalization involves in the long run a change in the mentality of the street 
vendor. The need to invest to better themselves and their situation is clear not only in 
their efforts to modernize their own infrastructure but also their own knowledge. A public 
                                                 
34 As explained in Chapter 2, through the program MiEmpresa of the Ministry of Labor, Local 




official from Comas told me that in the middle of a meeting of the European 
Commission, he gave a talk about the entrepreneurial capacity of his district’s residents. 
The public official, one of the most energetic and assertive managers of economic 
development that I have known, reported proudly that in Comas “we have street vendors 
that now have built their own mall”. He explained to me that the officers of the European 
Commission wanted instantly to see it. They were intrigued by the idea that it was a 
‘mall’. As it was just in front of the municipality, the public official took them there. 
After seeing what resembled a big parking lot with a plastic roof and small and crowed 
metallic stalls, he could not help but feel embarrassed realizing that the problem was a 
misunderstanding about the term “mall”. In Lima, many vendors may use the word 
‘commercial center or malls’ for places that may look like galleries, an enclosed place 
with crowded narrow stalls more or less reflecting the practice on the streets. Reflecting 
on this experience, he states: 
“After that, I also reacted. We are delayed too much. I talk to everyone of the 
vendors, they are improving their infrastructure. Now you can see, it will look like 
a commercial center, in two months they will reopen it”. (Comas, LED Office) 
To achieve formalization, training has become an important tool. Public officials 
perceive that training helps to change the outdated mentality attributed to informality. 
Many municipalities offer their own training courses in management, and also count on 
the support of private universities and central state programs. Specialized courses are 
offered with a discount and even if initially unsuccessful, they have become an important 
felt need among vendors: 
“Now many market and street markets in Villa el Salvador have understood , 
vendors come and ask for courses, because if before they weren’t important and 
became assemblies for the leaders to make claims or manifestos, now they know, 
that being asleep puts them into bad shape. Working in markets with matt walls 
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and corrugated roofs will not give much benefit to their clients”. (Villa El 
Salvador, LED office). 
In Miraflores, a district with the opposite situation whose residents are more 
likely to hold professional appointments, training is also used as mean to motivate 
vendors to improve their service, including English courses and sanitary training, “We 
work giving them incentives, for instance now we have a training course in two weeks”. 
While no aggressive policy towards formalization exists in this district, the public official 
proudly reports that with time many vendors have moved out of the streets and started to 
either buy stalls in established markets or buy properties within the district to open new 
businesses. 
Despite the enthusiasm around formalization, little is known about the outcomes 
or consequences of those policies for street vendors’ economic growth. In contrast with 
the numerous censuses and studies carried out before relocations, there is no systematic 
collection of information on the outcomes of formalization but rather general 
impressions. Trusting their perceptions, as street markets’ clientele may follow, they do 
not believe that there is a decrease in their income,  
“That is because, they [street vendors] kept their clients, then that tells us, that is 
an indicator that the street vendors have their ‘caseros’ [patrons] and that they are 
faithful despite their displacement. Then, we have come to the conclusion that the 
possibility to relocate is feasible because the clients will follow and that will not 
have much impact on their income”. (Independencia, LED office) 
Policymakers conceptualize formalization as an educational process that entails 
above all a change in the mentality of how to make business, using training offers as a 
source of incentive to convince street vendors to formalize. Attuned with the national 
initiatives, a ‘blind’ belief that formalization will increase their competitiveness 
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perpetuates this practice, giving vendors a higher responsibility to validate their 
entrepreneurial capacity.  
4.2.2 Bogotá: The call to commit for vendors’ own good  
Within a centralized top-down approach to policymaking, the call for a more 
inclusive policy has involved the coordination of different institutional levels to increase 
resources for upgrading policies35, as well as to generate more knowledge about street 
vending through the development of in-depth studies to sustain the upgrading policies. 
More importantly, it has also redefined the role of local control. In this practice, the street 
vendors are subjected not only to ‘pedagogical’ operations –which strength vary 
according to zoning– but most importantly encouraged to participate in the exchange 
options –under the commitment of assuming its occupation as temporary. The upgrading 
approach is validated by technical knowledge, purposively designed for vendors’ ‘own 
good’. 
The value of technical knowledge to sustain policy making has entailed the 
development of a series of studies conducted on street trade in the city. This has merited 
the designation of resources to treat street vending as a serious matter, not exempt of 
controversy from the public opinion. As an IPES public official coordinating the REDEP 
explains in response to the criticism in the media about the way resources are 
administered: 
“If they [the media] don’t understand, it is because they don’t want to. This 
process needs time, the resources are not just given, and we have to fight for 
them… They manage a political issue but not an economic inclusion issue. The 
guideline is established by us. But of course, from a technical standpoint”.  
                                                 
35 As explained in Chapter 2, DADEP, IDU and IPES have come together to regulate street vending 
through zoning. The Metropolitan police intervene according to the priority given to recovered and special 
zones in which informal vending is strictly prohibited. 
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For instance, in order to determine their sales capacity to justify the installation of 
REDEP stalls, IPES public officials designed a study in which they followed vendors for 
a month, recording their daily sales and investment, calculated the amount of sales and 
identified the most common brands of the products sold. The results helped to project the 
feasibility of renting the city administered stalls and involve key providers to develop a 
controlled channel of commerce. By conducting a count of vendors by the hour during a 
week in all the localities, they not only calculated the average number of vendors that use 
a street in a given day but also identified highly trafficked areas to support their approach 
to plan vending as a pedestrian service. Furthermore, they conducted a detailed street 
vendor profile in order to identify groups by age, level of education, conditions of 
displacement, and family situation to tailor options for a specific interest group.  
Ironically, the information for building policy options favoring vendors does not 
necessarily capture the value of practical knowledge from a vendors’ perspective and this 
is much clearer in terms of urban design. For instance, to select the fixed stalls, they 
choose the stall that won an urban design prize, named “Lápiz de Acero”. In a meeting I 
held with IPES public officials, I naively asked if a vendor was part of the jury after a 
proud official showed a photograph of the REDEP stall. Surprised by my question, they 
answered no. Validated by the prize, they did not even thought on making trials first to 
collect vendors’ suggestions to modify possible flaws in the design. Illustration 4.3 shows 
that the roof of the REDEP stall is too narrow for cover in a rainy city, and vendors 
usually improvise with a big umbrella, which is still called “an unauthorized item” in the 
stall in the views of public officials. 
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Illustration 4.3 REDEP stall with umbrella 
 
The call for social inclusion requires on behalf of the vendor a commitment to a 
civic culture and a careful planning from a policy making perspective to make the use of 
streets legitimate and functional to the vocation and vision of the city. That implies that 
part of the vendor’s civic commitment involves assuming their job as inherently 
temporary. For instance, fairs have a one year limit, REDEP stalls two years, a transitory 
zone between one or two years, or the time that it takes accomplish the access to the 
social program chosen. 36 Once an option is taken a vendor is expected not to come back 
to the streets but if he or she does, he is not eligible to participate in other upgrading 
options again. Notice that the choice given to the vendors constitutes their responsibility 
                                                 
36 Up to 2009, thirteen transitory zones were established with 296 vendors registered. The responses in 
terms of the resources by the city were delayed as most of the options selected involved relocations, 
assessment and credits for business start-up. Therefore, Moreno, by the Decree 450, derogated the fixed 
number of years for transitory zones. But they still hold the rationale to be temporary.  
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in terms of the outcomes. Within transitory zones the upgrading options are diverse, and 
ideally the option chosen is open to negotiation, requiring vendors to organize, but access 
to the option either collectively or by groups is according to their social profiles, viability 
of the project, and specific demands. 37 
Even if options are heterogeneous, most of them come from two rationales. The 
first one is seeing the reconversion of vendor as coming primarily through 
entrepreneurship, clearly the case of any REDEP, fairs or start-ups. While the push for 
entrepreneurship is similar to Lima, it is qualitatively different. In both cities, vendors are 
perceived as an entrepreneur in the making, but in Lima they perceive them as a business 
person that has already achieved a market and needs a push to become formal. In Bogotá, 
since vendors are viewed as full-time sellers but not specialized ones, the public officials 
perceive that they have to learn to become entrepreneurs, framed as a type of social 
assistance option rather than economic development strategy. The IPES representative 
explains that most temporary solutions on the street are based on the rationale of training 
an entrepreneur, “we have to train people to become entrepreneurs using the public 
space”. For such purpose, within the REDEP, and designed spaces within the Puntos de 
Encuentro-infrastructure plan in some key areas within the Transmilenio network, the 
vendor is required to save money for up to two years, actively participate in training and 
assistance for an individual start-up so then they are able to leave the place to another 
vendor.  
The second rationale is that these planned alternatives involve the reclaim of the 
control of the economic use of public space by the city administration. In other words, 
once a transitory zones is recovered no options are available for any vendor, rather the 
                                                 
37About these processes I will discuss them in detail in the section “Palo or Polo”. 
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area is subjected to police control and it is the city that may decide to incorporate in the 
design any other form of temporary vending and administer it. Moreover, the 
appropriation if available is inherently temporary:  
“They can use the stalls, but they cannot stay there all their lives, those are goods 
that are not transferable, they are not subject to commercialization”. (DADEP) 
In both processes, a reification of the vendor as a law abiding citizen committed 
to the ideals of a harmonic city life is needed. The vendor not only has to be committed to 
his or her own development, but to belief that the designed temporary alternatives to 
work on the streets are functional to his or her purpose of sustaining a living:  
“there are a number of periodic fairs, then you can see that at the end of Santander 
Park, sometimes the Nieves park is assigned, etc. to other vendors also organized, 
supported by IPES, that is, that have subscribed agreements and that you can see 
they are trying to improve their life quality and they are working towards it. We 
give spaces as ‘handrails’. That is, we leave them in a park, they behave well, 
they make an adequate use of the park, that is, they work some time at the park 
and then we let the park rest, it cannot be occupied all the time because a public 
space is for all, and the population needs to decongest their spaces”(Santa Fe, 
Legal Adviser) 
To make it an inclusive process, IPES officials have given some guidelines to the 
agencies that execute control. In this sense, operations of control are meant to be 
pedagogic, particularly the local legal advisers. The Metropolitan police, responsible for 
the surveillance and control of recovered public spaces and special zones, need to inform 
the vendor first before confiscating merchandise. If merchandise is confiscated, the 
Metropolitan police take it to a specialized office. For each intervention, informative or 
confiscatory, the police are expected to record the name and ID of the vendor. The same 
guidelines are in place for local legal advisers, but on top, within transitory zones and 
other critical public spaces without any classification, they need to coordinate with other 
institutions such as DADEP and the police to give a guarantee that no human rights 
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violation is committed. Local legal advisers cannot confiscate merchandise in those 
spaces.  
The educational role of their control operations involves local public officials 
informing vendors about the law and options available to them at IPES. Some critical 
areas are supervised not only by the local legal advisers but also the police, since 
residents may complain about the occupation of recovered public spaces. Public officials 
cannot confiscate merchandise, unless there is a critical complaint about piracy or 
sanitary conditions, but they can take the stall. More clearly, the accounts of officials 
show that peripheral localities in the South are less ready to apply sanctions to vendors:  
“Of course, we do operations; we have done operations to recover public spaces, 
but peaceful ones. It is not like other localities where there are strong conflicts, as 
in Puente Aranda, closer to downtown; there it is like the cat and the mice. Here, 
we plan them differently. The day of the operation comes, and we ask the police 
to arrive earlier, before vendors arrive, around four o’clock in the morning. Then 
at around 5 a.m., we meet and tell vendors that they cannot be there, optionally 
we give them alternative places like neighboring streets or other sectors, so the 
people get use to the mapping. Later and progressively the space is occupied 
again. But, with the way we have done this, using dialogue and building 
consensus, and all these type of solidarity strategies, we have been able to stop 
this issue; then, it’s all about operations and coordination with the police is done 
in the same way” (Ciudad Bolivar, Legal Adviser) 
But within highly valued commercial areas as those found in central and 
commercial localities such as Antonio Nariño, a different story is usually told. The 
educational operations seem not to work efficiently to recover public space, and more 
frequent operations are needed to assert control:  
“It is a total failure. That, the issue of vendors, is the same as keeping flies away. 
One takes them out and in 10 minutes they come back. It is like the cat and the 
mice. Of course, there is conflict with the police. The policeman is obliged to 
recover public space, but the lady who sells obleas38 as her only capital, does not 
                                                 
38A Colombian dessert. A form of thin round pastry filled with marmalade or other sweet sauce.  
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want to give the merchandise. The Arequipe39 ends up on the clothes of the 
policeman. This is permanent, even weekly. But the police are much more 
humane and careful, but there is always conflict, small conflicts.”  
Similar to Lima, controlling street vending in Bogotá is viewed as the capacity to 
govern the city. The increase of vendors on the streets is perceived as failed government. 
Political success to a greater extent is more connected to the call for policies to be 
efficient in controlling vendors, either through inclusion or by force. The proactive role 
of the Garzón-Moreno administration has lead to considerable criticism, and self-
criticism as well. Even in localities in which local officials are progressive and connected 
to the mission of social inclusion, there are many manifestations of a “Frustrated State”. 
In the following testimonies, a public official in Tunjuelito qualifies these measures as 
‘lost money’, and in Los Mártires, the public official states that being proactive means 
providing an incentive to never stop vending: 
“This is, too, lost money of the city; give them economic help to relocate them, 
why? Other options than the street are not useful for them, they do not accept any 
proposal, they only want to stay on the streets, who does not like not to pay taxes, 
not to pay rent, not to pay services?, then they will never accept a relocation” 
(Tunjuelito) 
“As you can see, there are alternatives, there are solutions, but what happens is 
that if you do not have the number of vendors ‘frozen’ and you give those 
alternatives, anyone can come, and even more if you give them an opportunity. 
They come and they will keep coming, and we will never end this. We should 
have a list and say it is over, no more vendors. That is the only way we can keep 
the phenomenon of these people that say that they supposedly can’t get a job” 
(Los Martires) 
A softened approach towards control combined with a well documented top-down 
approach potentially validate at the local level the idea that part of what makes vendors 
not commit to change is the “culture of informality”. As expressed in these testimonies, 
                                                 
39 A thick, creamy caramel-like milk based sauce. 
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critics blame the vendor, but this is justified by prevalent stereotype on the lack of civic 
culture (unwillingness to pay taxes or comply with regulations), or a dependent 
relationship with the State (in which policy options provide greater incentives to be a 
street vendor).  
4.3 THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
4.3.1 Lima: Competition as a motivational tool 
Early in 2005, after the opening of the Megaplaza mall in Independencia, I 
interviewed respondents in some neighboring districts. In Comas, the economic 
development office was expanding and had a discourse centered in the entrepreneurial 
capacity of its district. They conducted an economic census and published some results, 
praising the diversity of commercial and productive economic activities in the district. It 
did not have any large retailer yet. I wondered if that discourse was a sign of a resistant 
attitude towards private investment, a strategy to resist further competition. In my talk 
with the Head of the Office, I shared the experience that I had in Santiago de Chile where 
one of the poorest comunas (local municipalities), Cerro Navia, decided not to allow 
supermarkets to install in their jurisdictions, but in collaboration with international 
development agencies developed a policy strategy to improve service and sanitary 
conditions in Ferias Libres (regularized street markets). I asked what would happen if a 
mall or supermarket installed in the district, how they would remain competitive if they 
are confronted with a competition that may not care for the local economy. With a smile, 
the public official replied: “if they want to come to this district, we welcome modernity”. 
Modernity is understood as symbol of opportunity. 
“There is a great capacity of consumption and big companies like supermarkets 
and even Molitalia (Pasta company) puts its most important storage facility here 
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in Puente Piedra, there is a strong economic dynamic and the population, the 
small entrepreneurs are not tuned in, you have to work so they can take advantage 
of this”. (Comas, LED Office) 
Competition in the predominant ideological discourse is perceived as a positive 
tool to motivate the modernization of traditional commerce. Many public officials, 
particularly in the peripheral districts, favor the expansion of supermarkets despite 
acknowledging the claims of lower returns on behalf of vendors. Supermarkets are 
perceived as a way to ‘wake up’ vendors, and to modernize the commerce sector:  
“Logically, in that zone [where supermarkets positioned], there are now very few 
paraditas, there is particularly one that is very affected and it is very depressed 
too, maybe that could be a turning point and will force these people to compete in 
a more aggressive market… in this sense the installation of a supermarket such as 
Metro not only brings a competitive vision but also bring us modernity for the 
commerce services that are established in its surroundings”. (Rímac, LED office) 
Again the negative effect of competition is minimized by the belief that there is a 
‘free’ market for everyone, so the push for competitiveness is much more appreciated 
than the declining earnings: 
“Investment is positive because now we can perceive the benefits that the free 
market brings to consumers that make vendors worry about improving 
themselves. This is not felt as it has not reversed anything in traditional urbanized 
zones, the neighbors there enjoy more the benefits of a better quality of service. 
But the informal settlements feel the drawback but as they would also say ‘there is 
a market for everyone’. Most often they feel the competition at first with the 
inauguration of a new supermarket, and the following months, maybe three 
months. Curious neighbors go massively but as time passes, they come back to 
the casero (preferred patron), they look for the personalized treatment, sometimes 
not as beneficial, but they are used to it”. (Rímac, LED office) 
Interestingly, ‘market for everyone’ here implies a socioeconomic segmentation, a 
market for the poor in the informal settlement that value connections, despite not being 
the best choice, over a higher quality of service. However, these same assets that explain 
why there is a ‘market for everyone’ rarely are considered important reasons for 
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improving service to even this same lower socioeconomic status population and having 
price regulation in the district. In the same district, the public official told me that a 
smaller format supermarket failed after three months when opening close to a large 
agglomeration of street markets:  
“Apparently it [supermarket] failed; I would think that is because of the tradition, 
the uses and habits of shopping that the neighbors have”. (Rímac, LED office) 
Interestingly, instead of watching this failure as a sign of the strength of street 
vending activity, there are no ‘rational’ reasons but only the motive of their being used to 
buy at that street market.  
There is a perceived fear that helps to motivate street and roofed market vendors 
even within peripheral districts that do not host supermarkets but are moving nearby: 
“Here, the paraditas are scared, because they know that the presence of Plaza Vea, 
Tottus, Metro and Eco are about to make Ciudad de Dios [roofed market] fail”. 
(San Juan de Miraflores, LED office) 
“We have said to these people [street vendors], tomorrow you will die crushed by 
those big retailers; tomorrow, if you work in unsanitary conditions, you will not 
have more clients, look! What would happen if for example Metro appears close 
to you”.(San Martin de Porres, LED Office) 
In a survey administered to clients within Caquetá, one of the largest street 
markets in the Northern Cone, in San Martin by NGO Alternativa, declining earnings 
were reported by vendors, but prices remained competitive (Lazarthe 2006). The 
municipality reported before the eviction took place that competition improved the 
service within the street market but the declining earnings were not substantial,  
“Naturally, they had to change their criteria to improve a little bit, regarding the 
sanitary conditions, but up to now, that market is as they [supermarkets] never 




Formalization policies imply also the transfer of ‘modern tools’ to compete. It 
entails not only a greater investment in improving the quality of the service in terms of 
training or physical investment but also the management of financial risk. Municipalities, 
in different degrees, promote the savings of vendors in the financial institutions serving 
the district. In the program Capitalizando, which promotes savings among regularized 
and informal vendors, the Head of the Economic Development office showed me a 
presentation that included a picture of vendors’ opening their savings account in Scotia 
Bank. He explained to me that the municipality contacted the officers in the bank to come 
to promote their savings strategies, offers for loans among other things. After all this 
information, the chosen bank even offered a whole day to register vendors, what was 
shown in that picture. He qualifies that as a progress:  
“there were people that never step foot in a bank, they never had a saving account, 
if you have a saving account and the bank knows you, they can follow your 
savings, your capacity, your willingness to pay, I believe this is important for 
them, it is true that they have small amounts but they can be used as capital, bring 
to them a series of benefits and will realize the advantages of having access to 
credit”. (Metropolitan Lima, LED Office) 
Private banks chosen by the vendors are perceived as a way to guarantee 
transparency to supervise that vendors are saving. But the catch is not only that the 
municipality can access their bank statements but also the future access to credit that will 
serve to start off the acquisition of land and fund the construction of a roofed market:  
“they can save in any bank they choose, the municipality does not promote any 
bank in particular, we only supervise that they keep saving, so they can have the 
amount necessary to get the credit, which is a quarter of the value of the land they 
want to purchase”. (Comas, LED Office) 
But the amount saved by vendors is also perceived as an asset of the municipality. 
In 2006 Comas initiated negotiations with other financial institutions such the Caja 
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Metropolitana so they can transfer their savings there. Also, Independencia approved a 
fund to start a Caja Municipal [Municipal Credit Union], to administer the collective 
savings for formalization projects. As the public official describes, there is no need for 
direct subsidy, but only credit to solve the problem,  
“About the issue of street vendors, last year 40 thousand soles were approved, but 
not to share with the vendors, but instead for making a fund for formalization, that 
could end being a Caja Municipal or financial institution, these are things you 
learn in this process, but now you have a municipal decision to fix the problem”. 
(Comas, LED Office) 
Many districts are trying to catch up on the installation of banks in their 
jurisdiction, which previously was not attractive for business,  
“Up to 2003 we did not have banks, in this first administration we have 
committed resources to make banks come here by improving security, now they 
see the district in another way”. (El Agustino, LED Office) 
What is at stake here is the process of construction of a modern market at the cost 
of formalizing vendors. The tools for achieving successful competition are thought to be 
the tools of the modern economy that require wider access to credit and investment. 
While this can be partially true, other considerations such as the ability to offer lower 
prices, proximity and personalized attention are little understood or simply dismissed in 
their promotional efforts when targeting street vendors.  
4.3.2 Relationship with private sector: planning for commercial efficiencies 
In a coffee conversation, a high ranking public official who worked during the 
Peñaloza administration shared an interesting story. After months of massive evictions 
downtown, a representative from Malboro, a famous cigarette corporation, knocked at the 
door of the mayor’s office. He explains “the sales of this company depend heavily on 
street sales, without exaggerating, they told us that almost 70% of their daily sales are 
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from vendors”. From this perspective, the type of street vending in Bogotá could be 
understood as an available labor force ready to introduce any product for a convenience 
market on the move. Therefore additional to the aims to build a project of social 
inclusion, public officials have started to think of the role of vending as a channel of 
commerce that also needs to be controlled. In such an aim, policies are designed to 
maintain the complementary role of street trade, which also corresponds to the objective 
of increasing the participation –and perhaps control- of the formal stakeholders of this 
type of trade.  
After conducting a careful study of the products sold, amount of sale by product 
and spatial dynamics of vendors, public officials of the city administration are very aware 
that vending, despite the vulnerable conditions of street traders, is in itself a good 
business that helps enterprises, formal, informal and even illegal, to keep business 
flowing or even as a smart startup strategy. A public official from DADEP describes it 
well when talking about BonIce, an ice-cream company,  
“I am going to give you an example, how does BonIce entered the market?, It did 
through informality, it entered through street sales and then they entered the 
supermarkets and retailers, but it essentially used this sector, because it is the best 
form to make your brand visible, and make popular a product that was in the 
introductory process; then there are many manifestations and diverse phenomena 
that generate the presence of the informal vendor”. 
Beyond the rationale of the need to work, there is a market that benefits from the 
work of traders and whose needs also contribute to the permanence of street trade. In this 
sense, for the Garzón-Moreno administration, the challenge was to build mechanisms that 
recognize the activity, create a clearer framework for formal retailers to participate, 
guarantee the minimum wage, and maintain the objective of graduating vendors from the 
streets. To do so, public officials evaluated the policies of the previous administration. 
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The study of locations helped to see that peddling was embedded in the way the market 
for pedestrian-oriented products works and that was the main reason of the failure of 
relocation in off-street projects: 
“Vendors as an organization have strengthened, but 33 casetas do not have a 
commercial force to make them a point of destination. Then, they use those 
casetas as a bodega.” (IPES, director) 
While keeping those policies as part of the exchange options when a special case 
applies, they discovered that they needed to create an additional one to recognize vending 
on the street while at the same time planning it as a supervised service for the pedestrians. 
These objectives are exemplified by the REDEP policy, which consisted in creating city-
owned stalls administered by the city. The creation of a controlled institutional and 
spatial setting corresponds to the rationale of reconstructing a ‘fair’ environment, from 
which the vendor, the private enterprises and the city can benefit: 
“We created a business seeing it from the perspective of public space. This is a 
business for vendors to benefit from. What is needed? Control The city 
administration has to have absolute control on what is sold, how much is sold, 
who sells and how it is sold. Why do we care about how much is sold? Because 
this is a process of economic inclusion and we need to have control”. (IPES, 
REDEP program)40 
Even if framed as a business designed for the vendors –and still requiring self-
discipline, the fact that the channel of commerce needs to be administered by the city 
reinstates formally the power of the private stakeholders of street vending. The rationale 
is brought by the need to speed up the provision of the stalls and maintain a control not 
only over the inclusion process, by knowing exactly how much a vendor sells, but also to 
filter the products that may not be authorized: 
                                                 
40 Interview by Diana Alejandra Silva. 
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“Of course, they have to go through the authorized providers. Then what is the 
catch? The provision is an administrative process, more than a social one, it has to 
create commercial efficiencies, quality, low prices and fast provisioning”. (IPES, 
REDEP program) 
The idea of control corresponds to the changing interests of the federations of 
formal commerce such as FENALCO and the Chamber of Commerce in the city: 
“I keep communication with FENALCO and their perception on street trade has 
changed. There is no longer a big issue about the vendor being there or that they 
pay for staying in the public space. Their worries are more related now to piracy 
and smuggling… you know, there are some vendors that have commercial 
registry too. But the Chamber of Commerce also manifested its concern for piracy 
and smuggling particularly in the case of shoes and construction materials. Then, I 
think we will require the DIAN to intervene too. In San Andresito, once in a 
while, the DIAN fights.” (IPES, director) 
The emphasis on social inclusion is not fostered only by concerned public 
officials but also encompasses demands that are clearly expressed by the formal 
commerce organizations. Many of the initiatives in place also have been promoted and 
tried by these formal commerce organizations. For instance, in an interview with 
FENALCO, the representative informed me that in 2003, right after the Constitutional 
Court Sentence, they were able to run a pilot project with 800 vendors to explore four 
strategies to upgrade vendors. The minority wanted to keep working as vendors, the other 
three groups were divided in options of training, formal employment and start-ups for 
microenterprises. FENALCO claimed that some advances were made but the toughest 
policy was to reintroduce vendors into the formal labor market. In their study, they 
calculated that on average vendors made around 800 thousand pesos, more than double 
the minimum wage. Therefore, even if opting for formal employment, the lack of 
qualifications prevents them getting a job competitive with their existing earnings. They 
partnered with Bavaria, a beer company, which needed 20 construction workers, as their 
study showed some of the vendors came from the construction sector. They tried to 
122 
 
improve their qualifications for the job by giving them training courses. Only five were 
hired and among those only two kept the job. In many of the options the success rates 
were also low, but although FENALCO started to become aware of the limits to the 
options approach but still they supported the administration:  
“We cannot ignore the social reality that exists, the lack of opportunities, they 
exist definitively, and when one sees the monster, that is the public space and the 
vendors, even if we want to take up this issue 100%, it is impossible. We think 
that sometimes we want to cover too much and we may end up not doing 
anything. But starting with small things is valuable”. (FENALCO, Head of 
Research) 
Also, FENALCO in partnership with Cámara de Comercio (CCB) has been 
closely monitoring areas of interest in Bogotá, surveying vendors. The effort as the 
Chamber of Commerce head of research explains, “it is not only to evaluate the 
administration but to collaborate with their efforts”. CCB monitors advances in policies 
through the Observatory of Public Space which annually publishes a report “Bogotá 
Cómo Vamos” [Bogotá, how are we doing?], IPES officials participate actively in 
framing their evaluation of these experiences. Therefore, current policy efforts rationalize 
the control over the distribution channel through recognition of space, which matches the 
interest of stakeholders in the city.  
Despite awareness, upgrading the status of the vendors in the retail chain is not 
seriously considered within the policy framework. On the one hand, neither the option of 
relocation on or off the streets constitutes a framework for stable employment. When 
relocating on the streets, the vendors should assume their occupation is temporary, and 
despite their dependence on working only for one provider, they are not entitled to wages 
as other dependent sellers might be. Access to credit and promotion is also dependent on 
assuming that street trade is temporary. It is desirable from the perspective of the public 
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officials that they direct the inclusion process and match State place-making with 
increasing possibilities for entrepreneurship. It is a directed entrepreneurship that pays 
little attention to what can be learned on the street.  
In the option of relocation off street, vendors are not expected to become owners 
of the stalls run by the city. As the policy proved a failure in some areas, it is easier to 
include other small business than incorporate ownership as part of the policy strategy: 
“I decided that since the Institute has changed its function and we also deal with 
small entrepreneurs, we will link them to those spaces. We are working towards 
that. Later, with the changes in the legislation, those spaces will be difficult to 
sell, because the legislation states that public goods should be sold in auction. 
Logically the best offer should come from vendors, but if things continue as they 
do we need to make those changes”. (IPES, director) 
On the other hand, informal providers as a target group that control access to 
public space ‘illegally’ are completely absent in the policy approach. Many public 
officials at the local level are aware that there is a process of illicit appropriation of public 
space in which the vendor is victim. A stricter control in the past seem to have brought a 
hidden ‘mafia’ which enforces by force the access to key spaces, a practice found not 
only in downtown but also within zones in the North and South of the city. In Ciudad 
Bolivar an IPES official narrates his concern, 
“The food mafias exploit the informal vendor, how? Simply they bring their stalls, 
they leave them with merchandise on credit, and then at night they come and 
collect the product and the money that they have left them”. (Ciudad Bolivar, 
IPES official) 
In Suba a similar story is told by a legal adviser who worked for the previous 
Peñaloza administration,  
“This is terrible, look, the vendors that have lots of money fight for the space 
because of it, they earn tons of money; as Peñaloza said in one opportunity: an 
informal vendor standing in the 7o with 9, can you see it? Earn more than what 
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the mayor makes, and that is proved, is more than true. Then, they make an 
operation, but what do you see? the displaced women, mother of a family that you 
leave without a stall, a head of a household that cannot have a job, and who lives 
in a shack and only has its packages of merchandise, and that, you don’t see the 
one that owns the stall, and who owns perhaps 4 stalls and sublease them because 
they do not stand there the whole day, they have their vendors there, and it is a 
small group who scares the rest and they kill. They approach anyone who comes 
to the area, they start to ask for money to use the space and it is so hard to ask 
about it... Look, they are profiting, I take their stall, and then they bring another 
one, there is always a second plan, they don’t pay”. (Suba, Legal Adviser) 
The rationale behind directing the inclusion process seems to have rendered an 
increased preference for participation by the formal stakeholders. Meanwhile, the 
appropriation of street-wise selling skills has validated the technical perspective for 
planning street trade. However, policy making, and its emphasis in asserting control over 
public space as well as the provision of street sales, is still blinded to the experience of 
the informal vendor as no provisions are taken to avoid the illegitimate practice of selling 
public spaces by mafias and informal providers. Therefore, while the vendor remains the 
subject of discipline, other illegitimate stakeholders benefit from their absence as policy 
targets.  
4.4 RELATIONSHIP WITH VENDORS’ ORGANIZATIONS 
4.4.1 Lima: ‘Partners’ not enemies 
Despite the emphasis on the entrepreneur as an individual, the formalization 
policy actually is implemented based on a collective strategy. As an approach highly 
dependent on collective success, public officials have actively changed the conditions and 
roles of local organizations who participate in policy making from a political to a 
managerial focus to assure a ‘partnership’ in the formalization project. In this process, 
they have depoliticized organizations, conditioned the means to negotiate and even 
repurpose the role of their leaders and connections with wider defense-oriented unions.  
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Public officials are aware that no formalization project is feasible without 
organizational efforts from below, as individually it is unlikely for vendors to afford a 
relocation project. In cases in which the number of members in an organization is not 
enough to advance rapidly in collective savings, public officials actively organize 
dispersed vendors.  
“The first thing we did was making associations, the emolientero41 worked for the 
sake of it, the candy vendor the same, the municipality has proposed to create 
associations so they can be recognized as street vendors, but not as Juanita, 
Luisito, Pedrito, not that way (…) the municipality have no budget to invest and 
look after each of them, but for the association we do, that is why the first thing 
we did is creating an association for emolienteros, candy vendors, anticuchos’ 
vendors, and so on”. (Villa María del Triunfo, LED Office) 
In the process of strengthening organizations already created from below, many 
public officials have selectively excluded political leadership which ‘filtered’ 
communications with vendors, and demanded instead a more managerial type of 
leadership from the organizations and direct communication mechanisms with the 
membership base. As explained to me, dirigentes42 [political leaders] have a bad 
reputation. They are perceived as the actors that ensure the continuity of conflict instead 
of partnership by discouraging the wider base to be part of formalization projects,  
“So they [dirigentes] live off the conflict. Without conflict they will not get paid 
to solve problems. So, they do not find any convenience in a well constructed 
roofed market, if everyone is an owner they will not have a business to live from. 
As many vendors have very low educational levels, they are easy to be taken 
advantage of”. (Ate Vitarte, Mayor’s Office) 
Consequentially, public officials opt to call for direct assemblies, to increase their 
frequency of visits to vending sites, to develop a relationship with individual vendors. 
                                                 
41A street vendor who sells emolientes, a hot traditional beverage. 
42Representatives that are elected to manage an association as political broker 
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“The office has to make a battle against those dirigentes, you have to get into the 
heart of the organization to change things around and make them see that it is not 
what they say, it is the municipality who has to communicate directly about what 
we think about them…now I have friends. I sat on a bench to talk to them, now 
they perceive us not as the ones giving orders”. (Comas, LED Office) 
Working with the leaders has entailed also motivating them through training to 
assume a managerial approach, in that sense, they repurpose the reasons to organize: 
“We group them, we don’t unionize them (…) one of the problems is that they 
have representatives but they don´t feel that they belong, that is why we teach 
them tools of business management”. (Villa El Salvador, LED Office) 
The careful follow-up work on organizations also reduces the importance of 
maintaining a relationship with metropolitan or district level unions, unless these 
organizations can be committed to formalization projects. In Comas, when asked if they 
work the most popular federations and unions in the northern cone, I was told “these are 
people that are there to show off, they do nothing for the federations or for their 
members”. But still, vendors’ organizations are invited selectively to participate in wider 
calls that deal with economic development policies. For instance, in Rímac, street 
vendors participate in the Economic Development Council that has representatives of 
small and micro enterprises, with a wider agenda that does not include their issues in 
particular. When asked who gets invited in these initiatives, public officials respond, 
“I consider the dirigentes that are willing to work hand in hand with the 
municipality, because our policy is not against them, it is to favor them (…) all of 
those who twist things, we have to leave behind, and we cannot be subjected to 
the will of five people [referring to federation leaders]”. (Comas, LED Office) 
The selection not only works for wider instances but even within local 
organizations. In an organizational setting in which women tend to be under represented 
as dirigentes, some public officials have promoted some women to assume leadership 
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positions. In this same district, a public official argued that you can trust better women 
dirigentes, 
“Almost all of them are very grateful for all the training they received, to give 
back they responded with courage, spotting those who did not want to save or 
pay”. 
The instances of negotiation that were provided in the previous regulatory 
framework such as the Technical Mixed Commission are either disregarded or 
transformed. Most of the municipalities either did not have this commission or if they did 
they claimed that it only served to extend stay on the streets. An exceptional case was 
Independencia, in which the majority of relocation projects were possible with the 
collaboration of the members in this commission. However, they used a different 
strategy. They asked members to sign an agreement despite acknowledging that the 
previous regulatory framework may give members room to oppose the intervention,  
“Indeed, according to the Ordinance 002 and the Supreme Decree 005, in which 
they gave legal recognition to street vending, we could not confiscate their 
merchandise, then they feel that we cannot touch them, but the norms do not 
encourage putting a threat to the health of the population, then we need to keep 
moving…we requested them to sign a public agreement in which they recognized 
that our efforts did not mess up with those regulations, relocations cannot be 
qualified as a threat to their right of work, we are just organizing vending”. 
(Independencia, LED Office) 
All these strategies have make management more efficient at the point that an 
eviction can be scheduled. Most municipalities as soon as a new mayor takes office sign 
agreements that require vendors to have two or three years to leave the streets, and 
closely monitor their commitment and progress toward the relocalization project. 
All these testimonies confirm that there is no space for further negotiations. Street 
vending should be temporary whether or not they can or can’t formalize. Organizations 
from below are perceived as committed to the purpose of the municipality even further 
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within traditional residential districts where many vendors are not residents. The 
Miraflores’ public official states “we don’t have problems with vendors; they are always 
willing to collaborate”. While protests, among other forms of opposition still exist, there 
is an increasing expertise to manage conflict that is only confrontational in particular 
circumstances, such as the evictions of large street markets.  
At the time of my first round of interviews, the news reported that municipal 
police killed a vendor in a residential district of San Isidro (Flores January 06, 2005. La 
República). All my interviewees denied the use of violence as a measure to assure 
control. But all of them recalled that for massive evictions, public officials used the 
National police. Municipal police serve to grant more security to the district residents and 
even if not carrying weapons, contribute to increase the sense of control. In peripheral 
districts, they only give vendors notifications,  
“Serenazgo [municipal police] only have a stick, a stick that can be broken if they 
use it. A municipal policeman arrives and gives them a fine, a notification, but the 
street vendors can have thousands of notifications and it is the same”. (Villa El 
Salvador, LED office) 
But no clear supervision of municipal police or specialized training exists 
regarding their relationship with vendors. In the view of public officials, however, a more 
effective sense of control is brought by the formalization policy itself as the Cercado de 
Lima public officials argued, 
“It rarely happens, they are isolated events [municipal police abuses], there is no 
policy of the stick to evict them, and we think that a sustainable solution is the 
relocation with success”. (Cercado de Lima, LED Office local inspector) 
The need to strengthen organizations while at the same time encouraging people 
to aim at success is not free of contradictions. Once relocated, public officials observe 
that many vendors try to find a way to get individual titles, but the format of purchase in 
129 
 
the name of the association does not allow for that strategy. These issues are not 
particularly highlighted in the training as courses mainly cover issues to improve 
management of an enterprise rather than a cooperative.  
“Many of them only have a license by organization, that way they keep their 
backs covered, then they will keep paying as an association but if they have an 
individual license they can access credit, I tell them not to be closed-minded 
because that limits their success, but that is the idiosyncrasy, I just hope that 
changes overtime”. (Comas, LED Office) 
4.4.2 Bogotá: “Palo or Polo”43 
When explaining my research to friends and family in Bogotá, it was very 
common to hear a common truth “Garzón was elected because the vendors voted for 
him”. This statement will apparently imply that street vendors’ federations at the time of 
elections were powerful and very organized and as a unionist Garzón managed those 
connections to achieve a militant base before the elections. However this is not 
necessarily the case. The past administrations fragmented the organizations in such a way 
that they decreased in numbers and membership (Donovan 2002).44 A stricter control, 
and large evictions, in past city administrations meant that fewer organizations were 
formed, and made less possible building citywide organizations based on vendors.  
                                                 
43 Meaning Polo Democrático, the political party of the mayor at the time of study. 
44 In my initial exploration, I got a list of 6 contacts in Bogotá from the International Street Vendor 
Organization, named StreetNet which involved participating organizations since 2004 and 2006. However, 
at that time few of the phone numbers and addresses led to an active independent organization that was 
focused on the street vendor with a membership base. Four of them were coordinated by a National 
Workers Organization. Two were directed by the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT), and the rest by the 
Conferderación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) and Confederación General de Trabajadores 
Democráticos (CGTD). All of them were initiatives to organize the informal sector which included not only 
vendors but different types of informal workers such as domestic workers and formal vendors. One of them 
was local and could not be identified. And only one linked eight organizations in the city, most of them 




Initially, the vote of vendors at least at the beginning of Garzon was due to his 
charisma as a unionist and a promise for social inclusion. Public officials who entered the 
IPES administration are very aware that an active role of building organizational efforts 
among this sector can produce a political gain for the party and the entering mayor,  
“I think that in the popular elections of this mayor [Samuel Moreno], the presence 
of the street vendors was determinant. The street vendors invented a slogan “Palo 
[stick] or Polo”, and the Polo is the political party of the mayor. This gave a 
classist connotation to the previous mayors that recovered public spaces. At least 
150 thousand votes were from street vendors”. (IPES, director) 
However, the progressive discourse does not entail a context conducive to self-
organization among vendors around their defense on public space. It rather involves a 
construction of participatory instances through the territorial and institutional framework 
for policy making and planning validated by the professional management of city 
resources. As a public official in Antonio Nariño pointed out social inclusion also 
requires building within the need to guarantee order:  
“In this, there are two stories, before and after Lucho, before and after the Polo. 
Before, all about vendors was persecution, human rights’ violations and 
stigmatization. That does not exist anymore. There is recognition, there is a 
vendors’ committee organized by the city, there is communication. There are 
resources, training; the policy design changed compared to Peñaloza. Lucho 
arrived and the discourse changed, he said that here there is social inclusion, 
tolerance but not tolerance for disorder”. 
The purpose of organizing and strengthening leadership among vendors’ 
organizations was twofold. On the one hand, it was intended to promote coordinated 
actions and planning to provide a more efficient use of resources, between clear 
established regulations. On the other hand, this process was not exempt from political 
interests and was intended, even if not explicitly, to provide a political base to the Mayor. 
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Combined with a ‘softening’ of the actions of control, effective enforcement appears to 
be less than in the past administrations, and has backfired in terms of the aims of control. 
As an increasingly fragmented sector, the election of representatives among 
vendors was encouraged from above. The institutional design at the city level established 
19 local committees with 5 representatives each. At the beginning, the task was given to 
the vendors who were in the process of establishing transitory zones. However, as the 
process of setting-up those zones is slow, the Moreno city administration decided to carry 
out an electoral census that was promoted in local media (CityTV 09/02/2009).  
The process of building leadership involves explicitly the expectation of creating 
a managerial role for the vendors’ organizations. In contrast to Lima, the managerial role 
is not related to that of a business manager, but that of a bureaucrat’s assistant. As the 
IPES official is not permanently in the locality–usually only shows up weekly or every 
two weeks in most of the localities, he or she needs someone that can keep track of what 
happens in the vending zones and of the local conflicts. That is where the leader comes 
in. He is not entitled to manage resources directly but he registers or accompanies 
vendors to register with the IPES, gives them the information and guidance and informs 
the IPES officials on new people coming to the site or in the agreement or disagreement 
regarding some policy options. He is also the one who makes the call for meetings: 
“For example, a vendor who did not register comes. Then, they come and tell me 
that they need to register and so forth. I said, well, where do you work? And he 
responds in that corner. Well, who is the one that knows the entire locality? And 
all its corners? I only know some critical spots. Sure, I live here in this locality 
and I know but if someone tells me about a place in another extreme –you know 
Bosa is too big- in a corner of that and that. Then I ask the leader to make a visit. 
After that, I go to visit too. But, I ask the new one to talk to the leader and to get 
an idea if that zone is a special, recovered or if there is an ongoing process in that 
area. What I do is more related to the processes already defined. That is those 
processes for which registration has already occurred and in which I made the 
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censuses and there is a commitment to two or three years” (Bosa, IPES local 
official) 
Despite leaders not having direct access to the management of resources, their 
social capital and knowledge built upon the time and commitment spent in cultivating 
relationships with public officials help them build some political capital that is useful to 
the Mayor’s political party. In some circumstances, they are actively invited to participate 
in the political party which has established connections with national unions:  
“Through the CUT we achieved political processes that we never imagined. It is 
impressive how much we have achieved with street vendors, most of them are for 
the Polo Democrático Alternativo. Now the same ones that previously did not 
come, participate in their organizations and talk about the economy, their human 
rights, they discuss how to consolidate their organizations and get ahead. This 
locality has elected the Polo every time”. (Antonio Nariño, Legal Adviser) 
Most of the public officials from the central administration agree that a key 
achievement of the Garzón-Moreno administration is the strengthening of the vendors’ 
organization in order to guarantee the commitment to social inclusion:  
“At least we have generated guidelines. When there is a population facing critical 
situations, it is difficult to generate an optimal situation. Yes, they [street vendors] 
can. It is common to undermine unions as they are perceived as fighting against 
the government. But this is only when you do not generate alternatives. It is 
common to undermine a lot of things, but it is useful to improve the quality of life 
in the city”. (IPES, REDEP program) 
Given the compromise to comply with the Constitutional Court, organizing 
vendors is understood as a key component of making possible a consensus building 
strategy in relationship to the right of economic use of public space, 
“Since we have to give solutions to everyone, then we made a compliance 
agreement, we established rules of use, in which organizations need to be 
established, not only in territorial terms45 but also in terms of the localities; a 
                                                 
45In this quote, territorial terms refer to the multiple areas of planning related to street trade, while localities 
refer to the administrative local unit. That is decisions take into consideration the policies governing spaces 
in particular but also the administrative responses of the local public officials. 
133 
 
public policy of economic use of public space needs to be consensually assumed, 
that is the only way in which we will guarantee that public space is preserved and 
respected”. (DADEP) 
The positive value placed on strengthening vendors’ organization is shared among 
public officials within the most impoverished localities in the South, which also have a 
tradition of political activism. The accountability of the leaders is an asset valued by 
localities in these areas and central authorities working within the localities: 
“Ciudad Bolívar is one of the most organized localities, and it is not because I am 
here, it is because the local committee has established a union, and they 
participate in a political party, then you have at the head leaders and vendors with 
political backgrounds. They are very well organized; they know how the locality 
functions.” (Ciudad Bolivar, IPES official) 
These localities in the South do not hold large numbers of recovered public spaces 
which are usually the zones that are strategic for to asserting control. Central and North 
localities, which are more commercially and residentially gentrified, have greater 
pressures to keep streets clear of vendors. Therefore it is more common to find between 
public officials in those area expressions of discontent and frustration regarding the lack 
of organizations. Once recovered, a zone cannot be named transitory and then, little could 
be done to organize vendors. Within these localities, officials perceive large number of 
vendors unwilling to commit to the options available: 
“There are some committees but there is no organization, they just want to fight 
with us. I held a meeting with them and ask ‘what have you done to make the city 
work for you?’, they only want to expand their commerce, they complain that we 
mistreat them and we move them away, but there are possibilities, they can 
request investment and make something nice”. (Usaquén, legal adviser) 
Even when public officials within these localities are committed to the vision of 
building an inclusive process, there is a pressing need to reinstate control on public space. 
Then, they perceive that the consensus building process is too slow and that the Sentence 
772 made vendors believe that they have a safe pass:  
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“It is not that easy. Within the spirit of the respect for human rights and the 
human dignity, we cannot treat this population as criminals but as merchants and 
working people, that is why you cannot take only repressive actions, but that has 
not been as good. Because it has created a certain feeling that public space can be 
used for anyone, then, it is a difficult issue. And the consensus-building is a very 
slow process”. (Chapinero, legal adviser) 
“yes, they [street vendors’ organizations] are strong to the extent to which the city 
administration allows for it, one day, they said to me that I cannot evict them 
because of the Sentence 772 and I said ‘make me a favor and make copies, give 
that ruling to everyone, ask them to have it under their arms, when I arrive show it 
to me, I will prove to you that with that I can ask you to move away’. They 
thought that with those protections they are allowed to do anything they want”. 
(Suba, legal adviser) 
Moreover, in certain localities, these public officials perceive that the policy in 
place have give room for leaders who have started a process of privatizing the street by 
charging vendors money for their assistance with building transitory zones. Then, 
vendors’ organizing are not perceive as legitimately representing the vendors: 
“Those leaders from other localities are messing up here, that is, it is like a mafia 
that has a leader and benefits from the exploitation and the location of the street 
vendor. If you are a new vendor, you just don’t arrive somewhere, the gentlemen 
have to have a ‘little school’ and we have discovered that spaces are sold to them. 
These leaders benefit from the displaced population, the unemployed, and those 
who are looking to make ends meet. And that happens because there is always 
conflict within associations, and then someone splits and looks for vendors to 
make its association. Some vendors have complained here that they were in an 
association but it does not function, that their leaders do not help them, that they 
only ask for money, then that is the situation, it is very critical the relationship 
between leaders and the vendors. I think that the city policy is good and there are 
positive outcomes but the problems comes when there are conflicts between them 
and all the interest behind is economic, organize them to ask for an amount of 
money and give them a space” (Los Martires, legal adviser) 
Conversely, these localities reinforce acts of control and in some instances look 
for alliances to confiscate merchandise based on sanitary or against piracy measures with 
support of the DIAN. For instance, in this locality, the local legal adviser requested a 
135 
 
sanitary legal adviser from the local hospital to justify the confiscation of prepared meals. 
Others have extended the request to declare special zones for bus stations, and for 
institutions beyond those of government and security, such as schools, hospitals, 
churches, and even commercial centers or supermarkets to extend the scope of their 
control. 
The uneven process of organizing and building leadership while at the same time 
keeping control in the ‘public spaces that matter’ created a mismatch in the expectations 
of political gain. When previously interviewed, the IPES director argued that, 
“The emphasis on the streets is circular and surprisingly there is a change in the 
image of the citizen with respect to the street vendors. Only three years ago, 62% 
of the citizens stated that they bought in public spaces. And 80% stated that street 
vending damaged the city. Now, you have that 78% continues buying on the 
streets, but only 75% perceive street vending as a problem. I believe that the 
recovery of downtown had a strong impact but I also believe that the citizens 
agree with the policy. There is a certain level of solidarity. The city feels that a lot 
of people are coming to the city because of displacement. Instead of watching 
them begging for money, they see them working. That has a value, and that gives 
them some positive influence”. 
The fact that the vendor was not a subject of greater debate reinforced the 
perception that a progressive policy was valued by the city residents, and while keeping 
downtown controlled, those policies will be perceived positively by most of the residents. 
However, a rise in expectations in peripheral zones, paired with selective acts of control 
around supermarkets and few resources of control and a lack of investment policies, 
resulted in protests against the Moreno administration in 2009. The Polo Democrático 




4.5 COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
While the policy approaches in Lima and Bogotá differ in substantial ways in 
terms of the different imaginaries related to public space and development, both of them 
still have some similarities in terms of the re-conceptualization of street trade as a subject 
of policy making. In Lima, streetwise neoliberalism has consolidated a common policy 
practice built upon the historical practice of stationary vending as an entrepreneurial 
activity. In Bogotá, sidewalk urbanism is committed to reorganize and regulate vending 
through the tools of urban design and planning. The current regulatory approaches while 
adopting upgrading strategies as policy staples do not entail the full recognition of the 
activity as a regulated and ‘stable’ occupation. Rather, both approaches involve a 
transformation of a subject of policy in terms of self-discipline, validated by a more 
professional management of policy, which complements or articulates the interest of 
private sector stakeholders. 
Both cities differ in their approaches to the professional management of public 
space. Lima is more centered in economic development and envisions public space as a 
social mirror in which the transitions to a better economic condition should be depicted. 
In Bogotá, the focus is more on public space and legibility, that is, different uses are 
recognized as they are subjected to rules of behavior and urban design planned by city 
officials. However, both cities also make a case for a trend towards a more technocratic 
management of public space, where those who validate uses are the public officials. 
Hence, street vendors’ economic use of public space is inherently illegitimate, unless 
conforming with the venues already planned and designed by policymakers. A street 
vendor becomes a transitory occupation which needs to be regulated with the aim to 
control public space. 
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At the core of the upgrading strategy, both cities have redefined the vendor as a 
subject of policy, who needs to self-discipline to be able to make the policies offered 
work. Either as an entrepreneur in Lima or as a subject of social assistance in Bogotá, 
street vendors needs to be committed respectively to formalization or a type of ‘civic 
compromise’ to graduate from vending. Behind the rationales, there is an underlying 
assumption that the options generated are ‘what is best for the vendor’, and does not 
necessarily involve the recognition of the practical knowledge of the vendor. In Bogotá, 
the rise of a more technocratic management, as manifested by the generation of censuses, 
studies and specialized knowledge have validated policy approaches. In Lima, the policy 
of relocation through associative efforts further ignores the conditions by which street 
vending is competitive and continues to instill the belief that modern tools such as credit 
and training oriented towards a formal enterprise should work for vendors.  
As a result failed policy experiences are justified by arguments close to the 
‘culture of poverty’. The permanence in street vending, brought by the unwillingness to 
formalize in Lima or to access the different policy options in Bogotá, is represented as a 
sign that a person is not willing to move ahead. Consequentially, the vendor is the agent 
to transform. In Lima, the vendor should assume the risks of the formalization project, 
based on the ‘proved’ knowledge of the professional policy makers who usually take for 
granted the benefits of formalization. In Bogotá, vendors should be informed and self-
regulate to use the institutional mechanisms in place to adapt to the rules of the city. 
Likewise, failed policy experiences consequentially give room for a blaming the victim 
discourse. In Lima, this statement is clearer as public officials more often point out that 
the lack of skills to achieve the full potential as entrepreneur makes people keep working 
in the informal sector. At the same time, if these people don’t make it after giving them 
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the training and the access to the ‘formal’ sector, it is not the policy that is wrong, but 
those who carry with them the burden of their lack of entrepreneurial capacity. In the case 
of Bogotá, policy inefficiencies are believed to be part of their lack of commitment to the 
civic culture or to the inability brought by their social vulnerability, a situation that 
prevents those making choices to improve their living conditions.  
Both policy approaches are functional to the private sector. In Lima, micro credit 
institutions and banks are brought into the policy implementation. In the neoliberal 
perspective, commercial gentrification is used as a motivational tool for increasing 
competitiveness and compliance from vendors. In Bogotá, large retailers are linked to the 
provision of regulated spaces of street trade. Moreover, in this city, the policy practice 
involves an active incorporation of the private sector in policy recommendations, design 
and surveillance. Both policy approaches in practice reinforce the spatial hierarchies of 
intervention, increasing control over areas strategic for private investment. 
As part of the implementation of these upgrading policies, both cities have 
reframed the structure of opportunities for establishing relationships with vending. In 
Lima, the political practice gives no room for questioning the benefits of formalization, 
reorienting deliberatively organizations towards a more managerial role. In Bogotá, the 
political practice directs participation from above for political purposes but relies on 
individualistic mechanisms of social welfare which are not managed by the political 
brokers directly. The progressive approach in Bogotá may lead to greater incentives to 
organize but still participation is reframed within the access of policy options. 
Consequentially, both approaches move vendors’ organizations away from the defense of 




Chapter 5: Changes in the local basis of street trade 
Lima and Bogotá come from different perspectives in policy making towards 
street vendors but share some common characteristics in their rationales of intervention. 
Coming from an economic development perspective, streetwise neoliberalism in Lima 
involves a proactive approach to promote formal entrepreneurship among street vendors 
in the hopes to upgrade their economic activity. Bogotá’s sidewalk urbanism, which is 
heavily influenced by the positive effect of urban design and planning, is also proactive 
towards upgrading vending through a series of options directed to exchange work at 
streets for other forms of employment. In both perspectives, however, street vendors’ 
economic use of public space is redefined in exclusionary terms, as its continuity as a 
spatial practice is interpreted by policymakers and implementers as a lack of commitment 
towards self-improvement and hinders the aim of building a modern city. 
As described earlier in the dissertation, historically, policy efforts in Lima have 
concentrated on street markets, when in Bogotá they are directed towards peddlers or 
semi-stationary vendors. These contrasting types of placemaking practices involve 
different forms of resistance or resilience in face of current policy approaches and may 
interact differently with the prevalent spatial hierarchies of intervention. In this chapter, I 
focus on a comparative analysis of the changes brought by the rationales of intervention 
from the perspective of senior vendors. I contrast the experience of these vendors 
between blue and red zones, which respectively represent places of trends and exceptions. 
As identified in the spatial analysis, blue zones are areas in which high enforcement 
corresponds to the exposure of commercial gentrification. In contrast, the red zones are 
those which despite commercial gentrification, interventions seem not to be as effective. 
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Within this distinction I also compare the experiences taking into account the levels of 
housing consolidation as an indicator of the neighborhoods socioeconomic profiles. 
Based on an analysis of 36 interviews –23 in Lima and 13 in Bogotá– as well as 
field notes and photo illustrations (for a detailed description of methods see 
Methodological Appendix E), I divide the analysis in this chapter in four sections (1) 
changes in the perceptions of public space and vendors’ senses of entitlement towards its 
use (2) perceptions on upgrading policies, (3) the effect of commercial gentrification, and 
(4) the reframing of the relationship with the State. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the changes and trends in specific comparable contexts in each 
city. 
Throughout the chapter, I argue that the transitions between taxing/licensing 
policies towards upgrading policies have entailed –perhaps unintentionally– an erosion of 
street trade’s local basis. While more clearly manifested in blue zones, the exceptions in 
red zones are also found strengthening this trend in both cities. Therefore, as the state 
increases its dominance over management of public space, tactics, some even more 
fragmented, individual and with little sense of entitlement, start to prevail.  
5.1 PRACTICES AND SENSES OF ENTITLEMENT TOWARDS PUBLIC SPACE 
5.1.1Lima: The erosion of collective placemaking 
A typical foundational story of street markets in Lima, particularly in peripheral 
districts, involves a sort of squatting by a group of neighbors. In Independencia, after 
structural adjustment in 1992, six out of the nine concentrations were started by a group 
of neighbors from informal settlements living nearby a roofed market, a better-off 
neighborhood or open space. They got together to decide the day that they will install a 
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street market. If there was no roofed market, they would knock at the door of the 
residents of the area either to ask for permission, invite them to join the vendors or give 
them notice that they will sell in the streets. If land was still available within an informal 
settlement, they would squat on an empty lot, and advocate in the neighborhood 
associations for including in their plat maps a project to build eventually a community 
roofed market. Individually access has always been in some sense restrictive. A new 
vendor in order to install its stall more permanently within an already taken space needed 
to get the approval of the association. Most often approval was granted if the applicant 
had a previous connection to a vendor that was a member of the association, and in 
assembly they will give the new vendors options to select a product in order to avoid 
further competition among associates. The story of vending, and their place-making in 
particular was not only related to episodes of ‘crisis’, but also to the act of collectively 
building a marketplace within the neighborhood. 
A local basis that was embedded in a neighborhood context which provided 
incentives to self-organize and opt for collective strategies to maintain their appropriation 
over public space has been substantially altered by recurrent evictions. Consequentially, 
as public space is no longer perceived as a legitimate neighborhood asset to allow for 
economic activities. Street vendors, even if they are perceived as part of the 
neighborhood, who decide keep their trade at streets after evictions are more likely to 
access space individually, willing to accept even detrimental and irregular forms of 
appropriation. 
Joaquín, a fifty-year old senior street vendor, has always worked around the 
Cooperative Market, in Ate Vitarte. His experience represents clearly the consequent 
problems after evictions took place in a peripheral district. Joaquín is a neighbor, and 
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after being laid-off, and several applications to get a job, he started to work as a vendor, 
but peddling first. He recalls how hard it was to be a peddler: “I walked and I arrived 
completely exhausted, then I started to look for a spot and sold things little by little”. He 
became stationary and considers himself a founder of the roofed market. He worked in a 
stall inside the market around 1981 but sales were not as he expected. Then, he came 
back to sell on the streets after three years. He started again as a stationary vendor, 
organizing with other new vendors, occupying an adjacent corner but recurrent evictions 
took place in 1998, and another street market was just not possible. The last eviction at 
the time of the interview occurred early in 2008 and fragmented even more the vendors 
around the area.  
Evictions were conducive to the dispersion of vendors but also increase peddling 
in the relocated areas. Dispersion not only in space but also in places of residence 
undermined the common ground that once vendors shared in a street market, making 
them individual rather than collective strategies. Joaquín recalls that around 1988, the 
remaining vendors were very few peddlers, usually called volantes, “street vendors were 
few, 13 volantes, 7 around here and 6 around there, I think we began to increase little by 
little, may be now we are 160, but all of us are dispersed”. Moreover, the newcomers 
come from different areas in the city; they are foreigners to the neighborhood. “The 
number of vendors increase because of the needs of the people, there are no jobs, here 
they come from Santa Anita, Huachipa, Jicamarca, Huáycan and even from Ceres, few 
are as me from this same area”, he explains. Most of the newcomers discovered the area, 
either by popular bus routes to work or in some cases with the expansion of rental 
housing in the neighborhood. When asked how these vendors knew about the market, 
Joaquín comments “some were renters, they started to sell here but now they have bought 
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their houses somewhere else. I actually started to sell here because of a family member 
worked and lived here, but then I moved here”. To guarantee his space Joaquín pays a fee 
to the owner of a house on the sidewalk he normally occupies. He claims, 
 “I would rather pay a license, and not to the owner of this house, because this 
sidewalk does not belong to him, it is a public street, it is up to the municipality, 
but they make a profit because the Mayor does not do anything, all mayors never 
have authority, either they leave things like this or they are corrupt”.  
In the perspective of the vendor, governability is not assured by evictions, as they 
do not give back to the municipality the control over streets. Rather, they make others 
feel entitled and make the vendors again a subject to profit from. 
Ivonne has a similar strategy to Joaquín. She sells around the Nueva Era’ market, 
founded during the 1980s, in Comas. Nueva Era is a large market specialized in produce 
and daily groceries but the neighborhood is not well-off, few houses could be considered 
consolidated. In contrast to Joaquin’s neighborhood, Nueva Era still has a low rate of 
formal small business but it is located at walking distance from a large supermarket. As a 
neighbor and a founder of the informal settlement, she followed closely the history of the 
roofed market when growing up in the neighborhood “this market was formed with the 
people, with our community”. Her mom and brothers used to sell prepared food on the 
streets around the market at different times of their lives. After being laid-off, she decided 
to follow her family footsteps. In eight years of business, she is estranged by the attitude 
of the municipality, as she never recalled much hostility from the neighbors against 
vendors,  
“It is just them (public officials), from time to time they come, they want a clean 
city, a clean district, a clean community, but above all that this central avenue is 
free of vendors, and they want the cars to pass comfortably, no traffic”.  
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She realizes that working around the market is not the same, since recurrent 
waves of roofed vendors, who rent stalls come and go,  
“Do you talk to your neighbors who own a market stall here? No, it is no longer 
like this... the families that owned, sold them already, they are from different 
places, some from Comas, Carabayllo, they come from everywhere here”.  
As neighbors are no longer the ones working in roofed markets, there is little 
room for a network to ease access to public space. Ivonne, whose family never faced 
opposition when setting up a temporary stall, now manages to have a safe pass by paying 
a fee as a deposit to use an empty stall at the roofed market. Then, she can work every 
day of the week as long as she keeps the sidewalk free and uses the pavement to install 
her food cart.  
Jorge opted for a different tactic than that of Joaquín and Ivonne. He was once 
part of a street market but never entered the formalization project in Pleasant Valley, an 
irregularly consolidated neighborhood in El Agustino. As a peddler the transition to 
becoming stationary was achieved as he became known to other vendors but it was 
reversed as evictions took place. However, as he owned a tricycle and used to buy in La 
Parada and then go to the market, he started a new routine,  
“I always saw that the market was small, but I liked it because it was friendly, I 
came first through the houses, then around the market, and the neighbors bought 
me everywhere, to rest I will stay in this space, but I had already made a good 
sell”.  
Owning a tricycle, has given him the peace of mind to avoid being affected by 
past evictions, but his ‘seniority’ in the neighborhood has also allowed him to keep 
selling. As he responds to my question on how he keeps selling there, he winks and 
affirms “I am not a founder, but I know people”. But indeed, there are few vendors like 
him around the Pleasant Valley Market, “if the market is not a big sale, you have fewer 
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vendors around too”, he adds. Then, as a peddler, their capacity to attract patrons is 
reduced and becomes more dependent in the roofed market than the street vendor. 
These three cases can be described visually with the pictures below, which were 
taken in another market in Los Olivos. Vendors are dispersed and evictions make them 
more dependent on people who are not legally entitled to grant access to space. In the 
best situation, they own a tricycle or a cart but they can no longer access a fixed post. 
Behind those testimonies, there is a trend that shows that from a marketplace of 
neighbors and acquaintances, street vending is affected by a weakening of the local basis 
of those neighborhoods. Strangers in roofed markets, strangers selling on the streets, and 
dispersion caused by recurrent evictions makes more difficult the celebrated transition 
that De Soto (1986) identified from peddlers to becoming a market stall owner. Now, 
individual mechanisms prevail. 46  
  
                                                 
46 The only case I found where vendors could organize, despite dispersion in space, was in downtown 
Lima but within the permitted types of vending such as ‘emolienteros’, ‘chocleros’, etc, which are actively 
encouraged to obtainlicenses or in the context of mandatory associative savings in the Program 
Capitalizando. The type of product that is sold and the licensing framework gave them a common ground 
to organize. A case that is unlikely to happen around the peripheral markets and in the products that are 










5.1.2Bogotá: The prevalence of elusive placemaking 
In Bogotá, the removal of licenses accompanied by a more permanent 
surveillance over public space reinstated the power of the city administration to regulate 
access to public space and presumably diminished the opportunity of mafias to operate, 
which previously controlled access to licenses. As certain streets are classified as 
recovered and special or transitory zones become heavily regulated, street vendors, who 
are mostly ‘permanent peddlers’, feel less entitled to use public space and are forced to 
constantly look for different destinations because their access to space cannot be taken 
for granted .  
At times when vendors occupied streets more permanently, vendors’ associations 
within centrally located and commercially attractive areas were common in Bogotá. 
While licenses were granted individually and annually, vendors rarely got licenses by 
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themselves. Usually, they had to ask around for the organizer or the leader, a political 
broker with contacts within the administration and even security guards, who sometimes 
charged a fee to get a license, arranged for the vendor to occupy a street stall, and even 
connected them with a provider. Even if those arrangements were subjected to change 
and were precarious in nature, vendors using those networks managed to get permanent 
access and sometimes defend their positions by claiming that the streets belonged to 
everyone. Rosalia, now a relocated vendor in a northern neighborhood, recalls her 
experience on downtown streets, 
“…when I worked in San Victorino, I remember that even if you had a license you 
cannot leave your space unattended anyway. You need to watch out. Someone 
will skip three days and then another person will come and say this is my stall. 
And then, all the fight again, that the street is for everyone, and the mafia came, 
they even had knives to fight for the stall…the person may leave the spot but then 
you will have to find another place to work if you paid a fee”. 
The vendors I interviewed, who had experience selling downtown, never recalled 
‘better times’ of collective organizing. Few vendors managed to stay free of people that 
felt entitled to grant access to space. Rather, organization came from those with ties 
above that helped to give a sense of security even if they did not grant them access to 
space at the start. Estela, who is still a street vendor in the Acapulco neighborhood in the 
locality of Santa Fe, also recalls past experiences,  
“I started like this as a peddler, but even at that time we were the same as today, 
do you understand me? All the sudden a leader from an association came…he will 
give us a stall all the stalls were numbered, and we had to pay, he gave us a purple 
uniform with the name of the association”. 
As access to space became more controlled by the city administration, street 
vendors have internalized that public space is administered by the will of the Mayor, 
which embodies the intentions of the city administration. Consequently, they cannot 
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claim their use as valid, but neither can any other non-institutional actor feel entitled to 
control their access. Estela has transited from the time when vendors’ could develop a 
more permanent access to the street by paying a fee to an association to a time where she 
works as a free-rider. The association that made her access to space more permanent was 
evicted during the Peñaloza administration. When confronted by managers of commercial 
establishments near her trade area, she claims,  
“I am not the owner of the street, anything like that, but that person over there can 
only give orders from the door to inside. –but if somebody tells you no, what do 
you do?– I said, it is a pity but the street does not belong to anybody, it belongs to 
someone when there are recovered public spaces. –who is that someone?– the 
Mayor.”  
As access to space cannot be taken for granted, peddling not only involves a 
greater challenge to maintain space but also the need to develop a ‘skillful’ eye to 
identify new opportunities across time and space. A peddler needs to identify 
arithmetically the borders of those more monitored zones, the places to hide and the 
hours to be more protected from police control. This trend can be more clearly identified 
in blue zones, which are those neighborhoods or streets that have been more controlled 
and subjected to commercial gentrification. Estela have been selling for almost 20 years 
close to a commercial area downtown, she decides to occupy adjacent streets of a 
recuperated zone on 7th street, which only comprises certain key blocks. She explains 
why she keeps selling there:  
“Well, I used to live far, but now I rent a room around here, you know here it is 
commercial, you have lots of people. You have to look where you can sell more – 
And do you have to ask for permission from someone?– To nobody. You know 
why? If you go to 7th street, it is dangerous; I want to tell you the truth. It is 
dangerous because the police bother you a lot. Just need to keep away from the 
recovered zones.”  
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Even when access to space has been achieved, and a peddler has become semi-
stationary, vendors constantly look for other opportunities that will come up, and that 
may help to get more control over her trade, that is, not depending on providers or 
‘security guards’. When I asked Angela, who was semi-stationary for three months in a 
blue zone in the locality of Suba, if she has tried to work in other places in the city, she 
explains, 
“you know, every place is the same, but I am looking for a place where I can earn 
more. For instance, there I know they are building a mall, I believed it is going to 
be called Luna… and I will go there. I will start there to be the only one, I know 
many will come later but I will gain the space first, nobody will condition me on 
that”. 
The reorientation of the pedestrian flow brought by the investment in massive 
transportation systems has added to the complexity facing a vendor seeking to identify 
the places to sell. Usually, the ‘predictable’ pattern in the agglomeration of people at 
different times of the day has enabled vendors to widen their range of mobility to identify 
new and more profitable areas to sell. Pablo, who works at the entrance of the 
Transmilenio transit center, explains, 
“Here to sell in Usaquen was not the best option. But now it has improved a lot, 
all because of this avenue. They have widened the avenue; this is the entrance all 
up to Rincon, now you can see how commerce has flourished here. They paved all 
these streets but you can see no vendor is up front, the people come and go 
through the Transmilenio and they walk right here”.  
Likewise, Rosalia who moved from downtown to Quito for a safer place to sell 
and was later relocated in a Caseta Popular– a commercial center with stalls to 
accommodate street vendors– can recount the history of commerce of the neighborhood 
by following the construction of the main avenues and the Transmilenio bus stop: 
“Before, the avenue had two directions, you saw how cars enter and left the 
neighborhoods but after the reorganization of Transmilenio, the buses come in 
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parallel, they don´t enter. So there is less flow of people, before people came 
through and there was more commerce. There was no mall, no supermarket, only 
CAFAM (a supermarket for social security affiliates). Now the neighborhood is 
enclosed, and with all this urban renewal the services will be more expensive, 
then everything will be more expensive. Still this is the only commercial zone in 
this sector because all the streets are just small alleys with no end. But, when this 
was the main avenue to come to this sector we sold to anyone, now the people 
that come are the ones that live nearby and feel too lazy to go to the mall or the 
main supermarkets”.  
The loss of pedestrian flow, which brings different kinds of customers to a 
neighborhood economy, is regretted in a street commerce that was never oriented to 
adjust to a smaller flow of clientele with rather sporadic needs.  




Within red zones, a different type of place-making has set in but even if not as 
persecuted as the practice within blue zones, they still are part of the IPES administration, 
and thus, they are not out of the radar of policy makers. These zones are located within 
neighborhood configurations that were or are still inaccessible, in part given the poverty 
of the residents in the area, and the later expansion of mass transportation systems. 
Usually these areas correspond to the South part of the city, closer to the Wholesale 
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market of the city named CORABASTOS. Another important characteristic is that the 
expansion of supermarkets has come later than in other localities. Ramon and Romulo are 
part of those vending sites that look very similar to Lima’s street markets (See: 
Illustration 4.2 picture b). In the neighborhood Los Andes located in the locality of 
Ciudad Bolivar, Ramon explains that the process of becoming a vendor was spontaneous 
and even natural given the characteristics of the residents and the area,  
“Most of the people of this area, we are from the village, and this neighborhood 
looks like any other small town in Colombia. You come here, you know you have 
visibility and this is like a small town inside Bogotá, you come, see, assess the 
situation, check what you can sell, and that’s it. You decide to stay here”.  
Romulo, who also sells vegetables, found in Los Andes an accessible area to 
expand his business,  
“What I like about here is that is close to where I live. I don’t need today 
transportation. This neighborhood is like the entrance of all the rest, so you get 
more people who buy here”.  
Another factor that has made this particular area appealing is not only the demand 
of the residents, who usually look for cheaper prices, but also the fact that the 
improvement in transportation infrastructure across the city, has made vending more 
profitable by lowering the price of getting merchandise,  
“I believe that the trade here has improved. Before, in order to go to get 
merchandise, my yucca sac, I have to take two cars, one to the crossroads, and 
another to the wholesale market. It was the same for going and coming. Then, I 
had to increase the price. Today with the avenue I can take only one bus to the 
market and one bus to come here. I think that opening the road has made our trade 
improve here”.  
However, this type of more permanent placemaking has not necessarily implied a 
perception of public space as a neighborhood asset. Similar to blue zones, street vendors 
recognize that their occupation of the streets is not only temporary but also at the will of 
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the mayor. Moreover, they have also internalized their ‘fault’ in not complying with 
keeping away from public space. As manifested eloquently by Ramon,  
“This area is neither recovered nor transitory, but the IPES reserves the right to 
decide what to do with it. The day that the City Mayor decides to evict us, they 
will. We are aware that all of us are temporary, and that we are invading public 
space –what do you mean by reserved then?– That public space is State property. 
You can only be the owner of a property from the door to the inside, and may be 
one meter outside… [Pointing to the local stores who need the garage door to be 
clear], but from here to there, where the cars drive, and this sidewalk is the State, 
this is public space, we are squatting”.  
Ramon recognizes that he is not following the rules of the city but he defends 
himself not only because of his need to work but also because he sees that his area is not 
a priority in city planning: 
“I know that there are sensitive zones, but here the vendors are not causing any 
problems because we are deep inside the mountains. Here you don’t find a lot of 
cars, here there are no malls as in the city center, or as in Chapinero or the Siete 
de Agosto. In those places, they (public officials) are recovering public space, and 
by doing so they are hurting the street seller because they are taking away his or 
her workplace without offering anything. We don’t have problems because we are 
in the middle of a mountain”.  
While conditions for the appropriation of public space have become more 
unstable within the blue zones, vendors in either type of zone in Bogotá are aware of the 
precariousness of their status in face of city regulation. They have a clear understanding 
of the rules which actually help to accommodate their placemaking tactics. To a certain 
degree, they do not develop a strong sense of entitlement within the routinized practice of 
their occupation; they perceive themselves as illegitimate, occupying areas where they 
don’t belong.  
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5.2 PERCEPTIONS ON UPGRADING POLICIES 
5.2.1 Lima: A misinterpreted risk-return tradeoff 
As a group of workers, street vendors have been re-imagined in policy making as 
entrepreneurs who need a ‘push’ to make it in the formal economy. The expectations of 
policy makers move along the lines of the principle of risk-return tradeoff, in which 
potential return rises with an increase in risk. Therefore, vendors are encouraged to 
invest, using bank loans, and increase their risk to be able to succeed in the formal 
economy. The widespread perception of street vendors as people who avoid risk by 
staying on the streets explains to some degree their cycle of poverty from the perspective 
of public officials. However, the aptitude towards taking risk is neither a product of the 
real expectations of higher economic returns for vendors. In face of greater persecution, 
in neighborhood-bounded markets, the rationales that explain the choice to formalize, 
even if entails a high price and risk involves an orientation towards maximizing security, 
that is to keep working and maintain a level of income that could secure long terms plans 
for their families.  
Maximizing security to achieve long term plans have always been the main 
motivation for street vendors. The low barriers to enter this occupation could be 
perceived as a low risk scenario in economic terms, but the horizon which justifies their 
staying in this occupation has usually been misinterpreted. As described in Chapter 4, 
public officials in Lima, even if recognizing that the need to work pushes people to street 
trade, perceive that the time they spent in that occupation shows a lack of will to move 
forward. However, the testimonies of older vendors give a different outlook. Despite 
many vendors, particularly men, entering street trade after being either laid-off or unable 
to secure wage employment, their permanence in the occupation has enabled them to 
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achieve long term household plans, such as building their houses and guaranteeing their 
children’s education, which means an improvement in their living conditions .Hilario, 59 
years old, was street vendor for 20 years who formalized his business in the last 5 years 
in the Altiplano Neighborhood in San Juan de Lurigancho. Unable to get a steady wage 
job, he started to work as a street vendor as soon as he became a father,  
“I had my first son, and with the second, my wife and I gained more strength to 
keep working in the street market, we have together seven children, we have 
educated them all with our efforts, now all of them are adults, and most of them 
work in their professions, in different places, I even have one abroad. When we 
started, the construction of our house was at zero, all we had was a shack in a lot 
that my father gave us when we got together, we have built the house little by 
little, now we own other lots, we built our best house with our children in Villa 
María del Triunfo and we have moved there a few years ago”.  
Permanency in street trade has meant in many cases a moving ‘upward’ or at least 
a more convenient occupational choice, particularly for women. While in the testimonies 
I found many transitions from inactivity to street vending, many women also consider 
their labor trajectories an upward step since in the transit from domestic wage work to 
street vending, they gain more ownership of their time and decisions, as well as a better 
income. Luisa, who is still a street vendor in Rímac, worked as a cook in a household. 
She tells me “at the beginning I had some fear because when you work in a house you are 
shy, but you know, when you have children you need to make ends meet, and I came here 
and realized that I could make more than the minimum my patrona paid me”. Victoria, 
now a market vendor in Ate Vitarte, started as a street vendor in her neighborhood also 
coming to the realization that domestic work did not pay her well, “I spent too much in 
transportation, I had to leave early and arrived too late to watch out for my children; too 
much money on buses for such little pay”. 
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In cases in which women had low-paid wage employment, street vending 
provided a relatively ‘safer’ and more promising venue for securing household income 
and opportunities for growth. An example is Celmira who graduated from high school 
and got a clerical job in a factory when she was twenty. She reflects on her forced choice,  
“I worked in an office, but you only get the minimum wage, not all businessmen 
offer you a good salary. I was dad and mom to my children and my salary was not 
enough. I was pushed to do this type of business so I can give my daughters an 
education… I already had four children and that little salary was too low, if you 
have a business at least you can expect to have a larger margin of earnings, you 
can make it work, so you can make your family go ahead. You get to learn things 
and may be, as I did, get a market stall, you have a better status after all your hard 
work, don’t you think?” 
As mostly women participate in street trade, it is difficult to isolate them as a 
worker group without taking into account their household division of labor and family 
cycle. In cases in which the couple works in the stall, women and men take turns 
according to the need for caring for young children and the opportunities that the husband 
may have for additional employment. Hilario, with seven children, stayed in the stall for 
longer periods when some of their children were too little “I think the critical time was 
when they started school, my wife will go to check on them and stay there as much as she 
could. You need to teach them the value of education”. Moreover, closeness to places of 
residence eases the double role of women. Rosa, 61 years old, was a street vendor before 
she entered the roofed market project with her fellow vendors in the street market. She 
explains her timetable “I tried to make a work schedule that was functional to me, here 
the business was from 6 am to 3pm, but I left earlier. I calculated the time that my 
children will arrive from school. I usually woke up very early and did some prep for 
cooking. At 2pm I went back home and finished cooking so I could take care of them all 
afternoon”. Closeness to the place of residence also provides a safer environment for 
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elderly vendors. Hugo, 67 years old, explains his rationale of keeping selling in his 
neighborhood in Independencia “I think that since here I live it is more convenient, I 
don’t have to spend on transportation. I am old and I can’t be walking around Lima, 
trying to get a spot in La Parada, returning late, then you get robbed, they kick you out of 
the streets. Now, here I stay; here I have my home, my things”.  





Permanency has also facilitated the division of labor within families to secure 
alternative ways of generating income given the greater uncertainty to secure permanent 
wage employment. Many of their decisions regarding the management of street trade for 
women and men are associated with their role in the household, and the perception of 
their probabilities to secure wage employment. For instance, Luisa explains, 
“Here in this neighborhood, women are street vendors. Very few are men, before 
we were all women. For women there are not many jobs out there, men can get a 
job more easily, that is why you see mostly women”. 
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Also, street trade works as a family business in the sense that children, especially 
daughters, are also introduced to the trade as a way to help out with the daily tasks. 
Hilario was introduced at an early age by his mom as was Luisa. In most of the 
testimonies, there is a noticeable preference among women vendors to count on daughters 
more heavily for management of the stalls and the diversification of the main stall. As 
daughters are perceived as the extra hands in the household, street vending becomes an 
extension of their household chores. For instance, in the case of Luisa, even though she 
had one sister and one brother, her mom counted on both daughters to expand the family 
business “My mom sold too, and she brought me here, she brought my sister too… my 
sister sold homemade spices and marinades, and I specialized in chopped vegetables, my 
mom sold the fresh vegetables and brought the herbs and peppers for my sister”. Tania, 
who never was an independent street vendor but was introduced by a neighbor to the 
trade because of her ability with mathematics, also shows the preference to organize the 
business around women in the family once they have a stall in a roofed market,  
“I came to the street market very little, I was eight years old, I helped out a lady 
that came from the province and did not know how to do bookkeeping, she related 
with the customers and I summed and told her how much was the payment. She 
learned little by little. Then, another neighbor hired me to sell and he paid me 
daily 5 soles –I was only 12– I worked till noon and then went to school. Then, 
the women I worked for first left her stall and moved to another neighborhood. 
She transferred the market stall to my mom. After I got married, my mom and my 
sisters worked here but then I came back, when my first child was born. Now, we 
all work together”. 
This earlier exposure to street trade may be perceived as a way to reproduce a 
cycle of poverty from the perspective of public officials. Nonetheless, the tendency to 
introduce children into trade and the preference for daughters to help out in the stall does 
not undermine the importance of education in the perspective of street vendors. On the 
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one hand, many vendors view these activities as helping young people to be responsible 
and to help out with education expenses after completing high school. While in most of 
the cases, they do not hire permanent helpers, they do give some money to family 
members who help out and that is perceived as contributing to their educational expenses 
while keeping flexible schedules. During the best time of her business, Celmira, still a 
street vendor hired some of her nephews who were students at the time. She says “I had 
two nephews helping me out, they chopped vegetables for me and sometimes would take 
care of my second fixed post, and this was a way to help them. I paid them weekly and 
they used that money for their transportation to go to the Institute where they were 
studying”. Yolanda hired a nephew in the top months of sales, “He studied then. I asked 
him to help me only until noon; I gave him 10 soles daily, so he has money for 
photocopies, bus and some food”. On the other hand, when children finish their careers, 
vendors tend to reduce their demands for help without a clear preference in gender. Leila, 
who started helping out in a juice stall and then sold gelatin as a peddler, usually had her 
daughter helping her out at her market stall. After her daughter’s graduation, she is no 
longer asking her for help “now I ask somebody else. She has always helped me but not 
now. She has another job to do, it is better for her”. Rosa, who also counted on his son, 
comments “my single son has always helped me, but I believe I have to look for someone 
else to help me here because he has just finished his career, he needs to focus on his 
things. I can’t keep counting on him even though he always stops by to give me a hand”. 
To assume that keeping selling on the streets is a sign of unwillingness to progress 
is as equally problematic as seeing the decision to formalize as a sign of the willingness 
to succeed in business. From the testimonies I collected, the only vendor, Jorge, who took 
account of profitability in deciding to stay in a market stall, preferred to become a 
159 
 
peddler, and the longer he stays working as such, the more careful he has become over 
where to formalize. After many of his fellows moved away, he rented a stall for a month 
but he realized that renting a stall in the market made its merchandise too expensive and 
undermined his earnings. Coming back to the streets as a peddler has made him more 
selective in terms of the formalization projects, as he has perceived the very different 
flows of people between roofed markets. While he still wants to get a stall eventually, 
safety and good sales are at the top of his priority as he looks at options as he grows 
older. Nonetheless, he is aware that he will need to finance this individually, as he is not 
part of any association and has found it very difficult to collectively organize: 
“I will never pick the Parada, there is a lot of corruption there, a lot of thieves, in 
Ate it is not like this. I would love to have a stall in Aires, because there you can 
sell up to 11 at night and there are lots of people. Having a stall will help me to 
buy various products and I could be there all the time, because at my age it is 
getting hard, but you need to have more savings if you rent alone”. 
Street vendors, such as Hugo in Independencia who work in mostly low-income 
settlements, perceive that having a stall in a market involves greater risks. as 
opportunities for sale are abundant on the streets “Have you ever considered moving into 
the market stall that is in front of your post? No, I know this market has empty stalls but 
in there it is worse than here, on the streets people at least buy something small, but in the 
market they don’t, in a market stall you are hidden, and people do not usually bother to 
enter all the way”. The visibility of their business is an important aspect to consider for 
any vendor, and the streets seem to provide a better opportunity to achieve this.  
Among the vendors more exposed to gentrification, the most recurrent argument 
that I found in the testimonies of vendors who decided to formalize was oriented towards 
maximizing security of the household. Informal self-employment certainly is one of the 
most unprotected worker statuses, without health insurance and social security access. In 
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that context, “you shouldn’t leave the street to your children” was the most pervasive 
argument which involved a sort of retirement plan. In face of the increasing uncertainty 
to guarantee a safe access to space, owning a stall provides better conditions for work and 
inheritance among their children. As Hilario explains “most of us in the market have 
reached the age in which we know we are leaving this for our children to inherit. I have a 
son that likes this business, and this is what I can leave him, I can help him, give him tips, 
we may retire soon and he or his siblings may follow up”. 
Formalization is also perceived as beneficial in most of the cases as a venue for 
security and safety. Out of 15 interviewees who are now relocated vendors, nine 
highlighted benefits over disadvantages and only four considered formalization a burden. 
Seven of those who highlighted benefits referred to being safe and secure, which meant 
mainly free of the persecution of the state. Other benefits pointed out in the testimonies 
were having a lower rate of credit at a bank because of the stall title and being able to 
work longer hours within a roofed market.  
The formalization projects, which more often involve collectively owning a 
roofed market, have served in many instances to reduce the costs of formality and avoid 
persecution. Celmira points out the benefits of collectively owning a roofed market: 
“Here, the SUNAT does not bother, that is the main advantage we have. The 
cooperative has everything as a private institution. Imagine, all by yourself, they 
will close our business, fine us. As a cooperative, we all have a license or a tax 
registry and that is an advantage because it is a formal status, without the fear that 
the SUNAT (tax inspectors) come and ask you about your receipts or documents. 
If you don’t have them, you get hurt, have fines, but if you have everything in 
order, you don’t have a problem”.  
And even when not owning collectively, the benefits perceived are related to 
being out of the persecution of local authorities. Miriam, whose formalization project 
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involved renting rather than a collaborative project to build a market points out “look, in 
this case this is an establishment that we rent. They (public officials) have nothing to do 
with this, we are independent, when we were on the street we were at the mercy of the 
mayor, they collected sisa and other fees, here it is different we paid our rent, and that’s 
it”. Interestingly, the benefit of formalization is still maximizing security and the 
conditions under they work, but not, as far as the testimonies indicate, obtaining higher 
returns.  
All those who considered it a burden referred to the rising costs of being formal, 
which involve not only keep paying the loans for the bank, giving payments towards 
improving infrastructure, but also the taxes and new fees that come along .Hilario, while 
still believing it was a good choice being formal in the long run for his children, 
complains, 
“You know, it is good to comply with all the corresponding regulations, but you 
have to pay a lot. For instance, we pay the sanitary card, each three months, but 
every year they increase the fee, I don´t know why. That damages us. We are still 
paying this property, and we are spending a lot. Worse it was when we were 
renting for sure, we at least know now that this will be ours but we are still 
worried about this. There are also other expenses we are making to improve our 
market. We are lucky that the SUNAT is not coming yet, but we know that they 
as well as other institutions will come anytime now that we are formal. They will 
damage us, they will supervise us.”  
The imaginary of the ‘entrepreneur’ as expressed in the public officials’ point of 
view focuses on the individual and his or her career as oriented to maximize utility. As 
the testimonies show, stationary vendors’ rarely justify their decisions to formalize by the 
expectation that their business will grow. Their decisions were mostly oriented to secure 
income for their household, in face of evictions, and the measure of their overall success 
was related to the improvement of the living conditions of their children. Moreover, it is 
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hard to separate business from family, as the assets of the family, e.g. the work of 
children and women, become the assets of the business. Ultimately, stability in access to 
space also becomes an asset of the family, but it is becoming a scarce asset. Due to the 
greater instability of earnings when formal, current street vendors come back or stay on 
the streets, but without the support of a local basis, their potential for economic growth or 
for securing long term assets for their families is undermined.  
5.2.2 Bogotá: The trap of dependency 
As placemaking becomes more elusive, vendors in Bogotá are often confronted 
with the need to give away critical economic choices in order to keep working. With the 
exception of certain inaccessible or non-gentrified red zones, peddlers usually can neither 
manage their margin of earnings nor specialize in any particular product. When a space 
has been ‘colonized’ by other actors – such as those providers who condition access to 
specific spots by forcing vendors to acquire their carts and sell their merchandise – the 
peddler have to comply with the rules of the specific street if he or she wants to have the 
opportunity at a given time of the day to access that particular spot. The street vendor 
becomes a professional seller with no attachment to a specific product and little 
knowledge of how to manage prices to become a trader. These conditions however are 
not only embedded in the social construction of informality but also within the regulated 
forms of on-streets or off-streets relocations, which in general limit the practice of 
entrepreneurship even if designed to promote it. In the red zones, where vendors are 
independent, their preference to avoid these regularized options confirm that the trap of 
dependence is embedded within the current regularized policy framework. 
Vendors explained that the degree of independence when selling on streets not 
only depended on the access to space but also on whether or not they own, rent or are 
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given their carts by the provider. In the pictures below in 4.4, I show some of these types 
of carts. Picture A shows a chaza (stroller) which looks like a baby stroller usually filled 
with candy and cigarettes. Picture B shows a tricycle, which is usually branded, filled 
either with ice-cream or beverages. Non-branded tricycles, as the one in picture C, are 
bigger and are usually used to sell fruits with or without chopped fruits on the side. Most 
of tricycles, branded or not, do not stay in one site for long periods of time. The carrito 
(mobile cart), shown in picture D, is usually bigger with a deposit to store more 
merchandise under the display area. Due to its size, it serves to display any type of 











From the testimonies I collected, the chaza seems to be an initial step towards a 
more independent trade, the branded tricycle is owned by the company while the non-
branded tricycle and ‘carritos’ mobile stalls can be purchased from a provider but the 
decision does not usually imply that the provider stops being the regular supplier. 
Vendors selling on branded tricycles or provider’s carts usually earn a fixed quota per 
product sold. They are assigned daily a sector to sell, and even if they are facing threats 
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of control, the company makes them pay if the merchandise is confiscated. Clarissa, in 
the Santa Cruz neighborhood close to downtown, explains to me,  
“I sell around 68 thousand pesos daily, but I get 100 pesos per ice cream. In a 
good day, I can make 30 thousand pesos, for almost eight hours going here and 
there. But it is the same as any other vendor. Police also bothers us. And the 
tricycle can be taken away, but the company can give us a backup. The company 
only cares about the merchandise, and if you get that rotten or if the police just 
takes it, you are worst off. But what can I do then? Need has a dogface [la 
necesidad tiene cara de perro]”. 
Ownership of the cart is a key feature to become independent, and curiously in the 
current administration where the confiscation of merchandise has been ‘informally’ 
suspended in many localities (See Chapter 5), their only independent asset is the one that 
is confiscated. Still in many blue zones, the confiscation of merchandise also takes place 
which makes the moving to independence in street selling an elusive quest for most 
vendors. 
Ana sells in a chaza close to the 42 avenue in a blue zone within the locality of 
Chapinero. A street vendor for almost 15 years, she started selling newspapers in the 
area, after her sister left her trade. Ana arrived at 5 a.m. every morning, all the way from 
her neighborhood at the south east of the city. As the bus ride took around two hours, 
making her leave the house in the early morning, she traveled in the company of her 
husband. After sometime in the area, she started with a little box to sell candy on the side. 
The box was made by her husband and gradually converted into a chaza to allow having 
more merchandise. After her husband got disabled due to a car accident, she became the 
only provider and had to find time for taking care of him and her kids “I started with the 
chaza in the afternoons, when my kids went to school, to the kindergarten, I left them 
with the lunch prepared”. At the start of her ‘independent’ venture, in one of the control 
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operations, she lost her chaza and merchandise. She could not recover from that episode 
and continued to sell newspapers until a provider offered a carrito. She bought the 
carrito after a time and considers herself once again an independent vendor,  
“I am la dueña [the owner], you know, you feel a little more peace on one hand, I 
have more stuff, I can sell a bit more. I am less exposed [meaning it is less likely 
that someone could rob her and that her merchandise will not be spoiled so 
easily], but you never know; they [meaning the police] can come and take 
everything. It happened to me before, I was left almost naked. They take your 
merchandise and your carritos. You know, you are left without anything to put 
your stuff, and then you lose your ability to attract customers”.  
Even if she works only the afternoons, her carrito is opened early in the morning. 
A close relative that lives nearby keeps the carrito overnight and opens it at 8.a.m until 
she comes around 1 p.m. Her busy schedule never gives her room to compare prices and 
check on other providers. Since she started with the carrito, she has kept the same 
provider. Her provider usually comes with merchandise at the beginning of the week and 
passes daily to get paid for the merchandise. She is happy with that accommodation “he 
says to me that he is never going to take the bread away from me as long as I comply 
with my payments”. All her merchandise is on credit, the newspapers too, increasing the 
risk to not only end up without capital if it is confiscated but in debt, and possibly losing 
the support of the provider if failing to pay him back regularly. In her future perspectives 
being part of a regularized project does not seem possible,  
“If I had the opportunity to be in an establishment that will be alright but only if 
you get enough income. You have to look for a good place, so you can pay your 
bills. I have to pay rent for the house I live in, and then you need enough for 
eating”. 
More real for her is the rationale to keep working until her health and the 
conditions permit  
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“So what are your plans? For now, I only have to work and pay what I owe –and 
how old will you be when you retire? I will work all the years that I have left; I 
have to look after people. This is what I have to do.” 
Among the senior vendors that I interviewed, few have achieved independence 
over a lifetime. Among the ones who did, the most ‘successful’ was the case of Nivardo 
who after a lifetime of hazardous work as a street vendor decided to ‘retire’, only to work 
closer to his place of residence. He explained to me that after 10 years in Bosa, he knows 
most of the spots nearby and has many friends. With the help of his daughters, who are 
already adults with their own families, he was able to buy two carritos to sell breakfast. 
He sells three times a week because he is not so young as to keep working every day but 
the key of his success is that he has become a provider and a carrito renter “At my age 
for working at streets, it is better to go in pairs, I have two carritos and I rent one but I do 
not have renters all the time. I give them to people that live around so they can bring 
them and take them away. The problem is not that people are not willing to work but you 
have to know them, see where they live, so you can trust they will be responsible with 
you”. Consequentially, the path to independence is always permeated with risk, or as in 
the case of Nivardo, little return on investment. 
The high risk of working on the streets makes it difficult for many traders to 
sustain an economic activity without limiting their range of choice in terms of their 
selection of providers or products. Nevertheless, the testimonies of vendors who opt to 
work within regulated options are no different, despite the claims of public officials who 
argue that these options teach vendors to be entrepreneurial. On the one hand, Bogotá 
restricts access to ownership in most of the off-street relocation projects. Rosalia, an ex-
vendor, is part of a Caseta Popular (off-street relocation project, now called Puntos 
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Comerciales. See Illustration 4.5 picture c) initially intended for 92, and currently 
occupied by only 33. She explains that  
“We pay 55 thousand pesos per month for these stalls, when they [the city] 
relocate us they told us that we will eventually buy these stalls, but so far nothing 
has happened yet. We had a good two years, but now we are few, and since other 
street vendors have come to the area, most of my colleagues don’t care about 
making this work. How you can invest in a place where there is no good 
business?” 
Traditionally, the city has not created administrative venues to access to 
ownership within their marketplaces. For instance, roofed markets also rent stalls at a 
very high price, beyond the means of any street vendor. Being a renter also limits 
incentives for vendors to invest in the infrastructure of their local establishment. Rosalia 
believes that if they were offered the possibility to own from the start, when they were 
making good sales, they would have made a good project. But instead most of the time all 
the collective strategies only counted as requests to improve infrastructure as they are 
renters “we made projects, and send them to the mayor’s office, but one thing is to send 
them and other to get them. We got to have a stair, to get the floor done, to improve the 
ceiling, but among us we cannot invest in a place we don’t own”. 
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In the case of on-street relocation projects, a vendor keeps ‘renting space’, 
changing the landlord from informal brokers to the city administration., In REDEP kiosks 
(Illustration 5.5 picture a), vendors are not allowed to select their providers as the city 
aims to control and supervise their earnings to monitor their progress and to avoid 
smuggled merchandise being on display. Gabriela, who sells in a relocated stall in 
downtown, pays around 150 thousand pesos per month. She is behind in the rent but is 
keeping up to pay the city back. She feels better in a fixed place on the streets. She tells 
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me “I never wanted to be in those Casetas Populares, the streets are much better”. But 
she complains about the narrow choices for her merchandise,  
“In all the years I had as vendor, I discovered that it was better to buy something 
and re-sell at a higher price, for instance a sweater, you can get a 20% earning, 
and for a product it is better to get something in the thousands, not 50 pesos like 
when you sell candy here. You know, we only can buy from that expensive 
provider. It is a robbery. But I can’t complain either. I am stable as long as the 
city keeps me here”.  
Her last remarks, “as long as” emphasizes the temporary agreement, a prospective 
on the future that is similar to the one they get on the streets where their access to space is 
not secured. 
The same experience was shared to me when visiting the street fairs run by the 
city. In one of the fairs at Bosa, closer to a public housing project, a group of vendors got 
to talk to me thinking that I might have more info on the city officials’ plans. They were 
concerned because their licenses are renewed each year and there were only three months 
left. Ursula, who is 65 years old as most of her fellow vendors, sells children’s clothing. 
She explains, 
“The fair was originally for clothing and handcrafted products, but many have 
switched to vegetables and fruits because that is the only thing that works here. 
They spent almost three months to get permission for their changes. They get their 
produce from the wholesale market, but it is too much work for me to go back and 
forth. We have to be here from 8am to 8pm”.  
Ursula and her fellow vendors pay daily a thousand pesos for city services. Up to 
now they are not paying rent, but they are trying to make the city keep the fair even if 
they have to pay rent. “We had a project to make a built up fair in the park but they are 
not moving fast at IPES”, Ursula and some other vendors have started to apply for other 
options such as temporary employment but they are denied because of their age and 
because most of them have never finished their high school, “what can we do next? We 
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need to work, there is nothing more left for us”. Their sense of instability and insecurity 
increase day after day, even if in policy terms, they might be categorized as ‘reconverted’ 
vendors just for using some of the policy options available. 
Another way to see the incongruence of promoting entrepreneurship to 
‘upgrading’ vending can be perceived in how options are perceived in red zones where 
vendors usually are more independent as they select their merchandises and control their 
trade. For instance, Ramon, who is still a street market vendor, describes his experience 
after taking a training course. He received high quality training but no funding or credit 
or even market opportunities to work in the enterprise that was designed by the course,  
“I had to fight for training, but look I got some training. They [Ipes officials] 
offered me a training course to learn to process milk derivatives. I was excited. In 
the Institute, they gave me all the ingredients, I had a very good instructor, I 
learned, I spent three months in transportation, I got my certificate. Everything 
looks pretty but then? The local municipality buys those products for school 
lunches, we learned to make yogurt, cheese, even sausages as a plus, but they 
prefer to contract big companies such as Alpina. Why do they teach me to do that 
if I don’t get any credit, any capital to start, not even a contract to do that? 
Fortunately I fought back otherwise only for getting that training you can end up 
in court because you are supposed to be off the streets”.  
Maria, also selling vegetables in a red zone, explained to me why they rejected the 
idea of having casetas (IPES stalls in illustration 5.5 picture b used at street fairs)despite 
having carnets now through her leader,  
“It is because of that law. If we receive casetas we are giving room to the State, to 
seize us, because they will bring those and will ask us to pay for them. Then, we 
are exposed that the day they [public officials] tell us that they will take them, we 
will have to turn them in, and we will be left with nothing. If we are in our own 
carts, as we are now, we can fight a little more if they try to evict us. We can have 
more independence”.  
Consequentially, the regulated options, while providing safer conditions to 
develop street trade, do not decrease the sense of instability, and give little margin of 
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independence. In that sense, vendors are reconverted into ‘supervised’ entrepreneurs 
whose temporal horizon is limited, and whose competitive capacity depends on the 
economic decisions the city allows them to have. Between regularized or informal trade, 
temporariness and instability seem to prevail in street trade, and being independent is 
conditioned by the difficulty of accessing public space securely. 
5.3 THE EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL GENTRIFICATION 
5.3.1 Lima: The polarizing effect of supermarket competition 
In the past, the everyday neighborhood routine of shopping in the streets 
contributed to a creation of a permanent relationship with loyal patrons, usually named 
“caseros”, who counted on a vendor to purchase a specific product, which contributed to 
specialization among street vendors. Rarely did vendors make drastic changes in their 
products of sale but rather counted on following up offers and staying with providers that 
could give them the best deal to keep prices low. Their control of a point of sale and self-
organization to regulate space, enabled them to introduce more vendors and strengthened 
the capacity of the street market as a whole to attract more customers despite the increase 
in competition among street vendors’ themselves. Being a large street market, even when 
close to roofed markets, guaranteed a very diverse offer not only in products but also of 
prices. The entrance of supermarkets within these zones, however, has gradually changed 
the relatively porous system for accessing space and the mechanisms used to deal with 
competition. Supermarkets thus, have divided vendors, as it has aggravated tensions 
between those in roofed markets and those at streets.  
Supermarket competition in peripheral districts started to be perceived as threat 
only as they learned and adapted closely to the traditional consumption practices of street 
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and roofed markets. When the Supermarket Metro opened between the boundaries of the 
districts of Rímac and Independencia in the Northern Cone around 1997, it was a sad 
experiment. Opened with all the amenities of any supermarket in a middle class 
residential neighborhood, nobody came and if they did they did not buy anything. Despite 
the failure, Metro pushed to open a new supermarket in a central area of Independencia, 
but changed its business strategy. It opened without a tile floor, to give it the image of a 
cheaper place. Then, it gradually studied the practices of people buying around the area. 
Instead of selling pre-weighted bags of fruits and vegetables, it put out a big banner 
telling the customers “Hágalo Usted Mismo” (do it yourself) so they can choose the 
product and see the weights as they normally do at a street or roofed market. After the 
opening of the big mall of Megaplaza, the supermarket boomed. They also offered 
entertainment on the parking lot, usually for children in the morning. As new neighbors 
trying to fit in, supermarket and mall managers as well as their marketing supporters have 
studied closely the consumption practices of the local patrons, learning from the informal 
practices of street markets and roofed markets nearby.  
Nowadays, supermarkets and street or roofed markets in the area compete more 
actively incorporating each other practices. To illustrate how far this aggressive 
competition has gone. I took the picture below in 2008 (Illustration 5.6) when Plaza Vea 
supermarket opened next door to the large and successful Unicachi Market in Comas. In 
this area, Plaza Vea initiated a battle over transportation practices commonly used by 
patrons of roofed and street markets. As shown in the picture, the parking lot has a 
reserved space for a mototaxi association. Managers at this supermarket decided to pay a 
subsidy to this association to bring more patrons to their premises at lower fares. In return 
Unicachi have started to modernize by contracting private security and also changing its 
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name. Note that market vendors have renamed themselves “Mega” Unicachi, simulating 
the name of Megaplaza Mall, and their sign post replicates the colors of the supermarket 
installed just next to them. Copying the ways of informal traders, supermarkets have 
learned to compete more effectively, and thus have also made vendors more aware that 
they need to proactively develop strategies to resist their competition. 







The aggressive competition between supermarkets and roofed markets has also 
undermined the local basis that has traditionally supported the place making practices of 
street vendors, intensifying the competitive tensions with roofed markets. Conflict 
between roofed market vendors and street vendors has always existed. In peripheral 
districts, such Independencia, Market vendor’ associations usually participated in the 
Mixed Commission, spaces of negotiation created by the Ordinance 002, even more 
actively than residents associations. However, as Mixed Commissions required longer 
terms for negotiation and the focus was mainly on the designation of restricted zones 
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(zones rigid as), or the availability of municipal owned lots (campos feriales) to 
accommodate street vendors, market vendors’ complaints were rarely effective. When 
actively competing with street vendors, roofed markets were ‘forced’ to either adapt to 
them or join them by using the streets as a way to diversify their businesses. More street 
vendors increased the choice of consumers by extending the quality and availability of 
products at different and competitive prices, which translated into an increase in the 
popularity of a particular commercial site, which also proved beneficial to roofed 
markets. However, as supermarkets appeared in the neighborhood, popular commercial 
sites –which included market and street vendors– are exposed to greater competition and 
as local authorities have become more pro-active in controlling public space, the 
difference of interests between market and street sellers becomes clearer than in the past. 
In the testimonies I gathered, I found a more aggressive attitude towards street 
vendors nearby, particularly when a supermarket was recently installed or in the midst of 
a formalization project. As roofed market vendors start investing more in their 
infrastructure, pay mandated fees to the local authorities, and try to reinvent strategies to 
keep up with supermarket competition, the margin for guaranteeing lower prices to 
compete becomes narrower, despite the credit that is available to them. Juana, now a 
roofed market vendor in a lower income neighborhood in Independencia close to a 
supermarket, believes that moving toward a market stall has represented a big 
achievement but at the same time a greater cost,  
“I have made progress, imagine I started selling little eggs, now I have a lot more. 
Now I even receive credit, they treat us as microenterprises and help us. But, 
competition and the constant high prices have also lowered our business, people 
buy less, and even so you have to invest more. When I sold on the street investing 
5 thousands soles was to have a good variety of merchandise, but now you have to 
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invest more, otherwise people see your stall and walk away. You need to fill it 
out, if market stalls are empty, they don’t bother to look closer”.  
Inside a roofed market, the stakes are higher. Visually, market vendors have to 
invest in their infrastructure and give services to show their commitment to sanitary and 
safety conditions that are constantly inspected. Yolanda, now a market vendor in a 
gentrified neighborhood in Los Olivos, explains the priorities of her association in 
dealing with competition: 
“Basically infrastructure –as I commented you earlier– people want to see it… as 
you see in Tottus or in Metro, then look at us all informal because many of our 
colleagues have their merchandises in boxes, then they get disappointed a little … 
the market should be of concrete, designed by professionals who know about this. 
We need to improve our appearance”. 
Those within consolidated and gentrified neighborhoods feel more affected since 
supermarkets’ target a sector of their consumers with stable employment. . In the roofed 
and street markets, the practice of fiado, very common in the past, implied a payment at 
the end of the month from loyal customers to the market and even a street vendor, with 
no interest. The practice itself implied a high degree of trust among clients and vendors. 
When failing to pay, however, the relationships between consumers and sellers tended to 
become tense. Eventually, if they fail to pay continually, caseros will damage their 
reputation in the market. As credit cards become readily available in supermarkets, 
caseros can skip those compromises, and keep their ‘good’ or ‘bad’ reputation 
anonymous, and even maintain a debt for longer periods of time by paying a minimum 
fee even though that would entail greater interest. Market vendors in contrast with greater 
debts to pay to keep stalls and with higher demands to increase the quality merchandise 
to attend those consumers cannot afford fiado. Tania, now a market vendor in Rímac 
working in a neighborhood close to a supermarket, recounts,  
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“Of course, many of my caseros now go to Metro, there are sales there. Some of 
my caseros have their own cars and prefer driving there, they have credit cards 
from that store. We cannot give credit, things are much more difficult when you 
work with loans and need to make payments. In a stall you need more capital, and 
giving credit is too risky”.  
Investing higher in a well stocked stall and infrastructure may indeed increase 
prices for customers, but as their clientele still looks for bargains they are forced to keep 
prices as low as they can to keep up with supermarkets while also dealing with 
competition from street vendors. As a result, many market vendors become more 
proactive in dealing with their closest competitors –the street vendors– even though they 
have seen over the years that the relationship with them can be functional. Fabian, a 
relocated vendor who sells in the Huamanga-Comas a gentrified neighborhood, angrily 
expresses his discontent, 
“We have to pay, and those who are on the streets don’t pay anything, just a few 
blocks nearby there is a street market and they don’t pay anyone. They can locate 
in the Avenue with the advantage that people comes there, I don’t know but their 
products are practically given away– they do have a different form of 
presentation, not like here, were we have to watch our sanitary conditions… but 
the people prefer them… I don’t know it is maybe our fault, but you have to pay 
and pay. I would rather not do it, and work like them, being an owner inevitably 
has its problems”.  
In this case, as the street market distracts the flow of the public, relocated vendors 
feel the competition strongly. Fabian also told me that because of this competition the 
representatives of the roofed market have presented several complaints to the local 
municipality.  
In some other cases, as in that of Ivonne, a street vendor whose experience we 
described in the first section, market vendors only keep some ‘complimentary’ vendors 
on a daily basis by making them pay a fee relaxing control on the weekends, occupying 
some streets by themselves and allowing more vendors to occupy nearby areas. These 
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selective practices help to keep space clear but at the same time call the attention of 
buyers so they can ‘read’ the market as offering bargains as well. This practice, however, 
is a result of an ongoing conflict. As narrated by Ivonne, at the opening of the market, 
there were always street vendors that have been there long before. After a few years, as 
the market started becoming empty, the association decided to press the authorities to 
kick out vendors or at least to make them rent the stalls. Ivonne, not only a street vendor, 
but a resident of the neighborhood which is still a low-income area but close to 
supermarkets, describes this process when traders who failed as renters, decided to still 
keep working on the street at the same time. The market vendors adapted by co-opting 
their space, and reserving street vending for them during the weekends and restricting the 
vendors who are tolerated nearby: 
“First, as everything was empty inside, the market vendors went to the 
municipality, made claims and tried to convince the street sellers to enter the 
market. They even offered them a stall charging only the minimum but once they 
were inside they started asking whatever they wanted. Then, as some of them 
stayed outside, they started to kick them out. But those were the worst times. 
When they kicked out the vendors there was not much business, residents were 
looking for the vendors and none of them were there…You can tell, when they 
evict vendors, there is not much business. People are used to look for the vendors 
to get good bargains. The market needs to adapt to vendors but they do it without 
letting us stay here, they more or less leave us on the weekends but that is when 
they, with their stalls open, come outside. You may think they are poor street 
vendors but they are market vendors who do not need to be on the street”. 
The symbiosis of street trade and roofed markets as general points of sale with a 
variety of prices and also complimentary services makes for mixed feelings about 
competition. The Market San Benito, located in a consolidated neighborhood in Ate 
Vitarte, surrounded by many small and formal shops, is a clear example. The market has 
specialized in prepared food, and many patrons come from the workers and customers of 
the nearby businesses. One key service of street vendors in the area is selling car parts, 
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and fixing them on the go at the entrance of the roofed market. Some street vendors even 
rent some stalls to keep their stock of car parts to serve their customers. This activity, in 
the view of the market vendors, is a key to calling attention to the area but it has called 
the attention of the local authorities as well. Fiorela told me that the municipality comes 
very often to the area, threatens vendors and brings police. She worries about this 
situation,  
“It is the municipality that doesn’t want street vendors on the streets, they are 
kicking them out constantly, and they say they are going to make a garden on the 
sidewalk so they cannot stay there. A garden? That would be the worst, the 
market will die, and who will come to eat here? Even the stores will need to close 
because nobody is going to come to this neighborhood, nobody will make a sale”. 
The instability of vending in public space has involved a change in street vendors’ 
economic choices. As they are no longer collectively attracting a permanent pool of 
‘caseros’, street vendors start to switch to seasonal products, or those that could serve a 
complimentary role to the clientele of roofed markets. For instance, Jorge who opted for 
peddling realize that he could keep selling produce, but needed to specialize in seasonal 
fruits and vegetables to be able to compete with relocated vendors by bringing the price 
down:  
“I sold vegetables and fruits, I usually pick what is less expensive, but now, for 
example, there is the orange campaign, I only sell oranges, I can sell papaya, but 
only when this campaign stops, then I switch to vegetables, and then from 
December to February I start with the grapes’ campaign. In this market, people 
don´t have that much income, and they (the neighborhood market vendors) sell a 
little expensive”.  
Likewise, Joaquín keeps selling clothing but now the dynamics have changed. 
Even if he keeps some regulars, he is no longer ‘looked for’ for his products as he was 
when selling on the street market. People certainly do grocery shopping at the 
“Cooperative” but rarely buy clothing there as they used to when there was not 
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department stores around. After learning that peddlers usually sold seasonal decorations, 
he started to bring also some plastic products like Christmas decorations, plastic flowers 
for mother’s day, etc to try them out, 
“With decorations, I did good, especially during Christmas and New Years, 
clothing is not as good, sometimes you don´t sell anything, sometimes you do, I 
sold something at Christmas, a bit more at New Years, mother’s day is much 
better. But you are stocked up with merchandise that will not sell constantly and 
then something new comes up and your merchandise only eats dust. I had to go to 
the provinces and put everything on sale so I don´t lose my capital, but I just came 
back with the money for my food”. 
While most of the trends identified correspond to gentrified neighborhoods, or 
blue zones as identified in the spatial analysis, the increased conflict between market and 
street vendors seems to be aggravated regardless of their exposure to commercial 
gentrification resulting from the fear of supermarkets. Interestingly, market vendors 
within emergent and unmapped neighborhoods, which have no exposure to supermarkets 
describe this fear more strongly. Hilario who is a market vendor in Altiplano at San Juan 
de Lurigancho, a low-income neighborhood with no supermarkets or formal business, 
states “I have heard rumors that Metro and other big chains that are foreign will come 
here, but that will be death for us, they will liquidate us completely”. In a similar context 
but in Chorrillos, .Laura, a market vendor also comments,  
“Having a supermarket here close to our market? Close to our people and 
neighborhood? That would be a total competition. It is not convenient for us 
because from what can we live then? All of us will oppose, because that is 
practically business for other countries and that is inconvenient, that is why the 
sales have slowed down, because of those big markets, which have affected many 
vendors already”. 
In neighborhoods exposed to supermarket competition but with a socioeconomic 
composition still serving low income households, the fear of supermarkets appears to 
vanish among street vendors. Within these neighborhoods, market vendors feel more the 
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competition of supermarkets than street vendors. In Independencia in a neighborhood 
right behind the Supermarket Metro, Juana, a market vendor, argues,  
“Of course, Metro has improved the area (meaning making the area cleaner and 
more appealing), but our business has slowed down a lot, because now they are 
taking our mototaxis and buses. Then, people go to Metro to buy things in bulk, 
the mototaxis and buses only charge them 0.50 cents, even they can go far to the 
Metro in Fiori and we get ‘cut’ in our work”.  
But Hugo, who sells in the front of Juana’s market as a street vendor, has a 
different perception,  
“Now that you have the Metro nearby, has anything changed for you? No, Metro 
here is now naked, the first 5 to 5 years they were full, now not even weekends 
you have people. If people don’t have money, why they will go there? We bring 
produce here directly and sell things cheaper”.  
The different perceptions about competition from supermarkets could be a result 
of increasing market segmentation within the traditional clientele that traditional 
commerce –market and street markets– have served. In 2005, I conducted a survey of 
clients of commercial agglomerations in the Northern Cone that had different numbers of 
street vendors selling nearby (Aliaga 2008). The results of the survey showed that patrons 
are rarely willing to abandon buying from street vendors and very resistant to diminish 
their visits to them despite increasing consumption at supermarkets. Moreover, the larger 
the concentrations of vendors, the more resistant patrons are to diminishing the frequency 
of their purchases. However, there is a general diminution of the overall amounts of 
money spent in street markets among the clients with higher socioeconomic status who 
routinely attend supermarkets. Therefore, the socioeconomic make-up of the 
neighborhood can influence the perception of the negative effect of supermarket 
competition. For instance, Elsa, a market vendor in Los Olivos, which is one of the most 
commercially gentrified districts in the Northern Cone and one of the more aggressive 
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ones towards street vendors, works within her neighborhood, which is still not exposed 
directly to supermarkets and where more than half of its residents are from low income 
families. Her perception is completely different to that of people in other areas of the 
district, 
“I don’t think these supermarkets would install here. It is not convenient for them; 
people here do not have money. Plaza Vea likes those people who have money, 
with stable jobs, with monthly incomes, here it is not like this, they work like us 
sometimes they have good business, sometimes they don’t”. 
Moreover, within gentrified neighborhoods with a mixed socioeconomic 
composition, street vendors still perceive that they have a good opportunity to sell among 
the neighbors with lower economic capacity. Cristina, a street vendor in Nueva Era in 
Comas close to a supermarket, who switched her schedule to Saturdays and Sundays due 
to the persecution of vendors, still defends, 
“I don’t think it [the supermarket] affected that much after all, people come here 
as always. My business has nothing to do with those supermarkets. You know, 
people come here because you can find better prices –as I say– all these people 
who live on the hills (these are informal settlements considered the poorest), do 
you believe that they will go to Plaza Vea or Metro? There are so many people 
who don’t have money and prefer the market; they may go to have a stroll 
sometimes, don’t they? But I live here 36 years and I have seen this I know”. 
To some extent, public officials have been able to work through the fear of 
supermarket competition to put more pressure to get rid of street vendors and respond to 
market vendors’ interests. There is ‘a market for everyone’ as they have suggested but at 
a greater cost. A more competitive market, while creating greater incentives to improve 
roofed market conditions and cooperate to reduce street vending, has not necessarily lead 
to economic growth. Most testimonies repeat the narrative of a slow-down in sales, 
higher individual and collective investments to keep up with competition, which have 
exacerbated intolerance of street trade, even when market vendors also began on the 
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streets and street vending was perceived as functional to the overall attraction of the 
commercial area. 
5.3.2 Bogotá: Entrenched competition 
Commercial gentrification from larger and smaller formal retailers and the 
expansion of urban renewal through transportation systems may be read as an opportunity 
for street peddling to reach new customers rather than a threat of competition. However, 
as both processes expand through the city, conflicts over public space aggravate. The 
constant surveillance of sites leads vendors to a more entrenched competition between 
them which are more clearly manifested in blue zones than red zones. While the 
perception of competition with smaller and larger retailers does not differ greatly 
between, a more stable environment in red zones is more likely to be conducive to 
agreements among competitors. In blue zones, the unstable environment brought by a 
stronger surveillance of public space cancels this possibility and bring more entrenched 
competition and conflict between street vendors.  
In the perception of vendors selling within blue zones, small business in the area 
and supermarkets only contribute to the uncertainty over the use of space but do not 
affect them competitively. Estela, who sells books and magazines next to bookstores in 
an area close to central universities, explains,  
“I know that I have in front of me someone that will call the police. But they sell 
expensive books and we sell cheap books, they cannot do anything. People can go 
to buy from them but they can also come to buy from me. There are lots of people 
that envy us, they don’t want us to walk by their doors, they don’t want us to 
pregonear [To call the attention of potential buyers by advertising offers in a loud 
voice], a lot of people are like this.”  
Ana, in the case of supermarkets comments,  
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“People have the choice to buy. You know when Carulla [upscale supermarket] 
opened; the press made a report that people would not buy from us. That was last 
year. We all thought that we were going to be in a bad situation, but the next day 
people were still buying from us”.  
Angela who sells next to a mall also shares a similar experience,  
“the people of the mall always send the police to us because they feel affected. I 
know they pay taxes and rent and they are affected. But we are not affected by 
them. If you want, you can buy from them or from us, the people buy where they 
want, where they feel better treated. They [mall owners] are the ones that should 
feel affected”. 
Supermarkets and malls in Bogotá have long being dispersed along the main 
transportation routes targeting most of the population traveling from one side to another 
in the city. Therefore, rather than a new neighbor moving in and trying to fit into the 
‘informal’ marketplace, supermarkets represent to most vendors the opportunity to 
capture sites with larger pedestrian flow at peak times. The pictures below in Illustration 
4.7 were captured at different times at the exit of a big transportation station at the north 
side of the city. Just at the exit there are a big mall and two supermarkets facing each 
other. I arrived to the site at 2p.m. and only informal transport was available. Very few if 
not any of vendors stayed within the next hours. As the afternoon sat into the night, 
around 5 p.m., vendors start proliferating, but not only them. Many merchants stopped by 
in vans to sell their products. More interestingly, the van of the Bogotá Public Telephone 
Company stopped by to promote their services and sell cell phone cards.  
The use of streets at these times is lucrative for all, and vendors are not the only 
people aware of that. Nevertheless, a concentration of vendors calls the attention of the 
police, even when the site is not classified as recovered or special. During my recurrent 
visits to the site below which was not part of the list of special or recovered zones, I saw 
police vans passing by at least twice in a period of an hour, but vendors either move from 
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one side of the street to the other, following the guidelines of those ‘invisible lines’ which 
mark territorial areas of intervention. Vendors, then, usually recur to tactics to maintain 
their work in the area but have learned to adapt to surveillance. Angela works in a similar 
setting as described in the picture close to one of the Exito’s Supermarket in Suba selling 
packet snacks and candy. She explains why this area is good for business,  
“Exito is here, that is chévere[cool], it favors us, and a lot of people come here to 
buy because what costs one thousand, two thousand there is only 500 pesos here. 
Even better because now the streets are paved, we are not anymore eating dust all 
day long, you are not in the middle of mud when it rains, we can carry a broom 
and clean our space. You know, when the street where not paved, there were no 
business here, that fat lady over there did not come, and those ice cream carts or 
those vendors who sell razors, purses in vans did not come. But the police come, 
of course, we run to the back; there is a spot where the security cameras cannot 
check on us.”  
A superficial observation of the dynamic of hiding and coming back may obscure 
to the observer the fact that among the vendors operating in those zones there are no rules 
that restrict access to space among them. Indeed, during my observation that day, I did 
not observe any fight among them. But a usual response when I asked vendors in similar 
settings how they gained access and whether they will allow someone new to approach 
the presumably ‘harmonious’ complicity is in the negative. As Estela, working in a busy 
street of 16 Street, described to me “The streets are not ours, but uno tiene que guerrearla 
duro[one has to fight a war]”.  
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In blue zones where vendors confront the local authority, informal rules 
predominate to gain access to public space. In addition to the access guaranteed by a 
known provider in the area, three main arguments seem to be used to convince vendors to 
respect someone’s use of space but they have to be present at the same time. First, 
seniority is one of the most important attributes that vendors should have to be entitled to 
defend their space. This explains why vendors constantly look for new destinations. 
Secondly, the continuous use of a particular site is required to avoid some interpersonal 
conflict with other vendors. Third, if you are new to the area it is better not to sell the 
same things as your colleagues. Angela, selling in another commercial area of the north, 
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describes how she managed to work back again in the spot she used to work after her 
chaza was taken away by a provider. 
“You know, I used to sell from someone that rented me the chaza. Then, he did 
not want me to work in the chaza any longer. But then I got mine and I came here 
and people wanted to move me away. They forget about you, they say that you 
are new, and I responded I was here for a long time. I ate the dust from here when 
they were building this supermarket, and they will try to shut you up, and will 
move you away. It is complicated; if you don’t come, you lose here. Now they are 
forming their committee too. But who can move you away?–Here you have men, 
they can push you- but you have to pay them to let you stay? Are they organizers 
or something?– the street is the mayors’ they cannot charge you….–so what did 
you do?– I kept fighting, they gave up because I was not their competition since I 
was selling other things”. 
These informal rules do not exclude conflict between vendors as well as a sort of 
‘self-discipline’ that is functional to police control. One of the most common reasons to 
exclude new vendors was due to the need to avoid attention from the police. Mayda, who 
sells close to a supermarket in the locality of Suba, has only three other partners nearby. 
They have achieved an agreement with the police. They would not bother them as long as 
they are few. So she opposes fiercely the idea that any of them could bring vendors  
“We, the remaining ones, are here for many years; we don’t let new vendors to 
come, mainly because the police tell us not to let new vendors come. The problem 
is that if we are more vendors, we are gonna be more agglomerated, we have 
started our association, and we will not allow anyone else get in”.  
In red zones away from commercial gentrification, vendors share a similar 
perception about the lack of competition in economic terms from larger retailers, but they 
seem to be more open to accommodate new comers and negotiate with small commerce 
to avoid possible conflicts among them. While police control is not as strict, the 
‘openness’ has the same rationale as in blue zones, try as much as possible to collaborate 
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with police to avoid any repressive action. In the street market in the neighborhood of 
Los Andes, Ramon explains, 
“I don’t believe supermarkets will come here anyway. I know we are not too far 
from them, you see in Soacha, you have a big area with all these supermarkets. 
But you know I went there and the experience is not so good, it left me sad. I 
entered the Super Olímpica[supermarket chain] to buy some fish and then I decide 
to buy also half pound of rice, then it was 1600 and how is it? The same rice of 
the same brand here costs 1200. Then, a supermarket as those only brings poverty 
because those prices are for rich people, people from here could not afford buying 
there. If they want to monopolize this area, that would be a negative impact for 
the strata. We have better prices here”.  
Vendors fear persecution the most. This is clearer for vendors in red zones 
working closer to where supermarkets are being built due to the expansion of the south 
routes of Transmilenio. As many vendors have opted to return closer to their localities of 
residence due to the persecution they faced when working downtown, the expansion of 
supermarkets may create pressures to create special zones or recover public spaces that 
require more police supervision. That fear also extends in the perception that in general 
supermarkets are against all forms of small commerce. Nelson in Bosa explains, 
“We feel that supermarkets will totally affect us. The vendor will be more 
persecuted here, and then will have lower income to bring to his or her family. 
Carrefour [supermarket chain] installed here and we have problems with that. We 
still have an association there, that is not a transitory zone but they are there. 
Carrefour wanted to move them out, and even asked the local authorities to close 
the mini markets around”.  
In the case of competition with small businesses, street markets in red zones in 
Bogotá have made certain agreements to avoid conflict. In Los Andes, vendors agreed to 
sell complementary products, not to obstruct driveways of small businesses and to reduce 
possible conflict between them. Despite the fact that many vendors are associated, there 
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is an open attitude towards new comers as long as they comply with the rules which 
avoid further conflict for public space. As Romulo explains, 
“We have avoided more than one problem here because we all are open to 
negotiate. Here a new vendor comes and we say, look you have to respect their 
entrance. That gentleman (pointing at a local store) has the right to call the police, 
he is paying rent to the house owner, and we have to leave the entrance free. We 
can give orders from here to the outside; they give the orders from here to the 
inside. That is his business we cannot offend them. You know here this works, 
you can see all of us sell líchigo (vegetables and herbs), we do not sell the same 
thing”.  
The argument ‘the street is for everyone”, which was prevalent in the past, still 
works when dealing with new comers within red zones. However, it is not used to control 
one another. Rather, it is used to comply with informal norms to avoid conflict that could 
affect the group. The competition is related to economic strategies rather than access to 
space. Maria in the Labrador neighborhood within a red zone claims,  
“People come to sell one thing and then other, we don’t bother them because they 
come from around here. It is people in need who are like anyone of us who are 
struggling. That cannot affect us because we have already made our clientele”.  
Conflict among themselves is diffused since the stability over space contributes to 
senior vendors’ building a clientele base, which new comer cannot take away. New 
comers need to skillfully manage commercial competition to build a new clientele. In Los 
Andes, Romulo adds,  
“Well here people come sometimes to sell the same merchandise, and we know 
that we have lower sales then, but we all have our own clientele. It is difficult 
when you are new, they usually start by selling at a lower price, and you sell the 
onion at 400 pesos, which in the wholesaler costs around 450. The clients tell you, 
see there the mona (blondie) over there is selling cheaper, the yucca is 300, but 
you know that at the end that doesn’t fly, you are losing money, you invested 200 
thousand and after 15 days if you keep that price you are left without a cent to 
invest”.  
Ramon in the same market also says,  
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“New vendors come here, but many have left because they ended bankrupt, they 
had a bad management and cannot hold their clients in the community, then they 
have to go. No one has been pushed away”. 
Contrasting the experience in Los Andes and Labrador with those in blue zones, it 
could be argued that as space becomes more contested, tensions between vendors arise 
and it is more difficult for them to establish solidarity networks amongst themselves as 
well as other actors around them.  
5.4 REFRAMING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE STATE 
5.4.1 Lima: The subordination of collective strategies 
Lima’ street vendors had a long tradition of self-organizing, even beyond the need 
to defend space. Even if many experiences have existed of failed collective projects, the 
local embeddeness of their relationships has helped them to keep developing collective 
strategies overtime. The more aggressive focus on formalization through relocation has 
implied a trend towards the subordination of collective strategies to policy objectives. 
Hence, their organizations have reoriented their organizational practices toward a more 
managerial rather than political focus, abandoning the defense of public space. 
Consequentially, an increasing fragmentation between those vendors who formalize and 
those who can’t has caused that conditions that were conducive to self-organization could 
not be as easily replied by persistent vendors working in nearby roofed markets. While 
differences between blue and red zones are not as sharp in terms of the perception of the 
need to self-organize, differences in the type of neighborhoods in terms of gentrification 
and socioeconomic status contribute to the hostile environment for street vendors. A 
more prevalent control in those upward socioeconomic and gentrified neighborhoods 
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have served to build a better rapport between agents of control47 and formalized vendors 
while limiting persistent vendors opportunities to self-organize in the sake of increasing 
safety and security in the area. Meanwhile, street vendors in poorer neighborhoods are 
also expected and pressured to formalize, but an erratic practice of control and 
supervision does not lead to a better rapport between them and agents of control or local 
authorities to guarantee safety and protection against criminal activity. 
Either street or ex-street vendors argue that the most important factor in achieving 
success in their businesses is ‘unity’, the capability to act collectively in their association 
towards a common goal. Being united around a common goal was perceived as the main 
difference between those organizations that achieved formalization or that were able to 
improve their service on the streets. For instance, current street vendors attribute the 
success of the formalization projects to the effective management of an organization. 
Jorge, working on the street in a blue zone which is a consolidated neighborhood with a 
recent exposure to gentrification in El Agustino, explains why he could not formalize “we 
started on the streets altogether, learned to organize but the dirigentes [leaders] there 
worked better, all united, compared to the ones here”.  
Even if initially formed to defend space, as Jorge explained, many associations 
separated once a group decided to formalize in the short run. Luisa, also in a blue zone 
but within a poor neighborhood in El Rímac, criticizes her organization on those grounds 
                                                 
47 The police and Serenazgo [local municipal police] are responsible for reporting and coordinate actions 
against vendors. Traditionally evictions are carried out by police after the request of the local municipality. 
Serenazgo may or may not, depending on the local municipality, carry out massive evictions of vendors, 
but may report vendors to local authorities and supervise specific areas to prevent vendors from occupying 
streets. The testimonies collected, mainly in peripheral districts, show that the Serenazgo did not physically 
intervene, but news on actions causing physical harm and even death has been reported in many districts in 
Lima. The most discussed case was that of Christian Freddy VenancioHuapaya, a 22 year old who sold 
agendas in a street intersection, and who died by asphyxiation at the hands of Serenazgo agents during an 




despite the fact that they managed to keep working on the street for almost 15 years. 
“Being associated, well, I don’t know if it has advantages. I have participated 15 years 
and I am still here”. The incentives of street vendors to organize in the current policy 
framework seem to be more related to the commitment to formalize than to defend public 
space. 
Collective organization towards formalization is related to the pressure of the 
state and its current objectives. In the case of Luisa, vendors became associated after 
some former street market vendors on the better-off neighborhood started to commit to a 
formalization project. By moving to the backstreets in the poorest area of the zone, the 
remaining vendors came to realize that the only way to keep working was to get 
organized, even though they are failing to move ahead in a formalization project. 
“We were all dispersed. But then, the municipality came and said we needed to be 
organized. Then we got together and elected a president. We needed to do that 
between us, because those at the bottom wanted us to pay a lot to be part of a 
formalization project and in here you don’t have much business”. 
While before, defense of public space was behind the need to get organized, 
nowadays, to negotiate with the municipality needs to start with a commitment to 
formalize. Teodosio, a street vendor who started as a political leader in Rímac is aware of 
the need to show this commitment, despite his zone not being as pressured by 
commercial competition. . For starters, the association decided to be named “Association 
of The Agustín Gamarra Market”. Portraying them as aspiring owners of a roofed market 
that is not built yet, the members decided to register their name in the public registry and 
show how they are willing to be formal.  
“We had the need to get organized this way because of the abuses of the 
municipality. If you are not organized, there is a lot of injustice, you have to be 
organized. We are registered in the public registry. 
193 
 
–But this is still a street vendor organization, isn’t it?  
Yes, but we are formal because we are registered, it is more responsibility, there 
is more respect on behalf of the municipality. We are an association of market 
owners”.  
Street vendors who persist face more persecution in blue zones that are more 
exposed to commercial gentrification and within a more socioeconomically upward 
neighborhood. This reduces their incentives to organize and receive less rapport from 
local authorities.  
Asked about their strategies to organize with fellow vendors, Ivonne who still 
managed to stay around the Nueva Era market says that it is impossible since each of 
them have to look after themselves: “Didn´t I tell you? as we are all evicted, everyone is 
on their own, you have to look where you can go”. Being constantly dispersed does not 
allow for developing a common strategy. Moreover, evictions can occur randomly so 
collective negotiation seems an unlikely choice. 
“They evict us, but it is not the same, as when you fight directly with the police, 
or you knew an eviction was coming after some negotiations, they take us 
unsuspectingly, one week you come to work calmly, we even used to sleep here, 
you think they will not bother you, then it is 6 or 7 in the morning and everything 
is full with policemen, watchmen, and you cannot do anything”. 
While the pressure to formalize seems to expand regardless of whether a 
neighborhood is located in blue or red zone, the practices of control and supervision show 
a distinct pattern when accounting by the degree of exposure to gentrification and the 
neighborhoods’ socioeconomic profiles. Within blue gentrified zones and upward 
socioeconomic profile neighborhoods, there is a greater presence of policemen and 
serenazgo agents. They collaborate with market vendors by limiting the number of street 
vendors while at the same time keeping an area safer for the general public. . Fabian, a 
market vendor, comments: “now, since we are here [the roofed market], we work closely 
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with Serenazgo, they are from the municipality, and the police always pass around here”. 
In contrast, a street vendor is mostly discredited as a subject of persecution and perceived 
as not worthy of police protection. Joaquin as a street vendor who has kept working 
despite the relocation of the street market describes how he manages his relationship with 
the police who frequently intervene in the area, but rarely help when street vendors are 
victims of crime.  
“We have to hire them, many robberies have occurred here, thieves even enter the 
houses, rob people. Each of us gives policemen .50 cents daily so they can come 
and protect us. You know the police are not at our service”.  
Interestingly, this agreement of protection does not give them a preferred 
treatment when the municipality asks policemen to evict vendors, but since those requests 
come unpredictably, the endless cat-and-mice game describes their relationships. As 
Joaquin continues to explain,  
“–So if you pay for protection there are no evictions? 
No. In 2001 we had an eviction, we had to leave for three months, and we came 
back again, in 2002 we faced another one, and in five days we came back, in 2003 
the same, and we came back one more time. The last time was this last February, 
and we moved a little farther from here. But you know, after a while, you have 
them [police] just letting people stay around there, maybe we go back again there, 
it doesn’t matter if they evict us again”.  
The lower the socioeconomic profile of the neighborhood, the less likely vendors 
are to be either supervised or protected by the police or serenazgo, Jacoba, a relocated 
vendor, told me that the serenazgo comes three times a week but policemen even if 
requested do not respond to their calls frequently. Luisa, a street vendor in an informal 
low income neighborhood, states “I don’t know why but they [serenazgo and policemen] 
do not come around here, it might be because we are organized”. Hugo also in a low 
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income neighborhood but relatively close to a main street where robbers proliferate 
complains: 
“I have to take care of myself here, because there is no authority, if I get 
distracted I can be assaulted. I have to defend my stuff, if I go to the authorities 
and I say to them that there are robberies here, they just look at me as suspect, say 
that I must be an accomplice or so. I only need to tell those dam drug addicts to 
go rob another place”. 
While police protection seem to be less permanent and even contradictory for 
those street and relocated vendors working in non gentrified neighborhoods with a lower 
socioeconomic profile, the ‘absence of control’ by local officials pushing towards either 
formalization or infrastructure improvements at roofed markets is not the case. Josefina, a 
relocated vendor, describes the presence of local officials: “they come to visit us every 
two weeks. They are starting to tell us that they want us to widen our alleys. They do not 
tell us when a formal inspection will take place, but they keep on saying: “we will get 
you”[les vamos a caer]”.The tone seems to be a threat, and is rarely accompanied by 
police. Hilario, also perceives that local officials are arbitrary in the way they intervene in 
their market.  
“Here, public officials come a lot but the police, not. They never come with a 
policeman. I doubt sometimes, but it has happened to us that some people come 
saying they are public officials but they want us to give them money. If they were 
a real public official, and they want to make an intervention, they have to come 
with the police as a guaranty that they are bona fide, but even those that we know 
are public officials just come as if it were a personal matter”.  
Control without protection seem be a prevalent practice in these neighborhoods 
where street vendors are even more exposed to the mixed messages of the local public 
officials, who want to evict them but at the same time use these spaces as means to 
collect rents. According to the testimonies of public officials charging for the sisa tax 
only serves to grant vendors a sense of entitlement toward the use of public space. Some 
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authorities have resolved to ‘switch’ the name to a payment for garbage collection, but 
interestingly the payment is sporadic and vendors are not clear when they will come to 
ask for that payment. As Cristina, selling in a blue zone but lower income neighborhood, 
explains,  
“You know before they evict us, they [public officials] came every day to ask for 
a fee for cleaning the streets, it was .30 cents. They came every day, but now that 
they evicted us, they come only on the weekends to collect .50 cents for the 
cleaning from us and the people in the roofed market that come out on the streets, 
but it has been almost 2 months that they don’t come and do not ask for anything. 
I don’t understand why”. 
The ambivalent yet strategic intervention of the State, in the form of agents of 
control, does not halt the process of subordination of collective strategies to the 
formalization project. As relocated vendors are perceived as success stories among street 
vendors, the role of their organizations are reshaped to a more managerial rather than 
political role. Once relocated, or in the process of formalization, the vendor associations’ 
concerns are mostly centered on economic strategies, mainly focused on efficiently 
administrating savings, and thus require a more managerial leadership, leaving behind 
those street vendors who stubbornly continue to defend public space. Yolanda, now a 
roofed market vendor who started selling on the street in Los Olivos, a district that earlier 
became commercially gentrified and concentrates an important share of the emergent 
middle class within peripheral districts, explains the process on how street vendors got 
separated.  
“We knew that they [public officials] have already planned to evict us, so we 
needed to organize to formalize so why we will continue fighting the streets? We 
did an assembly with the small group that was here in this avenue, and we elect a 
board, we grouped and made a project to present to the municipality. They evicted 
us as planned so we started renting a place, then two then three, it has been almost 
17 years until we could buy this place” 
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While the from below organizational style remains as in the past (e.g. the social 
positions and functions composing the board), the leadership is now more concerned to 
manage their economic collective strategies, which in turn involves a more active 
organizational life (e.g. more frequent meetings) and the need to find ways to make 
leaders accountable for the group savings. Fabian, also a relocated vendor, describes how 
the roles worked in his organization,  
“When a group organizes to formalize, you elect a board and this group of people 
have to be responsible for it, then one is the president, the other the treasurer, 
organization secretary, the other is for press, then you also have a social assistant, 
you have each element. Each person has its functions, then each of them work in 
their functions, the one responsible for the press [public relations or 
communications] start looking for new places to buy, the one who is responsible 
for organizing starts planning the meeting, the treasurer collects the payments, 
and then over the years of work you see that we all buy the land.  
–But what about the other associates?  
Each one works in their stuff, I work on my trade right there, the others the same 
but you have to get together each month or two for a meeting. We need to know 
how things are coming together, make decisions about the land to buy, how to pay 
for the land, in each meeting we had to make decisions and took some guidelines 
to follow up so we made progress”.  
This organizational style continues after relocation, which have been visually 
manifested in different degrees of success of their collective projects (See illustration 
5.8). Victoria, now a market vendor, describes the expectation of a leader. 
“We organize it as any other gerente [manager] 
– You mean dirigente [leader]? 
Yes, like that but he has to be like a manager. Vote by vote we elect a president, a 
treasurer we collect the savings weekly and with that we cover the expenses of the 
association. We have also a group of social assistants, they gather the money. The 
savings is like an insurance we have. We can use it later for collective activities 
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such the Christmas campaign or to organize football or volley championships for 
our anniversary. So all those activities need a gerente “ 
In that sense, the leadership is also more open to women, who have increasingly 
become targets for microcredit programs, as good payers and administrators. A new 
incentive to become a leader also comes from the need to check the accountability of the 
collective project, as Celmira working in a roofed market in blue zone explains “Personal 
benefit is none, you work for free and you have sometimes problems because you have to 
do more than the other associates. But I decided to be part of the board because I can be 
aware of how the things are going and not be surprised, I know what is happening and 
how we are improving economically”.  
Rosa, a roofed market vendor in a red zone, also explains,  
“I think the main benefit of being organized is the savings we do. Our savings are 
under the name of three people here, including me. We are of confidence, and 
need to report with a periodic balance. I believe it is beneficial because altogether 
we have a big account. As a leader you can’t move any cent, you sign a 
commitment with the bank to only get the money out when everybody approves 
it. The money is of all associates, but you see that, because of that account, a lot 
of offers for lending us large amounts of money come.”  
These two women share in common their participation in group savings 
experiences (e.g. Bancos Comunales) that have gained them the confidence of their 
associates and the experience to know more about how to manage collective accounts. 
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The selective partnership of public officials towards formalization, as described in 
the previous chapter, is grounded in the long tradition of self-organizing, but still lacks a 
better institutional rapport. Evidenced by the relationship of police and vendors, the 
spatial practice of control and the granting of protection discriminates zones of 
intervention along socioeconomic or exposure to gentrification profiles. Consequentially, 
street vendors are far less perceived as legitimate actors or individuals with rights.  
The greater fragmentation among street vendors raises questions as to whether or 
not the current policy approach may become a suitable venue to include a growing 
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number of street vendors. The absence or weakening of a local basis does not allow the 
development of collective strategies, which have enabled many of the processes of 
formalization in the past. A split path for the celebrated transitions to formality seems to 
dominate the current street vending practices in Lima. 
5.4.2 Bogotá: Tactical organizing 
The licensing framework permitted the development of associations managed by a 
broker with connections within the city administration, who granted access to licenses or 
space. Given the vertical relationship between associates and leaders, very rarely do 
collective practices (e.g. associative savings) succeed due to the lack accountability and 
difficulty of building leadership from below. At time of evictions, the capacity either to 
self-organize or to get organized around these leaders declined due to the changes that 
dismantled the networks within the city administration. Despite this ‘inherited’ 
weakening of collective organizing, different forms of tactical organizing today exist 
depending heavily on the embedded locational conflict of a vending site.  
Tactical organizing is perceived as a short-term accommodation, which does not 
hold people together to develop collective strategies or develop leadership qualities 
among vendors. The evidence gathered among the testimonies suggests that the more 
persecuted is the area, the lower the incentive to organize collectively as an association 
and thus, tactical organizing is more common. Therefore while in blue zones, vendors 
prefer to comply only with the informal rules and avoid organizations, red zones with 
increasing exposure to commercial gentrification or blue zones outside the boundaries of 
delimited recovered or special zones, become sites where vendors are more prompt to 
respond to prospective leaders, whose background as vendors is unclear. Only in red 
zones which do not fall under areas with high locational conflict vendors are more self-
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organized, combining not only informal rules but also an associative life entailing more 
participation and accountability of members toward their leaders, who happen to be 
vendors as well.  
Street vendors in blue zones tend to opt out of the various possibilities to develop 
associative networks. As described earlier, vendors mistrust each other as competitors 
and tend to accept restrictions from those who can grant them access to space. Since the 
city administration does not intervene with exchange programs in blue areas, they are less 
likely to be listened to, and are mostly subject to police control. Therefore, the only way 
they can resist and stay in place depends on some mutual enforcement of certain rules to 
limit police attention or to get informed early so they can move away when the police 
arrives. In many of these zones however, vendors have found ways to ease the job of 
policemen by informally agreeing to not let new vendors come. This situation has been 
made possible by the progressive tone of the current administration which prohibited acts 
of abuse against vendors. Only the vehicle can be confiscated but not the merchandise, 
and police must not hit them. Vendors are aware of this regulation, and can easily tell the 
difference from the persecution they faced before. Vendors’ self-discipline acts as means 
to keep their work, promptly abandoning streets as soon as the police pass by. The 
pictures in Illustration 5.9 (pictures a and b) show how this conditional control works. I 
was able to observe how vendors were told to hide when policemen appeared. A lady that 
was left behind had a word with a policeman who took her box away and was demanding 
her merchandise as it was a recurrent case. Even if they both were irritated, the police did 
not attempt to hit her and kept only giving her orders to turn in her merchandise 
(Illustration 5.9 picture c). Later, I was told by many vendors that police have hit them in 
the past, and even if they are more careful now, they still don’t trust them and try to move 
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in advance when they are informed by people they hire to stay in the main street and 
whistle when the police come. 






In highly persecuted zones, vendors do not find incentives to organize and prefer 
to comply with unspoken rules to avoid police control. Ana, who sells in a gentrified 
neighborhood in the north part of the city, explains, 
“We got to know each other day by day –and did any of you think about getting 
organized? – No. We all only get here to work to get something to eat, we don´t 
need to make a committee for that”.  
Estela in a different street but also in a locality of the north, is more outspoken 
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“We don’t organize because we are not looking for leaders, why would we? We 
know that the mayor got some people and gave them places, but we also know 
that in those places nobody sells”.  
They don’t see how organizations will benefit them and rather trust their informal 
rules, to keep working in a highly persecuted area. However, there is a drawback in 
avoiding a relationship with the police. Mayda, for instance, has been several times 
victims of robbery that she cannot report to the police. She even has witnessed some 
circumstances that she prefers not to report because of fear they will retaliate. Rather she 
decides to be safe by informally agreeing with other vendors to coordinate their time to 
leave,  
“We leave around 9 p.m. but we decided to leave altogether, before the evictions 
we used to ask police to walk with us to the bus stop, but now instead of being 
here permanently for safety, they just come to bother us in vans. They don’t take 
our merchandise as in the time of evictions but they just ask us to leave, and we 
do, but come back later.” 
When their site is not quite within the mapped recovered zones or red zones 
where commercial gentrification is expanding, vendors keep the agreement to not let 
more vendors come, develop organizations and register in the IPES through leaders. This 
does not mean that they have an associative life with a routine of holding meetings even 
if sporadically and holding elections or even having the power to get rid of leaders they 
don’t like. Maria, who works in a red zone close to a main street in Ciudad Bolivar, 
explains how they decided to organize through a leader,  
“About 2 or 3 years ago, the police bothered a lot here; we needed a leader to 
represent us every time there was a problem… I don´t know how she [leader] 
does it. She might go to talk to the police or in the office in which they can solve 
our problems. –so you participate in an organization– no, I don’t. We have an 
organization but we do not organize in meetings and such, we just tell the leader 
when something happens. She give us carnets, tell us not to bring more vendors, 
that is what we do, we watch that we are the only ones here”. 
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The expectation is to secure space in the short term. But leaders often entice them 
with the possibilities of getting resources in the long term that associates would very 
much like, such as access to credit for housing. Most vendors are renters in Bogotá and 
access to microcredit is not easily available for street vendors. Maria shares, 
“She [leader] is a very thin lady but with a big heart, we decided to organize 
because she wanted to fight for us, she started to call us to have meetings. Every 
time we had problems, she solved them, she fights for us. Now we have carnets, 
we have vests, now policemen have more consideration towards us. They no 
longer take our carts or anything, they only ask us to leave for some time and then 
we come back. Now she is telling us that we can make some savings so we can 
get credit for housing. She has fought a lot for us, and we will support her”.  
In most of the sites to which I went people talk kindly about their leaders but there 
weren’t leaders selling in stalls. Partially, they explained to me it was due to the fact that 
organizational duties entail several meetings. However, none of the vendors in the 
interviews knew the leader when they were working as street traders. Rather the leader 
came to them and claimed he or she could solve their problems. While I cannot assert or 
deny this tendency based on the fact that I only talked with one leader, it seems apparent 
that leaders usually come from types of background that make them more professional 
politically. Moreover, their organizational duties require payments from the associates 
justified by the requirement to keep the legal status of their associations current. Even 
when vendors do not necessarily pay on time, they still are constantly required to pay 
something or else they cannot be validated as an associate. Nelson narrates the way he 
became a leader of vendors in Bosa and how the foundation of the association required 
the payment of fees. 
“As I worked in construction and I had legally established a constructors’ 
association, five vendors of this locality from different sites came to my house 
one Sunday around 7 p.m. They invite me some beers, and told me about 
participating. They said that they needed my help. From all the five, only one 
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remains in contact with me, the others, I don’t know where they really came from, 
they just vanished, they didn’t even came to the meetings when I signed in as 
leader. They asked me, can you or do you fear? I said I can and I do not fear. That 
was my response. I liked this, this is good, and they came for me. I didn’t do it 
just to have an organization but because they asked me because they noticed my 
work in the community”.  
I asked “where do you work now as a vendor?”–he replied:  
“No, no. For example, now I have a meeting with the Caja Social, then I have 
another one with some people that are involved in a project to plant some trees. I 
have contacts here and there with engineers, architects, lawyers. If I stay as a 
leader just to sell gloves, socks, or those little things, I am not a leader. I cannot 
be waiting for the mayor to call me for a program, nobody will know me like 
that”.  
So you mainly work as a leader and how do you get paid?–I asked 
“An association without legal status is a left zero. You know. There is a quota that 
every vendor has to pay. The founders got to pay 30 thousand pesos, only nine 
gave the quota, but I still work like this … some give me 2 thousand, 3 thousand. 
You cannot force them. But the association statute says that after three missed 
quotas you can be retired for non-payment. I give them six months even a year. 
They know they will receive a letter which will be sent with copy to the mayor’s 
office and that they have signed a commitment. If they plan to save, how we will 
make it if they cannot even pay 5 thousand pesos a month”. 
It could be argued that associations in Bogotá in the current context mostly come 
from incentives from above –given the emphasis of the current city administration to get 
vendors organized through representatives– rather than from below and there are –even if 
blurred and imprecise– monetary benefits for the mediators who organize vendors. 
Vendors did not find any incentive to organize in the current policy framework; they 
mostly decided to do so to secure space in the short-term through their leaders who do 
negotiate alliances in the long-term.  
Different from the situation in blue zones, leaders in non-gentrified red zones 
work in the area and vendors have a more frequent associative life where they elect their 
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representatives from their fellow colleagues. The relationship with the police in these 
zones is more positive. Red zones usually are areas that do not fall under the 
classification of recovered or special zones, so the police are not forced to control space 
profusely. In these zones vendors have a good relationship with police who are perceived 
as guarantors of public safety and security and are willing to assert their self-control (See 
illustration 4.9 picture d). Ramon explains, 
“We work together with the police here, when there is a new vendor that is not 
following the rules of the association, I go to the police station and I can tell them 
what the problem is. They know about our rules, and they come and act on our 
behalf. That way we gain respect without having any direct problems”.  
Romulo, who sells in the same area and holds a leadership position, explains, 
“With the police it is a direct relationship. Here we do not have any problem, 
every time they change their chief, we go and introduce ourselves so they know 
us and we can keep our agreement”.  
In that sense vendors have greater incentives to organize and the relationship with 
authority reinforces their self-discipline. The trade-off is similar to that of the blue zones. 
They try to keep security at the site, to avoid any possible conflict.  
5.5 COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Street vendors in Lima and Bogotá come from different placemaking practices 
that shape their perception of public space, their trade (e.g. range of independence) and 
consequentially their internal (e.g. among themselves as competitors or members of an 
organization) and external relationships (e.g. with local establishments, large retailers, 
leaders and consequently authorities). In Lima, street markets function as open grocery 
stores, characterized by a local embeddeness within a neighborhood economy. In 
contrast, the permanent peddling in Bogotá functions as convenience stores, which 
usually lack local embeddeness, as vendors come from different neighborhoods and tend 
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to operate at certain peak times. Despite differences, both types of vending have 
developed overtime a local basis that granted access to space informally and more 
permanently. Faced with different policy approaches, labeled as ‘streetwise 
neoliberalism’ in Lima and the progressive ‘sidewalk urbanism’ in Bogotá, the 
comparative analysis of the interviews suggests that this local basis is being eroded in 
both cities with the expansion of commercial gentrification and surveillance over public 
space. Moreover, neither the progressive nor the neoliberal rationale behind the current 
policy framework shows a significant difference in reducing those effects.  
Historically, the difference between cities illustrates a contrasting behavior in 
terms of vendors’ sense of entitlement as producers of public space. Due to the local 
embeddeness of street markets, vendors in Lima used to perceive their streets as part of a 
neighborhood asset. The peddling style in Bogotá was more conducive to conflict over 
use of space but was validated in the common understanding that everyone had the right 
to feel entitled to develop their trade. As surveillance and control over public space 
became more widespread with the dismantling of the previous licensing or taxing 
framework, vendors in either context have means to revalidate their access to public 
space. The perception of no entitlement toward claiming their right to work in public 
space is clearer in Bogotá, while in Lima it is perceived as an arbitrary situation in which 
a once neighborhood asset has been taken over by the local authority and left more room 
for ‘unconventional’ practices to validate access to space. The constant persecution has 
left new vendors without clear rules to get permission or orient their trade. While 
substantial differences in rationale sustain the policy frameworks in Lima and Bogotá, 
these frameworks contribute to the prevalence of informal tactics since both involve the 
elimination or reduction of licensing.  
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As Lima promotes formal entrepreneurship and Bogotá offers upgrading options 
under the rationale of training the entrepreneur, in both cases vendors find it more 
difficult to sustain their economic activities. In Lima the relative permanency of vendors 
in public space permitted overtime a more independent trade. As transitions to roofed 
markets become more prominent, new vendors cannot replicate this independence as self-
organizing becomes more difficult within the current prosecutorial environment. 
Moreover the ‘choice’ to formalize seems to come more from a need to secure 
employment rather than an envisioned good opportunity for investment. In Bogotá, 
vendors do not perceive in the current options important opportunities that enable them to 
give up street trade. Both informal and regularized forms of street trade are full of caveats 
that diminish their range of independence in terms of choice of products and providers. 
The promotion of entrepreneurship consequently has a contradictory effect on the actual 
practice of the street entrepreneur as public space is not recognized as an asset that makes 
this occupation sustainable. Rather, the focus over control in the form of regulation over 
space and the distribution of street vending products, due to either aesthetics, economic 
or political interests such as showing how results increase the popularity of mayors, 
seems to direct policymaking. 
Commercial gentrification is understood sharply differently by vendors in Lima 
and Bogotá. Lima street markets are in open competition with supermarkets, while 
Bogotá peddlers see in the expansion of supermarkets and malls new places to attempt 
their trade. However, in both cities, commercial gentrification implies more locational 
conflict over use of surrounding public spaces. The tensions brought by this commercial 
gentrification go beyond the relationships between larger retailers and street vendors, 
posing increasing conflicts within the vendors’ networks. A fiercer competition emerges 
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between roofed markets and street markets in Lima, and a more entrenched competition 
over space permeates the relationships of street peddlers in Bogotá. Added to the interest 
of the municipality and police, particularly in areas closer to supermarkets, roofed market 
vendors often contribute to keeping the number of street vendors low. The situation in 
Bogotá is similar, but in contrast to Lima, street peddlers adopt a sort of ‘self-discipline’ 
arbitrarily excluding new comers in agreement with the police. Consequentially, the 
increase in tension among vendors makes it more difficult not only to self-organize and 
develop negotiated strategies to defend their right to the city but also reinforces the 
perception of the illegitimacy of their occupation. 
The differences between the typical placemaking practices between vendors in 
Lima and Bogotá are also reflected in the way they have self-organized in the past and 
how these experiences have changed in the current context. The local embeddeness of 
street markets in Lima facilitated the development of collective strategies not only for the 
purpose of defense but for other economic activities such as savings or collaboration in 
cases of disease or for recreation. In Bogotá, the licensing framework reinforced the role 
of leaders in organizing vendors, but sporadically facilitated initial attempts to organize 
for other purposes. The changes in policy framework have produced more fragmentation, 
limiting the possibilities for self-organization. Most of the Lima associations reorient 
their goals toward formalization as a valid way to build rapport with local authorities, 
leaving behind vendors that could not be included in such an enterprise. In Bogotá, 
peddlers avoid getting organized for fear of losing their means of employment. However, 
as more problems arise within newer gentrified zones, where political groups are trying to 
get adherents, leaders with connections start to capture those vendors who look for means 
to secure short-term stability, but may not perceive any advantage per se in the upgrading 
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options available. Therefore, while officials count on the organization of vendors, the fear 
of losing a livelihood subordinates organizing efforts to the purposes of policy in both 
cities, limiting the capacity of vendors to be recognized as legitimate users of public 
space. 
Placemaking matters in understanding the changes in the social construction of 
the informal economy as a subject of policy, and, above all, in the way the urban poor 
live and work in the city. More importantly, this comparative exploration serves to 
describe how advances in the recovery of public space have entailed a paradoxical 
outcome: the weakening of the right to the city for one of the most vulnerable 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I described the changes in the conceptualization and 
governance of street vending as an informal economic activity explaining in detail its 
relationship with the city politics of space. This study comparatively described these 
processes in two cities, Lima and Bogotá, which have different institutional and political 
contexts. I explained the changes attending to the ideological backgrounds of policy 
makers as well as the uneven patterns of enforcement across space in each city. In 
analyzing the patterns of variation overtime and across space and different scales/levels 
of governance I identified cases of specific vendors exposed to those changes in different 
degrees. 
This study merges urban sociology and human geography with literature on the 
informal economy. It also combines methods. It updated a count of vendors in Lima for 
2008, by collecting data across municipalities and physically counting on the sites the 
number of vendors in each street market for thirty three districts composing the urban 
core. Using spatial analysis techniques, it identified features in urban space that attract 
and repel vendors attending to their different placemaking practices as peddlers or 
stationary vendors in street markets in each city. It has made a first attempt– as far as I 
know– to model globally and map locally the effects of supermarket competition and 
levels of enforcement on the average number of vendors by square kilometer (mean 
density) in a given trade area. It also documented several experiences in policy makings 
across local and central governments administrations. During two years of fieldwork, I 
collected several types of data, including fifty four and thirty six interviews with public 
officials and vendors respectively. I traveled through each of the cities getting to know 
twenty nine neighborhoods with significant concentration of vendors. I walked around 
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the areas, talked informally with vendors took pictures and observed their work 
schedules. The spatial analysis was useful for finding patterns over space. I organized 
data collection by city and by locality, linking interviews of vendors and experiences to 
those observed patterns in the spatial analysis.  
Even when the informal economy continues to be a structural component of 
employment in many Latin American cities, street vending have been increasingly 
persecuted and displaced in many downtown areas. In the sake of increasing revenue in 
touristic and commercial sites, most of the cities in the region have been able to do so in 
the mid 1990s when the election of mayors permitted a more independent political 
function. The main factor behind the emphasis in controlling public space is the 
aspiration of the global city. The aim to assure private investment and keep space safe 
and secure has become a priority to show off governability. This focus of controlling 
public space in the last twentieth century is related to macroeconomic and policy changes 
such decentralization, the transition towards export oriented economies, globalization and 
the increase of foreign investment. 
However, these potent macro changes cannot solely explain the size of the street 
vending population as the spatiality in which people economically make use of streets is 
subject to other contextual factors. Only by considering the spatial practice, which 
involves perceptions, organizational and political dimensions of concrete groups of 
people that keep working as vendors at specific moment and places in the city we can 
understand how the informal city is produced and reproduced despite the emphasis in 
controlling public space. Throughout this dissertation I have argued that the spatiality of 
informality is a socio-political matter dependent on the urban structure as well as spatial 
practices, which involve acts of design, intervention by the state and the different modes 
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of resistance, resilience, negotiation or open confrontation on behalf of vendors. Thus, it 
is by the interaction between everyday spatial practices and the political structure 
organizing space that street vending could be understood.  
The choice of contrasting cities with similar outcome had the purpose of 
evaluating what difference progressive versus neoliberal influences in policymaking 
make in the regulation of street trade. Lima and Bogotá show different levels of 
advancements in urban planning and their governments at the time of the study came 
from diverse political perspectives but as many cities in the region both have 
implemented ‘successful’ evictions in the past. Motivated respectively by a neoliberal 
and progressive perspective, each city at the time of the study were implementing policies 
and strategies to keep the number of vendors low not only within downtown areas but 
across local administrations whose resources of control and promotion are centrally 
managed in Bogotá and decentralized in Lima. Lima, using the promotion of 
entrepreneurship as a tool, has targeted street markets for vendors’ financed relocation 
projects, encouraging group savings and approaching vendors’ organizations to the 
formal banking system. Bogotá was implementing a wide range of pro-poor options, 
financed by the city administration, for vendors to register and ‘reconvert’ their activity 
through access to temporary options of regulated street trade, temporary employment, 
microcredit or vocational training, among others.  
A key finding in this comparative project revealed that despite the progressive or 
neoliberal tone of the discourse and the inherent differences in resources of promotion 
and control, both city administrations have reified the meaning of public space as a 
domain that is functional to the private sector and the vendor as a subject to discipline, 
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which indeed contribute to reframing policy in exclusionary terms by disfranchising 
street vendors of their use of public space. 
I have explored the interaction between these cities’ governance of public space 
and every day spatial practices in several ways. I explored placemaking from above 
(State) and from below (vendors) revising Lefebvre dimensions of spatiality to locate 
placemaking. I also used De Certeau’s concepts of agency in space–strategies versus 
tactics– to illustrate vendors’ everyday spatial practices. 
In chapter 2, I identified the citywide patterns across time, local administrations 
and trade areas using multiple data sources. When describing the evolution of policies, I 
documented how they relate to changes in types of placemaking of vendors. Usually, 
types of placemaking involved peddling and stationary vending, with the former 
expanding as policies imposed a stricter control over accessing public space more 
permanently. The analysis revealed that even if we compare the same policy subject 
‘street vendors’, the forms of trade targeted in policymaking differ greatly. The 
permanent peddler has been historically prevalent in Bogotá and policymaking has 
traditionally included this type of vendor. While peddling has experienced a sharp 
increase in Lima after many evictions of street markets thorough the city, still the main 
target in policymaking continues to be the stationary vendor working at street markets. I 
also analyzed levels of intervention across local governments, identifying high and low 
enforcement districts/localities, showing a common pattern across low enforcement 
localities, which are peripheral with a greater degree of vendors living in their 
jurisdictions. This analysis revealed uneven patterns of enforcement, suggesting that 
placemaking from above is strategic in intervention, not only when discriminating policy 
215 
 
subjects but also when prioritizing street trade for intervention is specific local 
administrations. 
In chapter 3, I also explored the interaction between placemaking from below and 
above in a more restricted way. The focus of this chapter was on the features of the urban 
structure that are connected to the size of street vending sites and their locations. Here, 
location is understood as a starting point, that even if it could change overtime, represents 
an embedded social reality that could not be possible without an ‘enabling’ socio-political 
context. The chapter presents two types of analysis. First, using spatial network analysis 
(SANET), it identifies certain factors in urban structure, e.g. distance to schools, 
residence of vendors, supermarkets, recovered public space, bus stations, etc., that could 
globally explain the distribution of vending sites. As expected, vendors in Lima and 
Bogotá even if perceived to be located in central areas, are attracted –that is, tend to be 
located near– different features in the urban structure. For instance, vendors in street 
markets in Lima tend to work near their places of residences and locate closer to where 
many institutions that constitute part of the daily routine of shopping and traveling in a 
neighborhood such the roofed market, school, and main public offices. In contrast, 
peddlers in Bogotá tend to work far from their places of residence; centrality corresponds 
to the citywide scale as population in movement that could be easily found around bus 
stations, public parks, etc. Moreover, the distinctive zoning to regulate and supervise 
street trade in transitory, recovered and special zones also accommodates the way they 
‘read’ where to sell. Being closer to transitory zones –those where a group of vendors are 
in the process of reconverting– could be perceived as safer spaces in comparison to the 
special and recovered zones. 
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Secondly, using geographically weighted regression (GWR), I tested a model of 
the mean density of vendors in a trade area predicted by several variables accounting 
from the agglomeration factors that increase vendors, the levels of control over space 
given by the number of operations of control and market competition. I used the number 
of control operations reported as a measure of enforcement, the proportion of expected 
supermarket consumers as a measure of market competition and an index composed on 
different agglomeration factors identified in the spatial network analysis to account for 
the attractiveness of an area for vendors. The results are convincing in showing that the 
effect of local levels of enforcement matches those of market competition. While the 
effect of enforcement overall doesn’t significantly affect the mean density in general 
trends, it is at the local level that the effect makes sense. In Lima, the effect of 
enforcement is concentrated within downtown and northern areas and both coincide with 
supermarket competition effects, with few exceptions, which illustrate the strategic role 
of enforcement complementing private investment. In Bogotá, the effect of enforcement 
is even more widespread but interestingly a pattern of exceptions emerges in the south of 
the city. These results sustain my argument on the functionality of policy makers to the 
private sector, and further illustrate that rather than a global effect, their intervention 
cannot be understood without analyzing local patterns of enforcement across space. 
In chapter 4, I explored placemaking from above by looking closely at the 
rationales of intervention used by policymakers. Each city case show how different 
perspectives of planning and social intervention still develop rationales of intervention 
functional to the private sector and reconverts the vendor into a subject of discipline. In 
the case of Lima, I call this rationale “streetwise neoliberalism”, which consists of 
defending the practice of space control as a strategy to prove economic growth. Vendors 
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are approached through the lenses of promoters of local economic development. Thus, 
success of this policy perspective is expressed by the number of vendors relocated in 
roofed markets, consolidating the perception that formalization is a venue beneficial to 
the urban poor. Multiple private enterprises are involved in the rationale. Public officials 
proactively approach vendors to financial and microcredit institutions for them to self-
finance their projects and work closely with banks to get access to their monthly reports 
to supervise their progress. Supermarket competition is used as a motivational tool, 
instilling in vendors the idea that they need to formalize to have better tools to compete. 
The relationship with organizations is selective and conditional to their commitment to 
formalize, a strict timeline is established to pressure their transition to formality, and 
resources of control are used at the date of relocation and kept after relocations take 
place. As a result, staying on the streets is not only perceived as being informal but also 
as the unwillingness to move forward, or to avoid progress.  
In the case of Bogotá I call this rationale “sidewalk urbanism”, which consists in a 
pedagogical perspective of urban design and planning. As a city with very influential 
architects, there is the vision that public space can be designed to accommodate ‘all’ 
users harmonically. Thus, success is expressed in the number of square meters recovered 
for the purpose of planning. Vendors need to learn that their survival strategies can be 
developed in an alternative way that accommodates the vision of a ‘democratic’ public 
space. Given the favorable ruling for vendors in the Constitutional Court, different social 
programs at the city administration are offered to opt out informal trade to guarantee at 
least the minimum wage; including relocation at streets in designed and administratively 
controlled stalls. Vendors are expected to graduate from the options and do not come 
back to the street. If they do, they are neither entitled to the city options nor capable to 
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sue the city again. The city works closely with organized sectors of private retailers 
whose institutions made not only policy recommendation but also finance some pilot 
studies and even monitor progress. The city actively organizes vendors so they sign 
commitments to leave streets but solutions can be individualized. Behind the rationale, 
the discourse used by authorities is that it is in the best interest of vendors to upgrade, and 
find an alternative way of living according to the city rules and norms of behavior. 
The centralized or decentralized management of both city administrations do not 
entail substantive differences in rationales but in practices of governance. In Lima, 
attuned with national initiatives of formalization, low and high enforcement districts 
coincide that the promotion of formalization is the best policy to upgrade the vendor, and 
in most advanced scenarios this policy is extended to licensed street vendors. In Bogotá, 
where national initiatives are politically in tension with city politics, public officials 
across administrations are politically committed to the progressive vision of the city 
mayor. Following the centralized government structure at the city level, design and 
policymaking decisions are executed in central offices while local administrations have 
the responsibility to enforce policies. A careful documentation of Bogotá’s policymaking 
practices, inspired by a progressive discourse, showed a more institutionalized framework 
of action in Bogotá, with regulations and norms regarding the behavior of public officials 
and police, and a greater promotion to educate vendors on the rules governing space. In 
Lima, there is no clear institutional framework as local authorities rarely comply with 
metropolitan ordinances and most of the times resolve evictions through the local 
mayor’s published edicts and without much attempt to regulate the police. 
In both cities, low and high enforcement districts/localities are not only an 
outcome of the difference in resources but also of the uneven importance attributed to 
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certain public spaces whose control represent a political gain for the mayor. A spatial 
hierarchy of intervention is established in each city. In Bogotá, investment and resources 
of control are distributed according to the zoning. Low enforcement localities –usually 
located in the peripheral South– do not have recovered and special zones as much as do 
high enforcement localities. Rather appointed central public officials in low enforcement 
localities prioritize ‘pedagogical’ interventions, encouraging vendors to organize to create 
transitory zones and advance in recovering public space. In this practice, some political 
leaders are brought closer to the political party of the mayor. In Lima, as relocalization 
projects are financed by vendors, most resources are used in strategies of control or 
definitive evictions. The overall differences between districts are mainly explained by the 
availability of local police and personnel to supervise vendors. In practice all districts, 
including low enforcement districts –also more peripheral than central – prioritize areas 
of intervention inside their jurisdictions, what I called a “multiple downtown effect”. 
These spatial hierarchies are reflected in the results of spatial analysis. The practice of 
surveillance is permanently reported in Bogotá, contrasting with operations in Lima, 
which are reported mainly when referring definitive operations. This explains why in the 
spatial analysis the effect of enforcement on reducing vendors is more widespread in 
Bogotá than Lima.  
After the qualitative analysis of public officials’ interviews, I found that both 
neoliberal and progressive rationales of intervention perceive street vending as an 
occupation that should not be permanent. Thus, a street vendor use of public space is not 
legitimate if not willing to compromise to the policies offered by the city, which insist in 
upgrading options out of street trade. This potentially contributes to further disfranchise 
vendors of their use and access to public space, as evidenced by the widespread use of 
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tactics over collective strategies to maintain their work at streets which I explored 
Chapters 5 for Lima and Bogotá. While in Bogotá the rapport with institutions reveal a 
clearer set of expectations and knowledge of current regulations that could reflect a more 
institutionalized setting in terms of public space governance and acknowledgement of the 
vendors, the conditions to sustain a living in streets are highly erratic, facing sudden 
changes overtime, uncertain as no one can claim a stable access to space, and deeply 
dependent on unconventional senses of entitlement that the vendor is willing to trade off 
in exchange for his or her right to work. Likewise in Lima, vendors remaining after 
relocations have adopted similar tactics. Nonetheless, in this city, forms of collective 
organization are maintained by transforming its discourse and organization towards the 
objective of the local governments that is formalization. 
Given the differential treatment that local officials establish across urban space, I 
explored the testimonies of senior vendors distinguishing between places of trends (blue 
zones where enforcement and competition reduces vending) and places of exceptions (red 
zones where competition or enforcement fail to reduce vending) as identified in the 
spatial analysis, including neighborhoods with different socioeconomic make up and 
exposure to competition. In these places of trends I documented through these 
testimonies a continuous erosion of the local basis that once supported street trade. No 
longer is there a defense based on the idea that “public space is for everyone” as it was in 
Lima but also in Bogotá. In Bogotá, vendors say that public space is up to the mayors’ 
will and do not feel entitled to claim it as belonging to the residents but as based on their 
need to use it as a place of work. Likewise, the sense of entitlement to public space based 
on the perception of it as a neighborhood asset in Lima has weakened. Moreover, it is 
more difficult to develop support networks between vendors. As persecution intensifies, 
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vendors resort in individual tactics rather than organizing collectively. In the case of 
Lima, as supermarket competition intensifies, market vendors become more proactive 
against street traders, even when before their presence was thought as beneficial for a 
particular commercial site. 
In the places of exceptions, rather than open contestation or oppositional 
discourses, more evidence confirms the trends. In red zones in Bogotá, street vendors do 
not feel more entitled to their practice than those vendors in blue zones who are more 
persecuted. They negotiate with police to keep a minimum of vendors to avoid greater 
attention from authorities and benefit by the fact that they are not in high priority space. 
In Lima, street vendors in red zones express more fear of supermarket competition. They 
are still working with local authorities to organize towards formalization, so it is just a 
matter of time; the defense of the economic use of public space is not the organizational 
agenda anymore. Their resistance is only explained by the fact that these red zones are 
low income neighborhoods that are not as gentrified as are other areas and are not yet 
rushed through the transition.  
By looking at the actors, both from the policymakers and from the vendors’ 
perspective, Chapter 4 and 5 illustrate how increasingly governed public space shave 
become a site of resilience (coping) rather than resistance (political statement), with 
unintended consequences in the livelihood of the urban poor. Similar to the findings in 
the mechanisms regulating the poor in Buenos Aires documented by Auyero (2010), 
street vending governance in both cities shows how the ‘visible fists’ (persecution) 
complement the ‘invisible elbows” (assistance) through which the poor need to prove 
their worth to be subject of upgrading policies. Moreover, it shows the connections of 
different forms of (symbolic) violence as identified by Alba (2010), in which the stronger 
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legitimate or institutional violence, the more horizontal violence or conflict between 
vendors exist. 
While the so-called ‘street mafias’, that is group of people who rent space, were 
not directly addressed in this study, the qualitative exploration suggest that these mafias, 
have fewer opportunities to develop in the current context. As licenses and taxes are 
omitted or restricted by the policy framework in both cities few opportunities of political 
clientelism emerge. These types of organizations in the past seemed to be reserved to 
high value public space in large commercial areas. Nowadays, however, widespread 
irregular arrangements can proliferate and take a more elusive form of social control. 
Furthermore, mechanisms of regulation do not lead to institutional practices of 
accessing public space and rather contribute to delegitimizing informal work on the 
streets. First, governance of public space does not seem to promote rightful access to 
public space, but instead provide incentives to non-institutional practices. In both cities, 
persistent or new vendors are exposed to ‘illegal’ arrangements to keep working at 
streets. In Lima, vendors pay fees to house dwellers or even to market vendors if they are 
willing to accommodate in a particular area. In Bogotá while renting space is not a 
common practice, in order to keep working vendors trade off critical economic choices 
such as the product that they sell to providers who through ownership of carts impose the 
conditions under which vendors can sell in an area.  
And secondly, the rationale of policymaking perceived as beneficial to the vendor 
reinstates a “blaming the victim” discourse. Failed policy options are explained by the 
lack of commitment of the vendor while in the perspective of the vendor policy options 
don’t necessarily mean an occupational upgrade. Despite the common belief in Lima that 
being a market vendor increases the status of the street trader, I have found a constant 
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struggle to make ends meet on behalf of street vendors who transitioned to a market. 
Even when convinced that working at stall is safer, they have to invest more and are at 
more financial risk. Likewise, the conditions of regulated trade in Bogotá are not 
different than on the streets. Vendors who are supposed to be trained to become 
entrepreneurs are always dependent on the economic choices made for them. Moreover, 
as space is elusive in the streets, it is the same as well in the regulated forms given the 
emphasis on being temporary. 
Finally, the proactive attitude of policymakers to promote organization among 
vendors contributes to the weakening of vendors’ sense of entitlement to public space. In 
Lima, street vendors associations abandon their political role to assume a managerial one 
in order to transit to formalization, leaving little room to defend their use of public space 
as workers. Similarly, vendors in Bogotá organize in a way that can in the short term 
secure some access to space but their discussions are more focused on the policy options 
and cannot be reframed independently of the policy framework. 
Notice that despite most of the spatial practices from below are taking the form of 
tactics, there is room for collective strategies and even protests, even if within a 
subordinate reframing. Later in October 2009, after my fieldwork, a large protest of 
vendors’ organizations coming mainly from southern localities in Bogotá, which also 
happen to be the ones in which vendor leaders were recruited politically, took place in the 
downtown area. The spokesman of the protest argued that there were not enough 
upgrading options, and instead they were facing more persecution. Despite the act of 
protesting, one can argue that it doesn’t mean that vendors developed an oppositional 
discourse, in which they are claiming their use of public space as legitimate, but rather 
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leaders are using the prevalent policymaking rationale to ask for tolerance to their use of 
urban space.  
Instead of taking a deterministic approach to space in which changing physical 
form or design are seen as changing social life, sociologists, as many other social 
sciences focusing in the social practice in space, can provide a user-centered perspective 
valuable to policymaking and social research (Gans 2002; Gieryn 2000). There has been 
relatively little research on the informal economy that has documented its spatial 
dimension, focusing largely instead on social and political factors without problematizing 
informal workers’ role as users of urban space. I tried to address this gap by including 
space/place and placemaking from below and above practices into consideration through 
the dissertation into the analysis of street trade.  
Thinking about the contributions of this study, I have shown that bringing space 
back into sociological theory does not allow deterministic interpretations of space or 
agency as urban space in itself is a site of contention. Contention cannot be read as 
setting, but as field in which spatial practice defines meaning and purpose. 
Representations of urban space not only influence perceptions of informality but also 
shape the structure of opportunities for the informal occupations available to the urban 
poor.  
Moreover introducing placemaking opens up more venues to interpret agency 
beyond organized sectors within the informal economy. Typically, the informal economy 
in Latin America has been understood as a product of a weak state capacity to enforce 
regulation and a networked community able to circumvent regulations (Portes and Haller 
2001). When exploring placemaking from above, the proactive state, even if centralized 
or decentralized, does not show simply an increase in its levels of enforcement but more 
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importantly a more strategic action across space which results in uneven patterns of 
informality. Also, a networked community does not suffice as a condition to reproduce 
informality. The exploration of placemaking from below showed that as level of 
enforcement increases vendors resort to more individual responses, which do not promote 
compliance. As observed by Bayat (1997b; 2000) and Scott (1985), non-organized forms 
of political action, even if individualized or fragmented, are also critical to understand the 
politics of the urban poor.  
Analyzing traditional organizational forms as ‘simply’ problem-solving networks 
(Auyero 2001) permits to go in depth into the motivations, and rationalities sustaining 
those mechanisms without attributing to the actors a priori value-orientations to their 
political and social actions. In this study the exclusionary reframing of the policy 
environment in both cities, away from the defense of vendors’ use of public space, has 
indeed ‘resolved’ the right to work in discourses that are not oppositional but 
complement the further reach of the State. As observed within the organized sectors of 
street vending, the reframing of the policy framework has entailed that this ‘networked’ 
community is more conducive to compliance. Therefore, incentives to organize are 
relatively low for the vast majority who cannot carry the cost or risks involved in those 
upgrading strategies. Seeing agency through the lenses of placemaking enables us to 
avoid oversimplifications on the role of informal actors’ organizational motivations and 
outcomes.  
Also by focusing on the role of spatiality, this work presents a more complex 
picture that blurs the boundaries between neoliberal and progressive perspectives in 
policymaking. The methodological choice using a combination of spatial and qualitative 
analysis contributes to overcome comparative approaches that are focused on one-level, 
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whether citywide or case-wide. This work also shows how traditional statistical models 
which assume that a relationship does not vary across space could be misleading in 
understanding the structure of opportunities for the informal sector. These non-stationary 
models may indeed support the idea that the state is not important when dealing with 
informality. Thus, by analyzing levels of enforcement across scales, this methodological 
strategy contributes to deepen the discussion of the classical categories used to 
distinguish levels of enforcement in bounded administrative units of analysis. Those 
cannot be understood without taking into account the strategic decisions which reproduce 
uneven patterns of intervention that are relative to specific structures of government and 
regulatory intents.  
This study also speaks to practical implications. It invites to discussions about 
what constitutes a ‘good practice’ in policymaking and debates about the right to the city. 
We learned that the framing of current policy approaches that emphasize the recovery of 
public space has rendered a paradoxical outcome. It has taken the “right to the city” – as 
originally defined by Lefebvre (1993) not encompassing only claims to resources but 
more broadly to urban life– as a discourse of defense for public authorities and elites, 
leaving behind the fact that these spatial practices are part of the livelihoods of the urban 
poor. The right to work, commonly used to defend their occupation, has become reframed 
into a neoliberal perspective of informality and their spatial practice redefined as an 
informal practice by means of deregulating their access to public space. Thus, as work 
becomes informalized with a renewed and more sophisticated “blaming the victim” 
discourse and criminalized by persecution, claims to defend their spatial practice and 
work become obsolete. These mechanisms put in question what has been understood as 
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success in policy making and question the status of the citizenship attained by these 
worker groups. 
Rather than a sharp division between these two perspectives of policymaking, we 
learned that interventions have a similar underlying purpose that is functional to the 
global pattern of urbanism. It opens up new empirical questions. On the one hand, given 
the aspiration of cities in the developing world to modernize, I wonder whether or not 
similar occupations in the developed world make a difference to the livelihoods of the 
urban poor. For instance, does progressive policymaking in the developed world make a 
difference to the way street traders’ access public space in those cities? Or, does the 
distinction between global north and south also blur when analyzing cases of similar 
disfranchised groups? On the other hand, I wonder how spatiality affects other typical 
informal occupations, such as home-based businesses or domestic workers, among 
others. For instance, how zoning regulations in now consolidated informal settlements 
affects the likelihood of the urban poor using their houses as means to create businesses? 
How does the distinction between domestic, private and public space as sites of 
intervention of the State affect claims for social protection for domestic workers? And 
finally, giving the richness of empirical evidence about land squatting in the developing 
world, I wonder how current trends in policy making which rather lead to ownership 
through formalization, relate to the disfranchising of informal workers in the realm of 
public space, and what they can tell us in the wider spectrum of the right to the city of the 
urban poor. I see in these questions new directions I imagine this work could take. And, I 






This study used a mixed methods approach combining spatial analysis with 
qualitative analysis to understand the evolution of street vending as a subject of policy. 
The main reason to use mixed methods is to allow for a systematic comparison between 
and within the two selected cities given that vending sites or types of vendors are rarely 
homogeneously controlled. Given that ‘hard’ data on vending in terms of population and 
policy outcomes is often incomplete or dated, this approach proved to be beneficial as it 
permitted to build upon the strength of diverse sources of information. Specifically in this 
study it served to explore how spatial patterns are manifested in daily life experiences of 
the street vendors and how they are produced by particular rationales of policymaking.  
It is important to emphasize that the follow-up qualitative analysis was not meant 
to double-check the relationships found in the spatial analysis. Rather the purpose was to 
explore comprehensively the dynamics at specific locations and how they relate to the 
larger trends in the evolution of street vending as a subject of policy. Thus both analyses 
were developed interactively. The initial descriptive data based on the spatial analysis 
served to classify vending sites and oriented the fieldwork. But the modeling of the 
effects of control operations and supermarket competition was developed at a later stage. 
Likewise, interviews for both public officials and vendors were initially open coded 
without any sort of classification in order to identify large trends. After the spatial 
analysis was finalized, codes were analyzed based on the classification found in the 
spatial analysis. Besides the limitations intrinsically related to the quality of the 
quantitative and qualitative data collected, the only disadvantage of this approach was the 
time spent to triangulate the information collected. 
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In these appendices I expand the description of the methodology, which was 
briefly summarized in Chapter 1. I divided the Appendices in five subsections. In 
Methodological Appendix A I describe the sources of information available in both cities 
that I used for following the evolution of vendors and policy outcomes. In 
Methodological Appendix B I describe further the data sets on street vendors used for the 
spatial analysis. In Methodological Appendix C I explain the techniques and data sources 
in detail of the spatial analysis and in Methodological Appendix D and E I describe the 
steps taken to collect and classify the interviews of public officials and street vendors 
respectively.  
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO FOLLOW THE 
EVOLUTION OF STREET VENDORS 
A.1 Household Surveys 
In order to provide a description of the evolution of the number and proportion of 
street vendors among the working population, I used the available household surveys 
constructed and implemented by the corresponding National Institutes of Statistics of 
each of the countries.  
For Lima-Perú, I used the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) for the years 
2003 and 2007. This survey is implemented nationally each trimester and has annually 
adjusted data set. Its sample is representative for different regions, including 
Metropolitan Lima. Since 2000, it has incorporated the variable ‘place of work’ which 
permits to identify more accurately street vendors within the module for the Independent 
Worker. Street vendors were defined using three filters: (1) people that declared their 
main occupation to be ‘vendedores ambulantes’ (street vendors), (2) worked in the 
commerce sector, and (3) performed their occupations at streets (as itinerant, or in an 
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improvised or fixed stall).The ‘commerce sector’ filter was used to discard people selling 
products as part of the services offered, such the case of beauty consultants, who are also 
catalog sellers but do not work at streets. The filter of the place of work was deemed 
important as in many cases people were categorized as ‘vendedores ambulantes’ even 
when they worked as catalog sellers or visitors to professional offices (e.g. 
representatives of pharmacies offering products to doctors.). Within the surveyed 
population who reported to be ‘vendedores ambulantes’ (street vendors) as their main 
occupation and the commerce sector as their field of activity, 93% described themselves 
as independent workers from which the place of work filter could be applied. Then, our 
estimation cannot verify if the 7% that declared being employed by third parties or as 
unpaid family workers are actually working at streets, and can be identified ‘fully’ as 
street vendors.  
Following this definition, street vendors represent around 10% of the 
economically active population in the survey in both years of reference, which goes 
beyond of the expected error of +/- 5% in the survey. Thus, general trends of the total 
population under research can be representative. Specific calculations based on sub-
groups of these workers, such the average income of peddlers or stationary vendors, fall 
below the margins of error and should be used with caution. 
For Bogotá-Colombia, I used the Encuesta Calidad de Vida (ECV) for the years 
2003 and 2007. The ECV include the variable of place of work which is applied to all the 
working population. It is an annual survey with national coverage. Its sample design in 
2003 is representative of thirteen main cities in Colombia, including Bogotá. In 2007, the 
ECV was only administered in Bogotá by the Departmento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística (DANE) at the request of the city administration. Street vendors were defined 
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using the same filters as in ENAHO (declared occupation as street vendors, worked in the 
commerce sector and place of work is at streets either itinerant or within fixed or 
improvised posts which in the case of ECV means “stationary”). We identified that 
around 20% of street vendors were dependent workers or unpaid workers for both years 
of reference.  
Street vendors as defined above represent around 3% of the working population, 
which is a share below +/- 5% sample survey error. Then, most of the calculations 
presented are above the established margin of errors for the survey. However, the ECVs 
are the only sources that could follow trends overtime within these limitations. 
A.2 Other surveys and administrative sources 
Household surveys provide a larger picture of the participation in the labor force 
of the street vending population. However, not all vendors are part of the records of 
municipalities. Administrative accounts even if not exhaustive can give us a glimpse on 
how the subject of policy in the eyes of policymakers is evolving overtime.  
In the case of Lima, each local municipality usually register, count or establish a 
‘padrón’ (list) of vendors based on the sites that they consider important to intervene. 
These datasets are not updated constantly and accessing them in the 43 municipalities is a 
time consuming task. However, the Registro Nacional de Municipalidades (RENAMU) 
compiles this information. RENAMU is a mandatory survey that the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística (INEI) conducts yearly since 2004 to compile information on the 
resources, achievements and plans of all municipalities. The compilation is retrospective, 
that is, the year of the survey asks question of the year before. The questionnaire includes 
two key questions relevant to follow policymaking relative to vendors: the number of 
street vendors registered, counted or calculated by the municipality and the number of 
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control operations48 performed to this population. These control operations are special 
requests by the municipality, usually related to definitive evictions that require the 
presence of either a substantial body of metropolitan police or municipal police on top of 
the regular surveillance that these policemen perform on the vending sites. Additional 
questions are the number of food vendors with sanitary permits and the number of roofed 
markets built in the district. However, this latter question was only included in 2004. 
In the case of Bogotá, the Instituto para la Economía Social (IPES), which is the 
institution responsible for implementing policies towards vendors in Bogotá, has a 
common registry of vendors which is updated daily since 2003. I accessed the registry up 
to July 2006. However, annual reports of the number of vendors per locality, amount of 
investment on vending policies are available on a yearly basis and disaggregated by 
locality. The number of control operations on public space violations is reported by the 
Secretaria de Gobierno within the System of Surveillance and Control (SVC, in Spanish 
acronyms) which records the date, time and location of the operation, the motive and the 
name of the public officials involved. These control operations entail also displacement 
of vendors but are not definitive evictions as in the case of Lima’ street markets. Public 
officials with policemen inform to street vendors that they are committing a violation, 
inform about the resources available to them and the regulations in place. Then, 
policemen give them a warning so they can be informed that they will be continually 
displaced. These are executed on top of the regular surveillance of the metropolitan 
police. 
                                                 
48 With exception of 2004, when the survey only asked whether or not the municipality performed any 
control operation for street vendors. 
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In both of the cities, I could not identify an available registry or system reporting 
regular operations performed by policemen. These institutions usually report cases of 




METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX B COUNTING STREET VENDORS 
The datasets used for identifying vending sites and the number of vendors come 
from different sources and methodologies in each city. Despite these limitations, these are 
the most up-to-date datasets available and represent a contribution in front of the 
common unavailability of georeferenced information for street vendors. 
The IPES in Bogotá conducted a street vendor’s count during the first semester of 
2006. Count takers were assigned to known vending neighborhoods sites and 
simultaneously counted vendors per hour from 6 a.m. to midnight on the week of June 4th 
2006 for the whole city. The week count was reported in a form of an average of vendors 
per site in a given day of the week. The total counting resulted in a geo-referenced data 
set containing 19, 276 street vendors located in 210 sites (including those clusters around 
popular market areas such Corabastos and 20 de Julio). This counting comprises 19 of 
the 20 localities in Bogotá that compose the urban core of the city. 
In Lima, NGO Alternativa conducted in January 2007 a street and roofed market 
counting for 14 peripheral municipalities. I expanded this data set by incorporating 19 
municipalities located within the central areas and updated the information of the existing 
ones from 15 May to 20 June of 2007.The collection of the information was based on 
teams of four per district which counted vendors on sites at a given day and hour from 
8am to 3pm. A pair of counters was assigned from two to three sites a day. The counting 
was conducted from Wednesday to Sunday. Sites were previously identified based on an 
initial collection of municipality lists and local queries to informal transporters (mototaxi 
drivers who usually cover street market clients). A total of 238 sites gathering 25,268 
street vendors were collected and geo-referenced. This count comprises 33 out of the 43 
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districts, all of the districts in which the count was conducted constitute the urban core of 
the city.  
It is important to point out that both data sets do not gather the full number of 
vendors in each city. They were intended to capture vendors at peak times that can be 
more permanently found by visiting popular sites. Therefore, there are some 
undercounting problems with both datasets that cannot be accurately addressed. 
The vending sites in both data sets were initially geo-referenced as poly-line 
events representing the segments of the streets occupied by vendors. The segments have 
in their attribute field the observed number of vendors. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX C SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
C.1 Unit of Analysis: Street trade area 
To define the Street trade area, from the 210 and 238 vending sites, respectively 
identified in Lima and Bogotá, I identified their centroid points. That is, vending sites in 
close proximity –between two to three blocks of distance– were grouped to avoid trade 
areas to be too small to observe significant differences. As a result of the grouping, a total 
of 191 and 102 vending sites centroids for Lima and Bogotá respectively were identified 
After converting those grouped polylines (representing the streets) of the street 
vending sites to centroid points, the observed counts were linked to ‘neighborhoods’ 
approximated as trade areas using the Thiessen Polygons’ function in Arc Gis. Thiessen 
polygons are a special kind of spatial partition based on the Euclidean (linear) distances 
of a set of points. Thiessen polygons mathematically computes and draws separation lines 
between sites taking into account the closest distance of each vending site with each 
other. It involves a three-step procedure. First, it draws straight lines representing closest 
distance between the points of reference, in this case the vending sites centroids (red dots 
in Illustration C.1). Second, it draws a perpendicular line at the halfway point of the 
straight lines corresponding to the vending site centroids (Perpendicular lines or bisectors 
in green on Illustration C.1). Third, using the separation lines, it divides the study area in 
sub-areas representing the street trade areas (Areas are A1, A2, etc. in Illustration C1). In 
this way, the thiessen polygons represent the area in which the travel distance to a site is 
shorter than it is to other competing sites. 
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Illustration C.1 Thiessen Polygons Procedure 
 
This spatial partition has been commonly used on retail analysis (Ghosh and 
McLafferty 1987; Jones and Simmons 1993) to identify areas of influence for each retail 
location. The basic assumption behind this partition is that consumers do not have 
preference for a specific site besides travel distance. The assumption is a feasible for 
street peddlers in Bogotá who sell pedestrian opportunity products. In the case of Lima, 
in which street vendors are more specialized, empirical evidence partially supports this 
assumption. Despite the fact that most street markets have their customers coming from 
nearby locations, larger street markets capture a greater area of influence as their offer is 
more diverse and prices tend to be lower (Lazarte, Mendez and Suárez 2006).For Lima, I 
used the weighted Thiessen polygons option in Arc Gis, to account for the number of 
street vendors in the centroid sites to define trade areas according to the size of the 
vending centroid. In this modification, each centroid is given a set of radius or circles of 
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influence based on the values assigned to the centroid (the number of vendors). Straight 
lines are drawn based on the closest weighted distance, and perpendicular bisectors are 
placed halfway accordingly to those weighted values.  
C.2 Identification of agglomeration and dispersion factors:  
Conditional Nearest Neighbor Analysis (CNN) 
In order to examine descriptively whether or not, and in what extent, the 
distribution of vending sites in each city is conditioned by the location of other type of 
establishments or zoning regulations, I used the Conditional Nearest Neighbor tool 
(CNN) in SANET49. 
Based on closest network (street) distances, CNN is a technique designed to test 
whether or not a non-base distribution of points –that is, locations that are not permanent 
overtime or fixed such the case of vending sites– are clustered or apart from base points –
e.g. fixed locations like supermarkets, zoning areas, etc. The tool tests the null hypothesis 
that non-base points are randomly and independently distributed according to the uniform 
distribution over a given network, using a Montecarlo simulation. To run this simulation, 
I run 999 iterations with a .5 confidence level. 
The procedure involves (1) the calculation of network distances for each base 
point and the closest non-base point in the distribution, (2) the calculation of the 
conditional distance association measure, based on the ratio between the observed 
average nearest distance and the expected nearest distance of a random point –this latter 
expected value is modified to account for the conditional distribution using a probability 
                                                 
49An Arc GIS toolbox extension for network analysis developed by Atsu Okabe, Kei-ichiOkunuki and 
SANET Team in Tokyo, Japan. 
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function50, and (3) it test the significance of the conditional association measurement at 
different distance ranges using a Montecarlo simulation. The final output to check the 
relationship between both distributions is a graph. (See Illustration C.2). 
Illustration C.2 CNN output graph 
 
Source: SANET Manual 2010 
The interpretation of the graph implies the revision of the position of the observed 
curve (blue dotted line) and the expected curve (red dotted line). If the observed curve is 
to the left of the expected curve in the graph, then it shown that the non-base points tend 
to locate near to the base points. If to the right, this means that the non-base point tend to 
locate apart. The axis shows the ranges of distance in meters on which that relationship is 
                                                 
50 The computational details of this calculation are outlined in Okabe, A and F Miki. 1984. "A conditional 
nearest-neighbor spatial-association measure for the analysis of conditional locational interdependence." 
Environment and Planning A 16:163-171. 
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expected. In the graph below the observed curve is at the right of the expected, meaning 
that up to 300 meter, the non basic points tend to locate apart from the base points.  
To account for non-base point distributions, I georeferenced a number of 
institutions–such as churches, schools, hospitals, police stations, municipal palaces and 
parks–, commercial places –such as supermarkets, malls, popular commercial centers, 
and roofed markets–, as well as informal neighborhoods and places of residence of 
vendors51. Additional information available only for Bogotá was also analyzed such the 
location of bus stations, centralities (or business districts), Casetas Populares (relocation 
off-street projects), REDEP quioscos (relocation on-streets projects), recovered public 
spaces, and transitory zones (areas where vendors are temporarily permitted to sell). 
Below are the all the output graphs per city. The results summary table is on Chapter 3. 
  
                                                 
51 In Lima, these places were detected by using the census reported occupation. In the case of Bogotá a 
40% sample of the street vendors’ 2006 registry was used.  
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Figure C1 CNN output graphs for Lima 




3. Popular Mall 
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5. Supermarket /malls 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































11. Street vendors’ blocks of residence  
 














































































































































































































































































Map C1.3 Street markets’ locations and 
city services 
 
Map C1.4 Street markets’ locations and 





Figure C2 CNN output graphs for Bogotá 
 
 
1. Casetas Populares (off-street relocation projects) 
 
2. REDEP Quioscos (on-street relocation projects) 
 





4. Transitory Zones 
 







































































































































































































































































































































8. Informal Settlements  
 





















































































































































































































































































































































13. Police Stations 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































C.3 Determinants on the mean density of street vendors in trade area:  
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) 
C.3.1 GWR method 
GWR is an extension of traditional regression techniques developed to estimate 
and visualize local parameter estimates when spatially varying relationships are 
hypothesized (Brunsdon, Fotheringham and Charlton 1998; Fotheringham, Brunsdon and 
Charlton 2002).Thus instead of assuming that a same stimulus produces the same 
outcome across the study region, GWR starts with the premise that a phenomenon is non-
stationary or heterogeneous, which means relationships between variables could vary 
over space. GWR works with spatial autocorrelation fitting models using iteratively re-
weighted least squares (Fotheringham et al. 2002). Then, apart from the global model, it 
calculates local parameters specific to each input location, which includes not only local 
coefficient but standard errors and R-squares. The main benefit of this statistical 
approach is that it serves to identify variable patterns of association across a study area. 
Instead, GWR rewrites the OLS regression equation locally as follows: 
( ) ( ) i
k
ikijkiji xwwy εββ ++= ∑0
, 
In this approach, the weights ( )ijw on observations are derived through a distance-
decay function, also known as spatial kernel. This means that closer observations are 
assumed to be more influenced by each other than farther ones. The formula for the 








Where ijd  is the distance between data point i and data point j and b  is the 
bandwidth. For a visual representation of the formula, see Illustration C.3 below.  
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Illustration C.3 Spatial Kernel 
 
To limit the number of data points considered for each local parameter estimate, a 
spatial kernel is used at the ith point. The spatial kernel can be either fixed, in which case 
the bandwidth of the kernel is also fixed, and thus varying numbers of observations are 
weighted for the computation of each local parameter. With an adaptive kernel, the 
number of data observations to be weighted varies according to the point density (See 
Illustration C.4).I used an adaptative kernel in the Gaussian or Ordinary Least Square 
Estimation Model.  
Illustration C.4 Adaptative Kernel 
 
Source: (Fotheringham, Brunsdon and Charlton 2002:45) 
Since this approach conducts several tests for each case, an adjustment of the 
critical values of the local parameters is needed. This means changing the global test-wise 
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error to maintain a local error rate at a similar confidence level α . I use the 







 Where β is the adjusted test level, α is the unadjusted test (frequently 0.05), eP  is 
the effective number of parameter in the local model, n  is the number of regression 
points, p  is the number of parameters to be estimated. In Lima and Bogotá, the adjusted 
critical value corresponding to 0.05 level of confidence was respectively 3.38 and 3.05. 
The mapping of local coefficients was drawn using those critical values. 
I used the GWR extension available in Arc GIS 10.3 and GWR3. For the analysis, 
I estimated a total of four models. The first model tested the relationship between mean 
density of vendors in the trade area and the index of agglomeration. The next models 
subsequentially introduced supermarket competition (Model 3), and exposure to control 
policies (Model 4). For each of these models, I tested the autocorrelation of local standard 
errors to check for model misspecifications using Moran I, and additional test for 
multicolinearity was also calculated within the Arc Gis options. None of the models show 
significant multicolinearity or autocorrelation of standard errors. For each of the city, I 
map and interpret the full model or Model 4. The Montecarlo test, an indicator which test 
for spatial variability for each of the parameters in the model, indicated that all 
independent variables show significant variability across space. I mapped those 
parameters and local R-square in the chapter. All the local analysis is interpreted using an 
adjusted 95% confidence level. 
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C.3.2. Dependent Variable: Mean Density of Vendors within Trade Area 
Since the number of street vendors per trade area in each city was fairly skewed to 
fit the assumptions for OLS regression within spatial autocorrelation models, I 
standardized the independent variable as a function of mean density to be able to explore 
local variations. 52 The mean density captures the relative concentration of vendors. It 
represents the average number of vendors per square kilometer within a trade area. It 
transforms the raw counts into a rate in which the offset variable is the square kilometer. 
To calculate this indicator, the following technique was used. First, I converted 
the original poly-line shapefile, representing the streets occupied by a group of vendors, 
to a point data file in which each point represented one vendor, assuming a random 
distribution within the assigned street. Second, I calculated the point density, using the 
simple density function within the spatial analyst extension in Arc Gis. The input 
parameters were a cell size of 30 square meters and 1 km search radius. Finally, I 
overlaid the trade area shapefile with the vendor density raster and used the zonal 
statistics function within the spatial analysis extension in Arc Gis to calculate the mean 
density. 
C.3.3 Independent Variables 
I used three main explanatory variables (1) an agglomeration index, to capture the 
number of features in the trade area that have been identified as appealing to vendors, (2) 
Supermarket competition, which is approximated by calculating the expected share of 
consumers that the nearest supermarket could have within the trade area; and (3) an 
                                                 
52This indicator is drawn from studies of hazardous facilities in which a Poisson or negative binomial 
distribution is generally observed. See: Mennis, Jeremy L. and Lisa Jordan. 2005. "The distribution of 
environmental equity: Exploring spatial nonstationarity in multivariate models of air toxic releases." Annals 
Association of American Geographers 95:249-268. 
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exposure to control policies indicator, which approximates the number of interventions 
performed in the last three or four years previous to the count in the trade area.  
Agglomeration Index (AI) is a count variable which refers to the number of 
features found within the trade area that attract vendors. To identify the features, I used 
the results of the CNN test, taking into account also the statistically significant distances 
where vending sites are significantly near to a particular feature distribution.  
For Lima, nine features were taking into account, namely vending sites being 
located at (1) 3 km from an informal settlement, (2) at to 2 km from a roofed market, (3) 
2 km from a popular mall, (4) 1 km from a school, (5) 2 km from a police station, (6) 
1km from a church, (7) 1 km from the municipal palace, (8) 1 km from health centers and 
(9) 2 km from residences of vendors (or census blocks with people reporting working as 
street vendors).  
For Bogotá, nine features were also identified. These are vending sites located 
near (1) 2 km from a park, (2) 1.5 km from a bus station, (3) 1.5 km from a mall, (4) 1.5 
km from a supermarket, (5) 2 km from a roofed market, (6) 2 km from a municipal 
palace, (7) 1.5 km from city planners’ defined centralities, (8) 1.5 km from casetas 
populares and (9) 2km from a REDEP stall.  
Network distances were used to identify each of those factors in both cities. The 
index consist on the sum or total count of those features of the vending site. 
Supermarket Competition (SC) was approximated using supermarket penetration 
rates. Penetration rates, a variable commonly used in retail analysis, refer to the market 
share or percentage of households that are could be potentially targeted consumers for 
modern retail (nearest supermarket) in a given trade area against other forms of 
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traditional retail (nearest roofed market). 53 For each city, we used three main components 
to calculate the penetration rates: the number of households of specific social stratum at 
the block level, their probabilities of consumption and their distances of the centroid of 
the block to the nearest supermarket and roofed market.  
I used the block stratification dataset for 2006 for Bogotá and the 2008 for Lima, 
elaborated respectively in each city by the Unidad Administrativa de Catastro Distrital 
(UACD) and the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI). Since both 
datasets are calculated at the block level, the number of household by block stratum was 
calculated based on overlaid by the latest censuses block data.  
The supermarkets and traditional markets were georeferenced and Euclidean 
distances to the nearest of each from the block were calculated using ET Geowizards54. 
The probability of consuming in a supermarket was calculated based on secondary 
sources of information provided by available marketing studies in each city. 55  
The formula used to calculate the penetration rates is as follows: 
jj NECjSPR /=  
Where jEC is the total of expected customers within the trade area j , calculated 
by ijij PCEC *=  
Where iC  is the sum of the number of household in each stratum multiplied by 
their probability to consume at supermarkets, and ijP  is a weight factor. Given the 
unavailability of a measure of attractiveness for each supermarket, I used as the only 
                                                 
53 For a detail description of the calculation of penetration rates, see Guy, Cliff. 1999. "Retail location 
analysis." Pp. 450-462 in Applied geography: principles and practice, edited by M. Pacione. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
54 This is an extension to Arc Gis procedures that go beyond the number of data points that could be 
handled in the student version of Arc Gis. 
55 In the case of Lima, it is based on APEIM. 2005. "Nivelessocioeconómicos en Lima Metropolitana y 
Callao." APEIM, Lima.. In Bogotá, the information was published by FENALCO in 2010 within an 
analysis of local grocery stores. España, Rafael. 2010. "La tienda de barrio: una racionalidad sugestiva." 
Bogotá: FENALCO. 
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criteria a function of distance. This weight factor was calculated based on the division 
between the inverse distance from the trade area centroid to the closest supermarket and 
the total inverse distance to the closest alternative retailer or roofed market. 
Exposure to Control Policies (ECP): refers to the expected number of control 
interventions on street vendors performed in a particular trade area. The number of 
control operations in a trade area is “expected” as the report on operations is available 
only at the local administrative level and there is no report on exact locations. Thus I 
approximated the operations taking place in a trade area based on the assumption that 
bigger trade areas- or areas with greater density of vendors- would call more control than 
smaller ones. 
Based on the RENAMU Survey conducted by INEI, I compiled the information 
of the number of interventions each local municipality undertook from 2005 to 2008 in 
Lima. In this city, interventions involve evictions which are reported taking into account 
the metropolitan as well as the municipal police. In the case of Bogotá, I used the number 
of interventions reported by the SVC of the City Secretary of Government between 2000 
and 2005. In this city operations involve the police but local authorities as well. They are 
meant not only to control but to educate vendors on the regulations available. In both 
cities routine control data were unavailable. 
I calculated a proxy of exposure to these interventions under the assumption that 
bigger street trade areas may call more attention from the authorities. Therefore, I 
computed a weighted average of the interventions a street trade area may have 
experienced taking into consideration the size of the trade area in respect to area of the 
locality or localities it falls in. The formula is:  
jiij AreaAreaXXECP /)*(∑=  
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Where j is the trade area, Xi is the number of interventions in each intersecting 
localities i. To compute this weighted average, I used the transfer tool available in the 
extension ET GeoWizards 10.  
C.3.4 Descriptive tables and maps 
Table C.1 Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables for GWR 
Bogotá Lima 
  N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation 
Mean Density of 
Vendors 102 87.1 124.4 191 83.9 105.0
Agglomeration Index 102 6.7 2.3 191 7.7 0.9
Supermarket 
Competition 102 17.4 7.2 191 3.8 5.7
Exposure to Control 102 6.8 18.0 191 96.1 287.0
 





Index Variance z-score p-value 
Mean Density 5104.31 0.394 -0.005 0.000 18.846 0.000
Agglomeration index 5104.31 0.359 -0.005 0.000 17.059 0.000
Supermarket competition 5104.31 0.181 -0.005 0.000 8.822 0.000
Exposure to control 5104.31 0.166 -0.005 0.000 10.147 0.000
Bogotá             
Mean Density 2922.42 0.430 -0.010 0.002 9.316 0.000
Agglomeration index 2922.42 0.568 -0.010 0.002 11.694 0.000
Supermarket competition 2922.42 0.256 -0.010 0.002 5.527 0.000













































































































































METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX D PUBLIC OFFICIALS QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of understanding how rationales of intervention were influenced 
by representations of public space and current development ideologies focusing on the 
informal sector, I conducted semi-structured interviews to public officials in Lima during 
July 2005 and May-June 2008 and in Bogotá during July to August 2008 and June-July 
2009. A total of 62 semi-structured interviews in both cities were implemented, including 
10 key informants and 52 policy makers at different governmental dependencies dealing 
with informal activities. 
The main focuses were the actions of control, design and intervention that were 
directly targeting street vendors. As these actions mostly take place at the local or 
metropolitan level, the offices dealing with vending across metropolitan and local 
municipalities were the main sources of information for the analysis and coding. The 
initial goal was to interview all the districts in Lima and Bogotá. Prospective public 
officials to be interviewed were contacted by sending an official letter of request, 
explaining the research purpose and attaching a list of the questions to be asked. Each 
dependency set the time and date of the interview. Public officials from 13 out of thirty 
three districts of Lima and 16 out of twenty localities of Bogotá were interviewed. Most 
of the districts in Lima that responded to the interview request came from the peripheral 
districts.  
The institutional design that relates with vending varies in each city. In Lima, the 
interviewees came from the Local Offices of Economic Development, usually the 
director or sub-director of the office. In the case of Bogotá, I interviewed the head of the 
offices of Legal Assessment (Asesoría Jurídica) which normally implement inspections to 
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control of public space. In each of these localities, the assigned IPES official was also 
contacted for an interview.  
Additionally, high-rank public officials at the Metropolitan and national level 
were also contacted in order to understand the interactions between local, metropolitan 
and national levels of government conducting policies towards informal entrepreneurs in 
the hopes to find a direct or indirect relationship with vendors. For the metropolitan level, 
I interviewed the Head of the economic development office and heads of specific projects 
targeting vendors within the metropolitan government. I also conducted an interview with 
the head of the Institute of Metropolitan Planning (IMP, in Spanish acronyms), although 
this dependency does not intervene in issues regulating public space. At the national 
level, the Head of the Program MiEmpresa in the Ministry of Labor, and one 
representative implementing the program at the local level was also interviewed, despite 
its program was not necessarily targeting vendors but in general terms informal 
entrepreneurs. I also conducted one interview with the representative of the titling 
program Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFROPRI) in the 
Ministry of Housing dealing with the case of formalization of roofed markets occupying 
public land in informal settlements.  
In the case of Bogotá at the city level, I interviewed the director of IPES and the 
Head of the Departamento Administrativo Defensoría del Espacio Público (DADEP). 
Additional interviews at the Metropolitan level were conducted also to the Heads of 
specific projects within the Economic Development Secretary, although none of their 
projects were directly involving vendors. The national offices I contacted in Bogotá were 
neither intervening locally, nor targeting vendors. To complement some info in both 
cities we interviewed key informants from large organizations of vendors, private 
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enterprises or labor unions to cross check the information regarding some interventions at 
the local level. (See full list of interviews in Box D.1. at the end of this appendix). 
The interview guide (See Box D.2 at the end of this appendix) was designed to 
answer questions about the rationale of the policy towards vendors/informal workers, the 
arguments justifying recent interventions and cases, the institutional support they receive 
and the role they assign to private enterprises or organizations, the differences in 
perspectives from past administrations, and if applicable the strategies used to negotiate 
or work with organized and unorganized vendors. Interviews lasted from a half to two 
hours, depending on the interest and time availability of the public officials. The 
interview followed an official tone, in which the public official was asked to inform and 
explain the rationale of their interventions. However, in cases in which I knew the public 
official more closely from prior research –in which case the public officials got 
interviewed twice– conversations took a more personal tone, narrating more intimately 
their personal opinions and experiences. Almost all the interviewees, due to their position 
of heads or sub-heads of their respective offices had many years of experience working in 
the specific sector of regulation. In the case of Lima, many have worked in other local 
offices in other districts which helped to compare the differences in resources of planning 
and policymaking. In the case of Bogotá, public officials stayed in most of the cases 
along different mayor terms and the ‘recent’ ones had many years of participants in the 
political party of the current mayor.  
Each interview was recorded when permitted. Public officials asked not to 
disclose their names. Then, specific quotes of the interviews only point out the 
municipality or institution, they belong. All recorded interviews were transcribed and 
coded in NViVo8 using a grounded theoretical approach. At the first stages, I used open 
coding. Then, I organized the codes in the four thematic areas, selecting only the cases of 
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local and metropolitan public officials working with vendors to analyze the patterns 
found in the rationales manifested.  
One limitation of the interview strategy was that public officials were not 
observed at work, and most of their testimonies may indeed reflect more their normative 
opinions as they may have felt prompted to ‘defend’ their point of view. However, this 
same limitation benefits the research as the interviewee tries as much to show their role 




City Public Officials Key Informants 
Local Metropolitan National Unions/NGOs Private 
Enterprise 
Organizations 
Lima 1 San Juan de Miraflores 
1 San Juan de 
Lurigancho 
1 Villa María del Triunfo 
1 Villa El Salvador 
1 El Agustino 
1 Santa Anita 
1 Miraflores 
1 Rímac 
1 La Victoria 
2 Comas 
2 Independencia 
1 Los Olivos 
1 Instituto Metropolitano 
de Planificación † 





1 Licensing and 
Formalization Program 
 
1 Ministry of Labor. 
MiEmpresa† 
1 COFOPRI-Comisión 
para la formalización de 
la propiedad informal † 
1 Ministerio de la 
Producción † 




para la Defensa del 














Subtotal 14 4 6 3 1 
Bogotá 1 Chapinero 
1 Antonio Nariño 
1 Barrios Unidos* 
2 Bosa (IPES) 
1 Candelaria 
1 Ciudad Bolívar (IPES) 
1 Fontibón 
1 Los Mártires 
1 Puente Aranda 
2 Rafael Uribe (IPES) 
1 San Cristóbal 





2 Secretaria de 
Desarrollo Económico† 
1 Planeación Distrital† 
1 Defensoría del 
Espacio Público 
1 Movilidad† 
2 IPES (Director & 
REDEP) 
1 Metrovivienda† 
2 Ministry of Social 
Protection † 
1 DIAN † 
1 Central Bosa 
(Street vendor) 
1 CUT (Street 
vendor 
representative) 









1 ANDI (large 
enterprises) † 
Subtotal 19 7 4 2 4 
Total 33 11 10 5 5 
* Unrecorded 
†No direct relationship with street vendors. 56 
  
                                                 
56 INDECOPI and DIAN carry operations though for smuggling, on sites of relocated street vendors who 




Apuntar aparte pero 
no grabar 
• Fecha:  
• Lugar de la entrevista:  
• Institución u oficina a la que representa:  
• Cargo: 
• Tiempo en este cargo: 
• Experiencia en el tema que sea relevante a la investigación  
Perspectivas acerca 
del sector informal y 
el uso del espacio 
urbano 
1. ¿Cómo conciben a la economía informal desde la institución a la que representa? 
2. ¿Cuál es el análisis o las causalidades que encuentran para explicar la economía 
informal? 
3. ¿Es esta perspectiva la misma que hace 20 años? ¿Cuál es la diferencia? ¿Si 
cambió, a qué se debió la necesidad de re-evaluarla? 
4. [ PARA LOCALIDADES/DISTRITOS O INSTITUCIONES DIRECTAMENTE 
VINVULADAS AL ESPACIO PUBLICO ¿Cómo evalúa el uso del espacio público que 
efectúan los vendedores ambulantes? ¿cómo debería ser manejado este espacio 
público?] 




metas, logros y 
fracasos. 
5. ¿Cómo su institución se relaciona con los vendedores ambulantes? Probar: Describe 
los programas de su institución que están dirigidos al sector informal, precisar metas, 
logros y limitaciones en su implementación  
6. ¿A qué tipo de vendedores ambulantes están dirigidos estos programas? 
7. ¿Cuáles son las razones de los éxitos y de los fracasos de la política de intervenci’on 
a los vendedores ambulantes? Probar: ¿cuáles son los beneficios que trae esta 
política para el vendedor? 
8. ¿Con qué información cuentan para tomar decisiones acerca de sus intervenciones 
con respecto a los vendedores? 
9. Preguntas acerca decontradicciones ‘obvias’: (ejemplos:si dan licencias, ¿son 
conscientes que los costos de acceso a estos procesos también pueden promover 
más informalidad?¿sí se lo han planteado, qué reformulaciones han hecho al 
respecto? O en caso dan beneficios promocionales, ¿están estos beneficios ligados 
al acceso o la promoción de alguna forma de regulación? ¿porquésí o porqué no?) 
10. ¿Estaban éstos programas disponibles hace 20 años? ¿por qué algunos están 
todavía vigentes o por qué se desactualizaron otros? ¿ha existido alguna re-




actuales y pasadas, 
racionalidad para la 
focalización territorial 
11. ¿Involucran los programas actuales intervenciones locales ya sea para promover o 
supervisar los resultados de estas políticas? 
12. Si es así, ¿cuál es la racionalidad detrás de esas intervenciones locales? Probar: 
¿por qué priorizaron ese/esos lugares en particular? ¿cuáles fueron los resultados de 
esa intervención? ¿qué mecanismos utilizaron para garantizar esos resultados? ¿Si 
fracasaron, cuáles son las razones por las que no resultó la política tal como 
planeada?  
13. ¿cómo se convoca o se difunde la política? ¿hay una evaluación de las estrategias 
de convocatoria?  
14. ¿Los programas que existían anteriormente involucraban alguna intervención 
localizada? ¿En ese momento, cuáles fueron los resultados de esas políticas? ¿qué 
razones y mecanismos hubieron detrás de los éxitos y fracasos de esas 
intervenciones? ¿los criterios para priorizar los lugares de intervención cambiaron 
desde aquella época? ¿porquésí o porqué no?  
Alianzas/ 
discrepancias con 
otras políticas de 
15. Para la implementación de sus programas, ¿contaron con otros aliados 
institucionales? ¿realizaronaccionesconjuntas?  
16. Si fue así, ¿con cuáles organizaciones? ¿Cómo el trabajo o perspectiva de esta 
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otras instituciones y 
empresa privada 
institución con el sector informal es compatible con su institución? 
17. ¿Cómo se trabaja con la empresa privada en su localidad? ¿hay algún interés directo 
de las empresas privadas u organizaciones del sector privada en participar de algún 




18. En la implementación de los programas, ¿cómo se trabaja con las organizaciones de 
vendedores ambulantes? 
19. ¿Qué problemas y limitaciones encuentra en el trabajo con estas organizaciones? 
20. ¿por qué cree que es necesario o innecesario involucrarlas? 
21. ¿Cuáles son los avances que han alcanzado en su relación con este sector? 
Preguntas adicionales para clarificar puntos de vista o intervenciones. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX E STREET VENDORS’ QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
As explained in the first chapter, one of the theoretical guidelines in this study 
consists of understanding that street vending is intrinsically a place making economic 
activity in which access to space determines many individual choices as well as collective 
strategies. Thus, we may expect a different set of tactics or rationales shaping those 
working within divergent neighborhood contexts in terms of their exposure to 
commercial gentrification and/or control policies. For the purpose of documenting those 
differences, the general selection criteria for individual interviews were based initially on 
a general descriptive analysis of neighborhood characteristics with different 
socioeconomic composition and exposure to large businesses and chains.A total of 36 
interviews, 23 in Lima and 13 in Bogotá, were conducted during June-August 2008 and 
May-September 2009 within a four neighborhood typology in each city which consisted 
in (1) the gentrified, (2) the consolidated, (3) the strategic and (4) the emergent 
neighborhood. Each category was created from a dataset of neighborhoods in each city, 
giving preference to those of informal origin. In Lima and Bogotá, the gentrified category 
includes informal origin neighborhoods in which housing units are highly consolidated57 
or alternatively for Bogotá, are no longer in strata 1 or 2 and have 30% or more formal 
enterprises among their economic units. The consolidated category includes 
neighborhoods with full coverage of basic services,but an important proportion of strata 1 
and 2 households in Bogotá or non-adequately built houses58 in Lima and less, than 30% 
of formal enterprises among their economic units. The strategic category is similar to the 
consolidated category but it is within a 2 km distance of large retailers, within this 
                                                 
57 For Lima, highly consolidated neighborhood has more than 90% of the housing units with access to all 
basic services and built from adequate construction materials (brick and cement house).  
58 50% or less of the houses are built from brick and cement. 
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category I included some public housing projects in Bogotá whose transportation lines 
usually connect residents with supermarkets or large malls. 59 The emergent includes 
those neighborhoods with low coverage of basic services, no presence of formal 
enterprises and in which all households are categorized in strata 1 or strata 2 in Bogotá.  
The account in Lima is based on medium and small street markets that serve 
mainly a local clientele. Large and popular agglomerations at the time of the study were 
undergoing massive evictions and were difficult to interview. Despite these limitations, 
the account shows how policies that initially targeted these large and perceived as 
problematic areas have spread through the city. Moreover, as peddlers in Bogotá tend to 
be more oriented to places with large pedestrian flows, few cases of vendors were 
identified in the consolidated and emergent neighborhoods in this city. 
I focused on obtaining as many testimonies from different neighborhood 
geographies as were possible. These neighborhoods are located in the South, North, 
East/West and Downtown. As described in Table E.1,some types of experiences 
identified belong to the patterns observed in my spatial analysis such as : (1) The Blue 
zones, where control operations and supermarket competition seem to be affecting 
vendors, (2) The Red Zones, where supermarket competition does not show a negative 
effect on vendors but rather control operations are the driving force keeping the number 
of vendors controlled (as in the North of Lima or some specific neighborhoods within the 
South of Bogotá) and (3) the unmapped zones, where no significant effect was found for 
either supermarket competition or control operations. Note, however, that in the case of 
Lima, unmapped zones are not out of the radar of the state. In most of the testimonies that 
                                                 
59Note that I wasn´t able to get a recorded interview but I collected field notes on my informal talks with 
some two vendors in those zones. 
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I will describe in detail, I found that the majority corresponded to blue zones but where 
the effects of eviction were prior to that of the time frame in the model. 
Table E.1 Number of Interviews by Neighborhood Typology and Spatial Analysis 
Patterns Identified 
Type/Pattern Blue Zone Red Zone Unmapped Total 
Lima Bogotá Lima Bogotá Lima Bogotá Lima Bogotá 
Gentrified 2 7 1  1  4 7 
Consolidated 3    4 1 7 1 
Strategic  4   2 2  6 2 
Emergent 2 1 1 2 3  6 3 
Total 11 8 2 4 10 1 23 13 
Approval for human subjects was obtained on May 2008. I visited the sites for 
over two weeks, took pictures and had informal talks to identify potential interviewees 
for recorded interviews. Each interviewee was given a consent letter and fully informed 
on the objectives of research and management of sensitive information. The approval of 
human research subjects required me to keep interviewees and neighborhood names 
confidential.Therefore, except for the name of localities or districts, all names of 
neighborhoods and interviewees have been changed to comply with confidentiality. 
In each neighborhood, one or two vendors were selected, using snowball 
sampling, for a 30 minute to 1 hour recorded interview. One of the main objectives with 
the interview was to explore how the evolving socioeconomic composition, state policies 
and the installation of supermarket chains, have altered or shaped their informal or–may 
be no longer fully informal– ways to do business in the area. The interview guide 
followed each vendor’s personal history, with policy interventions, personal regulation 
decisions, and other meaningful events taking place in their neighborhood and workplace 
(For more details see Interview Guides at the end of this methodological appendix). 
Differences by gender and product were not established by a fixed quota and depended 
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on the neighborhood selected. Preference was given to the most experienced vendors who 
could give more in depth and broad information of his/ her experiences within the 
evolution of the neighborhood.  
The characteristics of the interviewees who allowed to be recorded are 
summarized in Table E.2 (See full list of interviewees in Box E.1 at the end of this 
methodological appendix). In both cities, most of the vendors were female, migrant and 
middle aged with slight differences between cities e.g. more city-born vendors were 
found in Lima. In terms of schooling, most interviewed vendors have some secondary 
education in contrast with Bogotá in which almost a half has either no or only primary 
education. While most of the cases correspond to married vendors within nuclear 
families, there were a few more cases in Bogotá of single parents with more than 2 
dependents. Also as expected due to their permanent peddling characteristic, most cases 
of vendors in Bogotá sold the pedestrian oriented products such candy, cigarettes and 
chopped fruits. In contrast to Lima, where vendors have been residents for larger periods 
of time and decided to work within their neighborhood after some years, in Bogotá our 
cases show that they have worked a bit longer in the area before moving in. This could be 
explained by the fact that almost all vendors interviewed in this city were renters rather 
than home-owners as in Lima making for them easier to change places of residence to be 
closer to places to work. Nonetheless, this situation achieved by seniority in the area 
could be an outlier in the larger trend identified in this city (See Chapter 3), where 
vendors in general tend to be far from places of work. Finally, as showed in the table, half 
of vendors in Bogotá describe their economic situation in their businesses as ‘regular’ 
while vendors in Lima are more equally distributed in the ‘poor’, ‘regular’ and ‘good’ 
categories. 
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Table E.2 Characteristics of Recorded Interviewees in Lima and Bogotá 
Variables Categories Lima Bogotá 
Gender Female 73.9 63.6 
Male 26.1 36.4 
Migrant Status Migrant 60.9 72.7 
Non Migrant 39.1 27.3 
Age Mean 51.09 47.18 
> 60 21.5 18.2 
Schooling None 0 9.1 
Primary 26.1 36.4 
Secondary 65.2 36.4 
Some College 8.7 18.2 
Marital Status Single 4.3 9.1 
Single parent 4.3 18.2 
Married/common law 82.6 72.7 
Widowed 8.7 0 
Family type Alone/couple 4.3 9.1 
Monoparental 13.0 36.4 
Nuclear 69.6 54.5 
Extended 13.0 0 
Number of Dependents Mean 2.4 2.6 
> 2 34.7 45.5 
Products sold Candies, cigarrettes, chopped 
fruits 
4.3 54.6 
Vegetables & whole fruits 17.3 36.4 
Prepared food 26.1 0 
Spices & herbs 8.7 9.1 
Fish 8.7 0 
Groceries 17.4 0 
Clothing, plastic products 17.3 0 
Years working as street vendor Mean 21.61 17.91 
> 10 60.9 54.6 
Years as neighbor within market zone Mean 23.0 10.91 
> 10 78.3 36.4 
Years working in neighborhood Mean 15.7 12.82 
> 10 60.9 54.6 
Economic Situation in business Poor 30.4 36.4 
Regular 34.8 54.5 
Good 34.8 9.1 
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The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using InVivo8. Initially, all 
interviews were open coded. Then, open codes were categorized within specific themes, 
proposed in the interview guide, such as access to space, the conditions that facilitate that 
access, strategies to maintain the business, changes in the neighborhood economies and 
responses to control policies. An inductive coding served to systematically compare those 
themes taking into account city contexts, neighborhood characteristics and informal 
entrepreneurs’ type of appropriation of urban space. Other sources of information 
complementing the interviews were based on a field notebook in which I documented my 
early thoughts, notes from the interviews I conducted as well as the description of some 











Independencia B Unmapped   No transition 
2. Kallpa Hilario, 
Josefina 
SJL A Blue control and supermarket 
decrease vendors 
post eviction 
3. Chincheros Jacoba SJM A Unmapped very close to blue zone   
4. Los Jardines Luisa Rimac B Blue both police and supermarket 
decreases vendors 
  
5. Amancaes Elsa Los Olivos A Red police decreases vendors 
but supermarkets have a 
positive effect 
post eviction 
6. Nueva Era Cristina, 
Ivonne 
Comas B Blue only police post eviction 
7. Pulcha Irene, 
Victoria 
Ate A Unmapped     
8. Los Altos Laura Chorrillos B Blue Only SP decreases vendors   
9. Loma Linda Jorge, Leila El Agustino C Blue control and supermarket 
decrease vendors 
  
10. Gamarra Tania, 
Teodosio 
Rimac C Unmapped     
11. San Paul Celmira Cercado D Blue only police, supermarket has 
no effect 
  
12. San Dámaso Rosa SMP D Red police decreases vendors 
but supermarkets have a 
positive effect 
  
13. Unión Joaquin Ate C Unmapped   post eviction 
14.San Benito Fiorella Ate C Unmapped     
15. Vivanco Miriam Carabayllo C Blue only police   
16. Tahuantinsuyo Fabián Comas D Blue only police   








1. Labrador Maria Ciudad Bolivar B Red 
Supermarkets increasing 
effect, control operations 
decreasing effect None 
2.Los Andes 
Romulo, 
Ramon Ciudad Bolivar A Red 
Supermarkets increasing 
effect, control operations 
decreasing effect None 
3.Quito 
Rosalia 
(relocated) Engativa D Blue 
Supermarkets and control 
operations have a decreasing 





4.Santa Cruz Clarissa San Cristobal C Unmapped 
No effect for supermarkets or 
control operations (Marcelino 





5.Acapulco Estela Santa Fe D Blue 
No effect for supermarkets, 






6. Pola Ana Chapinero D Blue 
No effect for supermarkets, 






7. Lagunitas Angela Suba D Blue 
Supermarkets and control 
operations have a decreasing 
effect None 
8.San Felipe Mayda Suba D Blue 
Supermarkets and control 










9. Cañada Pablo Usaquen D Blue 
Supermarkets and control 





10.Tayrona Sara Suba A Blue 
Supermarkets and control 






11. La Plaza 
Gabriela 
(relocated) Candelaria D Blue 
No effect for supermarkets, 









(relocated) Bosa B Red 
Supermarkets increasing 
effect, control operations 
decreasing effect None 
N.A 
Nelson 









Urbanización/AAHH Nombre:  
Información demográfica:(Edad, sexo, educación, situación económica, composición de su hogar)  
Descripción de ocupación 
Trayectoria residencial  ¿Es residente de este sector? Si es así, ¿cómo llegó aquí? 
¿Así también llegaron sus vecinos? ¿Cuál es el origen de su barrio? ¿qué tipo de personas viven aquí? (Me 
refiero si es de una asociación de empleados, paisanos, etc) 
Enfatizar: Recuperar fechas es decir años ver de dónde vinieron de qué parte de Limao provincia. Ojo también 
ver la modalidad de ocupación, si fue invasión, si el actor participó en ella etc. 
Inicios ¿Por qué empezó a [hacer su negocio] aquí? (Verificar si vio la oportunidad en el barrio, o simplemente era que 
no podría haber elegido otro lugar) 
¿por qué en ese momento en particular?(Complementar: ¿cómo estaba su situación personal y familiar en ese 
momento? ¿en qué estaba la construcción de su casa? ¿cómo estaba el barrio en ese entonces? ) 
¿Tenía algún antecedente trabajando así? 
¿Había otros negocios en ese momento? ¿cuáles? ¿eran iguales al suyo? 
¿Cómo eligió su rubro de trabajo? ¿cómo evalúo que funcionaría? ¿Cuándo estaba empezando cambió alguna 
vez de rubro? ¿por qué? 
¿Necesitó algún permiso en ese momento para empezar su negocio? (narrar cómo se enteró de los trámites 
que tenía que hacer). 





Desde ese entonces, ¿podría contarme los hechos más saltantes de su historia como emprendedor en este 
barrio? 
(DEJAR ABIERTO AL CRITERIO DEL ENTREVISTADO PUEDE QUE CON ESTO YA CUENTE VARIAS 
PREGUNTAS LISTADAS DEBAJO, EN ESE CASO SOLO COMPLEMENTAR SI HAY ALGUNA HISTORIA 




 Por ejemplo, podría contarme¿Cuándo se abrieron los primeros negocios/ cuándo llegaron los primeros 
vendedores?  
¿llegaron más ambulantes? ¿de dónde venían estas personas? ¿quiénes eran? ¿mujeres, hombres, los que 
tenían más dinero, etc.? ¿vecinos?) 
¿Cuándo surgieron negocios de otras personas que no viven en el barrio pero alquilan partes de casas? ¿en 
qué zona de su barrio? ¿desde cuándo? 
¿Algunos negocios han sido cerrados porque los vecinos no quisieron que se instalen esos rubros en su barrio? 
(por ejm. un bar, ambulantes, etc). ¿podría narrarme esa historia?  
¿Desde cuando abrieron negocios de su mismo rubro? ¿cómo maneja su competencia desde entonces? (a 
varios niveles: pequeños comerciantes, los mismos de su galería, etc.) 
Valoración de la 
evolución de los 
negocios 
¿Cree que su negocio ha progresado en comparación con sus inicios? ¿cuándo fueron sus mejores épocas? ¿y 
las peores? ¿de qué dependió?  
¿Anteriormente tuvo algún otro tipo de negocio en este barrio? ¿por qué cambió o cerró? 
Enfatizar: fecha de cuando se formalizó, quebró o cerró, etc. 
¿Cómo crecieron los negocios aquí? (Complementar: ¿crecieron cuando se instaló una tienda más grande? 
¿crecieron porque el barrio creció? ¿las viviendas mejoraron en ese entonces?) 
Detectar otros personajes y/o factoresimportantes 
Influencia de grandes 
cadenas y otros 
negocios formales 
¿alguna vez una tienda de cadena se abrió en el barrio o cerca de su barrio? ¿cuándo fue? ¿Cómo estaba el 
barrio en ese entonces? ¿Estaban en una mejor situación económica sus vecinos? 
¿Cómo la apertura de esta tienda afectó su negocio? (Complementar: ¿menos ganancias, más presión para 
formalizarse?, etc.) 
Mercado local ¿Cómo es trabajar aquí?¿tiene otro negocio en otro sitio? Si pudiera elegir, ¿dónde iría a establecer su 
negocio? 
¿Hay rubros o negocios que serían más rentables en su zona? ¿cuáles y cuáles no y por qué? 
¿Cree que su barrio puede ser atractivo para otros negocios más grandes? ¿cuáles? ¿cómo ve la posibilidad 
que se instale un mega mercado u otro establecimiento de su competencia? 






¿tiene licencia o paga sisa?  
¿Cómo accede al espacio en donde trabaja? 
¿Tiene seguro social? ¿Cuándo lo sacó y por qué en ese momento? Si no es así, ¿cuál es la razón?  
 ¿tiene empleados? ¿lo registró en planillas? ¿Cuándo lo sacó y por qué en ese momento? Si no es así, ¿cuál 
es la razón? Si no es así, ¿cuál es la razón? 
Para su tipo de negocio, ¿cuáles son los beneficios y/o desventajas de acceder a este tipo de permisos o 
regulaciones?  
¿Cree que en un futuro se formalizará? ¿por qué? ¿alguna vez lo hizo o estuvo en proyecto de hacerlo? Si es 
así, ¿qué acción tomó como resultado? Si no esasí, ¿por que no?  
¿Sabe si alguno de sus vecinos lo ha hecho? ¿les resultó bien a ellos? ¿por qué? 
¿alguna vez multaron/cerraron o desalojaron a algunos de sus compañeros por ser ambulantes? ¿ qué 
acciones se tomaron al respecto?  
Si nunca ha pasado, ¿por qué cree que no? (Ejm. ¿No hacen inspecciones en su barrio por su situación 
económica o por qué los vecinos saben cómo evitarlas?) 
Seguridad y vigilancia 
de la zona 
¿A lo largo de su historia, en el barrio existieron algunas intervenciones para los negocios informales?(batidas 
para licencias, SUNAT, desalojos, inspecciones laborales, inspecciones del INDECOPI, etc). ¿Cuándo pasó? 
¿Vinieron los medios? ¿lograron multar o cerrar negocios?  
Cuando este tipo de intervenciones pasaron, ¿cómo reaccionaron la gente que hacía negocios en la zona?  
A parte de estas intervenciones, ¿la policía u otra autoridad suele supervisar el barrio con frecuencia? ¿la 
policía interviene en estas inspecciones? ¿es beneficioso para usted que intervenga? 
Proceso de 
agremiación 
¿Participa en alguna organización relacionada con su actividad económico? ¿De qué manera su participación lo 
beneficia? ¿Qué problemas le ayuda a resolver? 






Información general  




Barrio donde vende:  
Barrio de residencia:  
Información demográfica:(Edad, sexo, educación, situación económica, composición de su hogar)  
Descripción de ocupación 
Años como ambulante 
Años trabajando en el barrio 
Trayectoria 
residencial  
¿Vive cerca de este lugar donde trabaja? Si no es así ¿cómo llegó aquí? (con esta pregunta queremos saber si 
cómo se informó que en este lugar había posibilidad de trabajar) 
¿Así también llegaron los otros ambulantes? ¿Cuál es su relación con estos colegas? (tal vez son vecinos de su 
barrio u amigos de otros lados, etc). 
¿Qué tipo de personas trabajan aquí–además de sus colegas ambulantes? (esto sirve para describir la 
percepción de la gente de su entorno) 
Inicios ¿Por qué empezó a [hacer su negocio] aquí? (Verificar si vio la oportunidad en el barrio, o simplemente era que 
no podría haber elegido otro lugar) 
¿por qué en ese momento en particular?(Complementar: ¿cómo estaba su situación personal y familiar en ese 
momento? ¿en qué estaba la construcción de su casa? ¿cómo estaba el barrio en ese entonces? ) 
¿Tenía algún antecedente trabajando así? 
Sí ha trabajado en otros sitios ¿por qué salió de esos lugares? ¿En comparación con este lugar cómo eran los 
lugares anteriores donde trabajó? (Recuperar: fechas) 
¿Cuándo llegó aquí había otros negocios en ese momento? ¿cuáles?  
¿Cómo eligió su tipo de negocio (es decir el producto que vende) ? ¿cómo evalúo que funcionaría? ¿Cuándo 
estaba empezando cambió alguna vez de negocio? ¿por qué? 
¿Cómo se comenzó a abastecer de sus productos? ¿vienen a su sitio? ¿sale a comprar?  
¿Necesitó algún permiso en ese momento para empezar su negocio? (narrar cómo se enteró de los trámites que 
tenía que hacer).  
Cuando llegó aquí ¿habían otros ambulantes vendiendo lo mismo que usted?, ¿cómo lidió con la competencia? 
¿Hubo oposición de los vecinos cuando abrió su negocio? ¿y de los negocios? ¿y de los otros ambulantes? 









Desde ese entonces, ¿podría contarme los hechos más saltantes de su historia como vendedor en este barrio? 
(DEJAR ABIERTO AL CRITERIO DEL ENTREVISTADO PUEDE QUE CON ESTO YA CUENTE VARIAS 
PREGUNTAS LISTADAS DEBAJO, EN ESE CASO SOLO COMPLEMENTAR SI HAY ALGUNA HISTORIA MÁS 
QUE CONTAR) 
¿fue desalojado alguna vez? ¿lo fueron alguno de sus compañeros? Podría narrarme cómo fueron esos casos 
¿De qué depende que un ambulante se quede vendiendo aquí? 
Y en relación a este barrio donde trabaja, podría contarme¿Sabe cuándo se abrieron los primeros negocios/ 
cuándo llegaron los primeros vendedores? ¿qué vendían? ¿cómo cambió su zona desde entonces? 
¿Hubo algún tipo de cambio que favoreció que la zona se hiciera comercial? (Se instaló un colegio, el 
Transmilenio, hubieron servicios, etc). 
¿Desde cuando vinieron negocios/locales que venden su mismo producto? ¿cómo maneja su competencia 
desde entonces? (a varios niveles: pequeños comerciantes, los mismos de su galería, etc.) 
¿ Desde cuando vinieron ambulantes? ¿de dónde venían estas personas? ¿quiénes eran? ¿mujeres, hombres, 
los que tenían más dinero, etc.? ¿vecinos? 
Desde entonces esos ambulantes permanecieron, ¿los desalojaron? ¿cómo ha sido el negocio desde que se 
instalaron?/ ¿se fueron? ¿o por qué cree que no se instalaron nunca aquí? 
¿Cuándo surgieron negocios de otras personas que no viven en el barrio pero alquilan partes de casas? ¿en qué 
zona de su barrio? ¿desde cuándo? 
¿cómo esto afectó su negocio?/ SI NO, ¿o por qué cree que no se instalaron nunca aquí? 
¿Algunos negocios han sido cerrados porque los vecinos no quisieron que se instalen esos rubros en su barrio? 
(por ejm. un bar, ambulantes, etc). ¿podría narrarme esa historia?  
Valoración de la 
evolución de los 
negocios 
¿Cree que su negocio ha progresado en comparación con sus inicios? 
 ¿Cuando crecieron- es decir fueron más rentables- los negocios aquí y por qué? Detectar otros personajes y/o 
factoresimportantes 
¿cuándo fueron sus mejores épocas? ¿y las peores? ¿de qué dependió?  
¿Sus mejores épocas eran también las mejores de sus otros negocios vecinos? Y viceversa, sus peores lo eran 
así también? 
Según lo que sabe de sus negocios vecinos, ¿cuándo a ellos les fue mejor en general? ¿a quiénes ahora les va 
mejor? ¿por qué? 
Según lo que sabe de sus negocios vecinos, ¿cuándo a ellos les fue peor en general? ¿a quiénes ahora les va 




Influencia de grandes 
cadenas y otros 
negocios formales 
¿alguna vez una tienda de cadena se abrió en el barrio o cerca de su barrio? ¿cuándo fue? ¿Cómo estaba el 
barrio en ese entonces? ¿Estaban en una mejor situación económica sus vecinos? 
¿Cómo la apertura de esta tienda afectó su negocio? (Complementar: ¿menos ganancias, más presión para 
formalizarse, más persecución o vigilancia?, etc.) 
Mercado local ¿Cómo es trabajar aquí?¿tiene otro negocio en otro sitio? Si pudiera elegir, ¿dónde iría a establecer su negocio? 
¿Hay rubros o negocios que serían más rentables en su zona? ¿cuáles y cuáles no y por qué? 
¿Cómo es un día normal de trabajo? ¿cómo son sus compañeros? (¿son ambulantes independientes o trabajan 
para otros?) 
¿Cree que su barrio puede ser atractivo para otros negocios más grandes? ¿cuáles? ¿cómo ve la posibilidad 
que se instale un mega mercado u otro establecimiento de su competencia? 
¿Cree que sus vecinos se opondrían? ¿se opondría usted? 
Proceso de 
formalización 
Sabe si su actividad cumple con las regulaciones de zonificación vigentes ¿es zona transitoria o área reservada? 
(Para Bogotá)/ 
¿Qué opinión tiene de este tipo de regulaciones? ¿es beneficioso? 
¿tiene su negocio registro mercantil? ¿Cuándo lo sacó y por qué en ese momento? Si no es así, ¿cuál es la 
razón? (SI BIEN NO ES UNA PREGUNTA PARA AMBULANTES, RESULTA QUE EN OTRAS ENTREVISTAS 
SI LO TIENEN) 
¿Tiene seguro social? ¿Cuándo lo sacó y por qué en ese momento? Si no es así, ¿cuál es la razón?  
Para su tipo de negocio, ¿cuáles son los beneficios y/o desventajas de acceder a este tipo de permisos o 
regulaciones?  
¿Cree que en un futuro se afiliará a cualquiera de las opciones que provee el distrito? ¿por qué?  
¿alguna vez lo multaron/cerraron o desalojaron? ¿Cómo fue su experiencia? 
¿y algunos de sus compañeros? ¿quién era, qué vendía? ¿sabe por qué lo hicieron?¿qué acción tomó su vecino 
como resultado?(esto incluye desalojos a ambulantes, inspecciones de la DIAN, inspecciones laborales, 
inspecciones de otras institucionescomo la localidad, etc).  
Cuando este tipo de intervenciones pasaron, ¿cómo reaccionaron la gente que hacía negocios en la zona?  
Si nunca ha pasado, ¿por qué cree que no? (Ejm. ¿No hacen inspecciones en su barrio por su situación 




Difusión de políticas 
promocionales 
Por otro lado, ¿han venido algunas instituciones a su lugar de trabajo para difundir políticas que sean 
beneficiosas para su actividad económica, tales como por ejemplo capacitaciones, créditos, etc.? ¿qué 
instituciones han venido? ¿con qué frecuencia? ¿desde cuándo ha visto su presencia aquí? 
Si no vienen, ¿cómo usted se entera de estos programas?¿por sus vecinos que hacen negocio también? 
¿ha participado en algunos de estos programas? ¿cómo fue su experiencia? ¿cómo ha beneficiado esto su 
negocio? 
¿ha participado de otro tipo de programas ofrecidos por la alcaldía que de alguna manera hayan impactado en 
su actividad económica (como por ejemplo, aquellos que tienen que ver con la prevención de trabajo infantil, 
etc)? ¿cómo fue esa experiencia? Si no ha participado, ¿por qué no? 
Seguridad y 
vigilancia de la zona 
A parte de estas intervenciones, ¿la policía u otra autoridad suele supervisar el barrio con frecuencia? ¿la policía 
interviene en estas inspecciones? ¿es beneficioso para usted que intervenga? 
Proceso de 
agremiación 
¿Participa en alguna organización relacionada con su actividad económico? ¿De qué manera su participación lo 
beneficia? ¿Qué problemas le ayuda a resolver? 
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